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Abstract 
For many, the English criminal justice system is considered to be among the best in the world. An 
important feature of the system’s success is thought to be the jury trial whereby in the most serious 
of cases, use of ordinary citizens to determine guilt is thought to make for fairer verdict outcomes. 
Yet despite being a more democratic process, questionable verdicts and low conviction rates for 
crimes such as rape have led many to question how impartial lay jurors are likely to be and to what 
extent preconceived biases may in fact be influencing verdict decisions. The overarching aim of 
the current thesis was thereby to examine the relationship between personal characteristics and 
juror decisions. Specifically, the role of psychopathic personality traits, rape attitudes, and juror 
demographics upon individual decision formation were examined. Another aim was to develop 
and validate a self-report measure of individual juror decision making, directly integrating 
theoretical features of the dominant model of jury decision making into an empirically testable 
scale. Tested separately between two independent samples within Experiment one, an opportunity 
sample of 324 university students comprised within 27 separate jury panels observed a videotaped 
mock rape trial before making individual and collective decisions. Within Experiment two, a 
systematic randomly selected sample of 100 community participants comprised within nine 
separate jury panels observed a live rape trial re-enactment before making individual and collective 
decisions. All participants completed demographic, attitudinal, and psychological self-report 
measures before the onset of the trial including; the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale (PPTS), 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA), and the Juror Decision Scale 
(JDS). Results displayed evidence of a discernible relationship between juror’s psycho-social 
make-up and the verdict decisions made during trial. Latent profile analyses revealed psychopathic 
personality traits were significantly associated with verdict preferences in the community sample 
and regression analyses displayed elevated rape attitude scores were consistent predictors of Not 
Guilty verdict decisions across both samples, pre and post-deliberation. Confirmatory factorial 
techniques displayed a bifactor model with three meaningful factors while controlling for the 
general factor was the best representation of the JDS data, with the three subscales evidencing 
differential predictive validity with external variables. Finally, path analyses revealed the structure 
of the relationship between all variables and verdict decisions, providing further evidence for the 
role of juror characteristics. These findings strongly support the assertion that within rape trials, 
juror decisions are directly related with the attitudes and psychological constructs jurors bring to 
trial. Evidence that a juror’s psycho-social make-up affects their interpretation of the evidence and 
ultimately predisposes them towards particular verdict decisions, gives rise to the possibility of 
needing to screen biased individuals out the jury trial process in the future. Whether change occurs 
or not to such historical English jury procedures, what can no longer be simply dismissed, is the 
role of individual juror bias upon trial outcomes within rape.
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Chapter 1: Background Introduction 
ABSTRACT  
 Criminal justice systems throughout the world have long considered jury trials to be an 
essential feature of a fair and just due process. Grounded in the premise that involvement of lay 
decision makers provides an important safeguard to liberty, use of jurors within legal disputes is 
widely attributed as defending against overbearing state control and thereby considered to 
represent the cornerstone of a demographic society (Conrad, 2013). Today, jury trials continue to 
be both valued and criticised for their involvement of lay persons within legal proceedings, but 
nonetheless remain in over forty countries throughout the world (Kaplan & Martin, 2013; Vidmar, 
2002). Despite this, the scientific study of this style of justice remains notoriously difficult to test, 
with legal restrictions often preventing researchers from gaining access to the jury room and jurors 
themselves. Specifically, within England and Wales, various legislation prohibits jurors from 
disclosing any aspect of their deliberations, a restriction which many believe to have hindered 
research surrounding the efficacy and fairness of jury decisions (Darbyshire, Maughan, & Stewart, 
2002; Zander, 2005). Whilst the social sciences have developed a number of alternative ways in 
which jury decision making can be assessed, the need for further, more ecologically representative 
empirical research remains apparent. In this chapter you will be introduced more thoroughly to the 
ideology underpinning jury trials, specifically within England and Wales (hereafter referred to as 
England for ease) and introduced to the objectives of the present research, which sought to examine 
the extent to which psychological constructs, attitudes, and inherent juror biases can impact the 
verdict decisions made during trial – in particular, within rape trials.  
1.1 THE JURY TRIAL 
 Steeped in tradition and historical significance, the use of lay decision makers within legal 
arguments is, for many, integral to the fairness of trial outcomes. For a long time, jury trials have 
been thought to exemplify a democratic society, based on the assertion that “no tyrant could afford 
to leave a subject’s freedom in the hands of twelve of his countrymen” (Devlin, 1956, p. 164). 
Accordingly, jury trials are publicised as a system of delivering justice by which fair and impartial 
decisions are more readily made. As such, verdict decisions are made not by a government 
employed judge but by an accused person’s ‘peers’. Moreover, jurors arguably provide a means 
of restricting the ability of an overbearing state in unfairly determining a citizen’s guilt (Conrad, 
2013). Certainly, support for such a notion from countries that do not make use of the jury trial is 
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not difficult to obtain, with recent high profile cases serving as an apparent example of judicial 
impropriety.  
 In Egypt, a short news broadcast, based upon interviews conducted with members of the 
Muslim brotherhood, an organisation which Egyptian authorities have outlawed (Al-Anani, 2015), 
recently led to the three Western employed journalists involved in the documentary’s production 
being tried and convicted of “broadcasting false news” (Amnesty International, 2015). The charges 
and case had apparent political motivations, with the trial judges determining the journalist’s 
crimes, namely the negative portrayal of the Egyptian government in the media (Amnesty 
International, 2015), to be worthy of three years imprisonment each. All three journalists were 
incarcerated for more than a year until international media attention led to the verdict being 
overturned (Amnesty International, 2015; Willmott & Boduszek, 2016). Similarly, the case of Ali 
Al-Nimr serves as a further example of state influence within judicial decision making. Aged 17, 
Ali Al-Nimr was sentenced to death by judges at his trial in Saudi Arabia. His alleged crime was 
holding a pro-democracy placard at a peaceful protest against government policies – a verdict 
many believed would not have been reached by a ‘jury of his peers’ (Amnesty International, 2016).  
 Central to this perspective is the notion that it is preferable to be tried for a crime by lay, 
non-legally trained members of society that are drawn from, and importantly representative of, the 
same community in which the defendant belongs. Here, jurors are expected to decide guilt based 
solely on the evidence presented, with decisions grounded in a collective lay consensus and are 
therefore largely insulated from any pressure directed from the trial judge (Darbyshire et al., 2002). 
The governing logic for this is thought to be that judges are often far removed from the life and 
experiences of those accused in criminal trials and, in principle, the decisions they make are likely 
to be aligned with views or policies of the state (Finkel, 1995; Vidmar & Hans, 2007). Whilst this 
represents the ideological premise underlying the jury system, throughout the course of this thesis 
you will hear how inherent bias within the jurors themselves may bring into question the core 
principles of trial fairness and impartiality, so heavily relied upon in jury decision making. 
1.1.1 Historical Context and Alternative Systems  
 The earliest form of lay participation in judicial decision making is said to date as far back 
as Athens over 4000 years ago. Here, documented accounts display ordinary citizens drawn by 
lottery from the local population were often involved in deciding the guilt of an accused person 
(McDowell, 1978). With assistance from Norman and Viking conquests, by the end of the 11th 
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century the jury concept had spread in varying forms throughout Europe, with the first documented 
English jury trial taking place in 1220 (Kadri, 2006). Despite often being linked to the charter of 
English liberties – the Magna Carta of 1215 - in fact the notion of ‘no free man being taken or 
imprisoned…except by lawful judgement of his peers’ has since been dispelled as referring to a 
citizen’s right to trial by jury (Darbyshire, 2011). Legal commentators explain ‘freeman’ was, at 
the time, limited to a select few social elite, with jury trials not becoming a routine means of justice 
for the ordinary citizen until around the 18th century (Kadri, 2006; McSweeny, 2014). Historical 
accounts do however suggest the central premise of lay participation in justice was driven by a 
need for greater fairness and independence within those making decisions. A desire to put an end 
to ‘trial by ordeal’ influenced the move to decide legal matters by use of ‘twelve good and true 
men’, who were to base their assessments of the facts upon locally acquired knowledge (Kadri, 
2006, p. 72). However, reports of jurors being fined, starved, and imprisoned, where verdicts did 
not match what the judge felt it should be (Lord Denning, 1982), appears to display impartiality 
and fairness were perhaps more of an ideal than actuality within trials of the time.  
 Today, juries continue to be adopted in some form in more than forty countries throughout 
the world (Kaplan & Martin, 2013). In Europe, countries including France and Germany now 
employ a mixed jury system, where lay jurors work in conjunction with legally trained judges in 
order to agree upon a verdict. This jury model is credited with utilising the best features of both 
approaches. However, criticisms around the extent to which lay jurors may be influenced by the 
opinions of the judge have been raised (Hans, 2008). Alternative models known as expert assessor 
collaborative court models can also be found in countries including Croatia and Thailand, where 
jurors again decide in conjunction with professional judges, but are selected for jury service on the 
basis of their personal expertise where it has relevance to the case or court system, for example, 
teachers and youth workers preside over cases brought against children (Ivković, 2003). Many 
countries including the United States (US), Australia, New Zealand, and Canada inherited the jury 
system from the British Empire during colonisation and have retained its use to this day. As such, 
the all citizen model of jury decision making remains the most commonly used and, despite many 
procedural differences having since been introduced (i.e. variations in jury size; use of grand jury 
indictments; majority vs unanimous requirements), community values surrounding fairness and 
justice remain of central importance cross-culturally in the courtroom. Whilst jury trial procedures 
have clearly changed over time and place, the basic underlying premise has remained the same, in 
that ordinary people coming together from the community in which they collectively represent, is 
perceived as leading to fairer, more legitimate, and impartial verdict decisions being made. 
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1.2 ENGLISH JURY TRIAL 
 The use of juries within English civil cases and coroners’ inquests have drastically declined 
over recent decades, thought to be the result of juror bias leading to “inconsistent and exorbitant 
damage awards” being given (Darbyshire, 2011, p. 544). Despite this, the criminal jury is still seen 
as the gold standard method of prosecuting defendants accused of serious crimes. Public opinion 
polls consistently display high levels of support for trial by jury, with more than 80% of British 
citizens strongly advocating use of the system (Bar Council, 2002; Thomas, 2007). The previous 
Attorney General, whose role was chief legal advisor to the British government, overseeing all 
Crown prosecutions brought in England, recently stated the jury system to be “an essential element 
of the justice system in England…deeply ingrained in our national DNA”. He went on to claim 
that the typical perspective among legal professionals remains that “juries almost always do a 
conscientious job and do it effectively” (Attorney General’s Office, 2013). Despite this, and the 
common misconception that most cases that go to court will be heard before a jury, only around 
1% of English criminal cases are actually decided in this way (Thomas, 2010).  
 Moreover, jury trials only take place when an individual pleads not guilty to a serious crime 
that they have been accused of and, if found guilty, the offence carries a possible prison sentence 
exceeding that which can be given within the Magistrates’ Court (Willmott, Boduszek, & Booth, 
2017). Around 140,000 cases meet this criteria and progress to Crown Court each year and, with 
most defendants pleading guilty, around 30,000 progress to full jury trial (Open Justice, 2016). 
This results in approximately 400,000 jurors being summoned to take part in such trials every year 
(Davies, Croall, & Tyrer, 2010). As stated, whilst this figure amounts to just 1% of all cases 
prosecuted, these trials typically equate to the most serious of all offences brought before the 
courts, often carrying severe punishments. At a minimum cost of £1700 per day of trial, totalling 
hundreds of millions of pounds annually (Johnson, 2010), the need to ensure the efficacy of jury 
trials therefore remains undoubtedly paramount.  
 Procedurally, English jury trials are comprised of twelve, non-legally trained, lay 
individuals, who work together in their role as determiners of the facts to reach a collective verdict 
surrounding the guilt of the accused. This role differs from that of the judge, whose function is 
primarily to ensure the evidence presented at trial is in accordance with the law. Not only is jury 
service considered a fundamental right of English citizens, but in fact a legal requirement, in that 
failure to attend court once summoned can lead to the prospective juror being found in contempt 
of court and prosecuted themselves (Juries Act 1974, s.20). Within criminal trials, individuals are 
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randomly and electronically selected for jury duty from the local register for parliamentary or local 
government elections, and can only be excluded from partaking upon falling outside of the 18–75 
age range or upon having serious mental health issues or criminal convictions (Juries Act 1974, 
s.1; Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s.68). Residency is also a requirement, in that jurors 
must have been living in Britain for a minimum of five years since the age of 13 (Juries Act 1974, 
s.1). Importantly, once summoned and upon arriving at court, jurors are selected for specific trials 
using a ballet system. Here, twelve of fifteen names randomly shortlisted for each trial will be read 
aloud in open court and it is these individuals that will be seated for the case (Juries Act 1974, 
s.11). Notably, whilst efficient, the use random selection in jury trials has become both sacred and 
equally controversial. 
1.2.1 Random Selection and Legislative Restrictions 
 The process of random selection is in itself highly regarded within the English jury system, 
considered to be a necessary component, integral to the fairness of jury decisions. In fact, random 
selection is held in such high esteem that the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for the most part, prohibits 
any questioning or peremptory challenges of jurors at trial (Lloyd-Bostock & Thomas, 1999). In 
comparison to the US, where extensive questioning of prospective jurors takes place pre-trial, 
during what is termed the voir dire process, recent amendments to English law ensures prosecutors 
are only permitted to request a juror ‘stand aside’ in cases involving issues of national security and 
with the Attorney General’s prior authorisation (Attorney General’s Office, 2012). Whilst some 
believe the purpose of random selection is to ensure the representativeness of jurors (McGowan, 
2005), not even the trial judge is able to intervene in the composition of a jury, whether racially 
unrepresentative or otherwise (Zander, 2007). The only circumstances under which a juror may be 
challenged at trial is where obvious prejudice or bias is shown towards the defendant or other 
parties involved (Juries Act 1974, s.12). However, upon considering the procedural construction 
of jury trials, many important problems emerge.  
 Firstly, as jurors are asked to remain silent throughout the duration of a trial and forbidden 
from discussing the case until all evidence has been heard (Zander, 2001), the likelihood or 
opportunity for juror bias to be recognised and reported before deliberations take place is 
substantially reduced. Furthermore, with jurors in England also legally prohibited from disclosing 
any element of their deliberations under the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, it is unlikely that any 
juror prejudice, or explicit bias that emerges during deliberations, will be brought to the attention 
of the court, or exposed externally once the trial has concluded. Clearly, despite the former 
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Attorney General’s assertion being that, “juries almost always do a conscientious job and do it 
effectively” (Attorney General’s Office, 2013), such legal and procedural restrictions mean that 
where prejudice does become apparent, it is arguably unlikely that the justice system would be 
made aware of it. 
 Random selection procedures and the Contempt of Court Act, which prevent jurors from 
disclosing elements of their deliberations or researches from asking about such, have also faced 
criticism elsewhere. Eminent legal scholar Michael Zander (2005) warned the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs Review Committee that permitting research access into the jury decision 
making process may illuminate an “intolerably high degree of irrationality, prejudice, stupidity, 
and other forms of undesirable conduct in the jury retiring room” (p. 2), that abolition of the jury 
system would undoubtedly be called for. Likewise, Darbyshire et al. (2002) criticised English jury 
recruitment procedures for having a blind faith in random selection techniques, a problem which 
others argue is only intensified further upon considering deliberations are conducted in secret. This 
is exacerbated further when considering that decisions made are final, and require no public 
justification or rationale (Kapardis, 2014).  
 Whilst countries, such as the US, continue to see value in some form of assessment of juror 
attitudes alongside the need to screen out those considered to be sufficiently biased towards a given 
case, the amended guidelines recently released by England’s Attorney General’s office make it 
more difficult than ever to question or excuse biased jurors from trials. In fact, the effects of 
inherent and implicit juror bias continue to be largely ignored by the English justice system. 
Accordingly, the need to examine the potential impact of bias upon verdict decisions resulting 
from preconceived attitudes, psychological constructs, and characteristics of the jurors themselves, 
is more necessary than ever. 
1.3 CURRENT STUDY RATIONALE 
 Legislative restrictions have undoubtedly hindered understanding in jury decision making. 
Researchers worldwide, and particularly in England, have been unable to reliably establish the 
accuracy of the assumption that juror decisions can be considered both fair and impartial. Whilst 
many studies have reported external bias effects, such as inadmissible evidence and pre-trial 
publicity, to be well documented in their influence upon jury decisions (Daftary-Kapur et al., 
2010), bias resulting from internal, inherent, and implicit factors of the jurors themselves, has been 
less well evidenced and, in fact, rarely even considered within an English legal context. 
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 The role of the individual juror’s psychological make-up upon the verdict decisions made 
during trial remains both complex and unclear. Debate continues regarding whether psycho-social 
characteristics have any significant influence upon decisions made, with dominant theory and 
research maintaining the sway of the evidence to be greatest factor impacting verdict decisions 
made (Kalvin & Ziesel, 1966; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). However, as Ellsworth (1993) 
naturally pointed out, where individual jurors draw different conclusions surrounding which 
verdict is most appropriate, despite having heard the exact same testimony in a case, the evidence 
alone appears unlikely to be the only factor impacting decisions made. This, alongside the fact that 
jurors are required to deliberate at all, tends to suggest that preconceived ideas and inherent 
characteristics within each individual juror have some bearing upon the verdict decisions they 
make. Preconceived ideas which it seems implausible to assume jurors are able to simply 
disregard, following instructions to do so by a trial judge or during deliberations.  
 Little empirical research has examined such relationships within English trials, although, 
within a North American context, there has been some evidence of a relationship between 
constructs such as racial bias, adherence to authority, and belief in a just world with the verdict 
decisions jurors made during mock trials (Cronin, 2006; Cutler, Moran, & Narby, 1992). Whilst 
such explicit bias and broad personality characteristics have provided some weak evidence for the 
predictive ability of psycho-social constructs overall, few explorations have focused upon more 
implicit psychological constructs, directly relevant to the decision-making task that jurors 
undertake, and which are important for the deliberative process itself. In particular, research is yet 
to explore how psychopathic personality traits, such as egocentricity, interpersonal manipulation, 
and the ability to both cognitively recognise and affectively feel empathy, may impact upon jurors’ 
verdict decisions, particularly within rape cases, where affective traits of empathy have previously 
appeared crucial (Debowska, Boduszek, Dhingra, Kola, & Meller-Prunska, 2015). However recent 
advancements in the domain of psychopathy research offer potential original avenues in which 
this research may now be explored.  
 Emerging directly out of the need to develop a clean measure of psychopathic personality 
uncontaminated with criminal or anti-social behavioural items, Boduszek, Debowska, Dhingra, 
and DeLisi (2016) devised the brief self-report Psychopathic Personality Traits Scale (PPTS). 
Underpinned by an alternative conceptualisation of psychopathy (see Figure 1.1), the scale allows 
researchers to specifically assess the essence of psychopathic personality across four core 
components; affective responsiveness, cognitive responsiveness, interpersonal manipulation, and 
egocentricity, regardless of an individual’s cultural or criminal background. To date, with the 
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validity of the scale and general factorial composition of the PPTS displayed using confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) techniques (Boduszek et al., 2016), the scale offers a reliable means through 
which the association between core psychopathic personality traits and juror decisions can be 
tested comprehensively for the first time. 
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Figure 1.1: The Psychopathic Personality Traits Model (PPTM) reproduced from Boduszek, Debowska, and Willmott (2017b). 
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 Interestingly, one area, where ‘scientific jury selection’ research has displayed greater 
associations between the individual differences of jurors and verdict inclinations, has been when 
measuring the attitudes of jurors related to specific case-relevant factors. Research assessing mock 
jurors’ attitudes towards drug control, psychiatrists’ reports, and expert testimony in cases relating 
to such factors, displayed much greater predictive ability in terms of the verdict decisions jurors 
were likely to make than were generated from personality features alone (Cutler et al., 1992, Moran 
et al., 1990). Whilst juror demographics are typically found to be weak and inconsistently related 
to verdict decisions in isolation, when measured in combination with case specific attitudes, 
studies display an apparent increase in the predictive ability that demographic factors have (Kovera 
et al., 2003).  
 Likewise, biases associated with prejudiced and preconceived attitudes surrounding sexual 
violence and rape, have been well documented in their effect upon jury decision making. These 
biases - commonly termed ‘rape myths’ - equate to unsubstantiated common misconceptions or 
beliefs surrounding what occurs during rape (Burrowes, 2013) and have been found to exist in 
almost every country, society, and culture throughout the world (Ward, 1995). Such rape myth 
acceptance and rape supportive attitudes are considered to be cognitive distortions, which develop, 
in part, from socially constructed norms surrounding the sexual treatment of women (Bohner et 
al., 1998; Debowska et al., 2015; Suarez & Gadalla, 2010; Ward & Beech, 2006). Accordingly, it 
stands to reason that with jurors randomly selected from the communities and society in which 
they live, such attitudes may impact upon the decisions they make while serving as jurors during 
rape trials. Examination of recent statistics appears to support such a notion. Of 34,741 allegations 
of rape recorded by the police in England during 2015 (Office National Statistics [ONS], 2016), 
just 3,851 cases proceeded to court for trial, and only 1,297 cases resulted in the defendant being 
convicted (Ministry of Justice [MOJ], 2016). The issue is, however, distorted further based upon 
recognising that rape is somewhat unique in comparison to other crimes. Little CCTV or direct 
witness evidence of the incident typically exists in the vast majority of rapes and, unlike other 
cases that reach trial, physical evidence is also generally of little value – displaying only that the 
physical act happened, not whether it occurred with consent (Willmott, 2016; Willmott et al., 
2017).  
 Despite this, an array of factors have been displayed to negatively impact jurors’ impartial 
decision making in rape cases. Factors range from victim-blame attribution as a result of wearing 
‘provocative clothing’ (Whatley, 1996), through to a lack of belief surrounding the veracity of 
victim’s claim, based upon delayed reporting (Raitt & Zeedyk, 1997), lack of physical injuries 
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(Temkin & Krahe, 2008), and a calm demeanour whilst in court (Finch & Munro, 2005). The 
impact of negative attitudes surrounding rape have been well documented within past research, so 
much so that judges in England are now encouraged to instruct jurors in related trials to avoid 
drawing upon similar views when forming their verdict decisions (Ellison & Munro, 2010). 
However, the extent to which instructions alone can prevent such deep routed societal biases from 
affecting the impartiality of decisions formed, remains largely untested.  
 Whilst research has established a link between personal sexual victimisation and the 
development of rape supportive attitudes in men (Debowska, Boduszek, & Willmott, 2017), no 
research to date has examined the relationship between sexual victimisation and voting preferences 
in jurors during trial. This is particularly true within the context of a rape trial, where past research 
would seemingly suggest that case relevant factors and rape attitudes are likely to have the greatest 
effect. Criticism has also centred upon the subtlety of measures traditionally used to assess rape 
myth acceptance in jurors, as well as the degree of reliance that can be placed upon mock 
simulation research findings in general, which report evidence of a relationship between rape 
attitudes and verdict decisions. 
 In fact, methodological criticisms have plagued jury research and its findings since the 
onset of the discipline. Highlighted legislative restrictions have meant studies typically employ 
weak methodological designs where concerns surrounding the usefulness and ecological validity 
of research are in abundance (Diamond, 1997: Lieberman & Olsen, 2009). As jury research has 
the potential to inform legal policy, mock trial simulations commonly conducted in unrealistic 
settings, presented in short written format, unrepresentative of genuine trial evidence jurors would 
observe, presided over by undergraduate students as individual decision makers only (i.e. no group 
deliberation element), is rightly questioned by legal practitioners. Of particular importance is the 
lack of gravity generally associated with participant decisions in that, unlike a real trial, mock 
jurors are undoubtedly aware that the verdicts they return relate to non-genuine cases and have no 
consequence upon the freedom of the defendant accused. Almost all jury research is so far removed 
from a genuine trial scenario that findings obtained may not accurately represent the gamut of 
thoughts, emotions, and internal processes that underlie actual juror decision making. As such, the 
need for research which measures the influence of psychological constructs upon the juror decision 
making task, within settings more realistic and representative of the procedures encountered in 
genuine criminal trials, are undoubtedly required before sound conclusions and findings can be 
used to guide legal procedures. 
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 Theoretically, a number of models have also been advanced, which attempt to explain how 
jurors make decisions at trial, yet Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model (1992) is credited as the 
most comprehensive and widely accepted theory to date (Groscup & Tallon, 2009). Suggesting 
jurors construct competing narrative accounts of evidence heard, before one version of events is 
selected and matched to a verdict option available, Pennington and Hastie’s model details the exact 
decision-making process jurors are thought undertake when forming their verdict selection. 
Moreover, the model posits there to be three phases leading up to the formation of a verdict 
decision; story construction, verdict representation, and story classification (see Fig 1.2 below). 
Each of these phases contains several sub stages or governing criteria that stories constructed must 
have in order to be accepted as a viable account of events by the individual juror (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1993). However, the story construction phase is considered most important for individual 
decision formation.  
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Figure 1.2: Reproduced from Pennington & Hastie’s (1993) explanation based Story Model 
of jury decision making. 
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 During story construction, it is proposed that competing narratives presented during trial 
are assessed by individual jurors according to what the author’s term, certainly principles. A story 
constructed is only accepted when a juror considers it to have adequate; (1) coverage of crucial 
evidence, the quality of (2) coherence regarding how (3) consistent, (4) complete, and (5) plausible 
it is deemed to be, alongside being (6) unique, in that alternative equally credible explanations do 
not emerge from the evidence available. However, despite the model’s credited 
comprehensiveness (Devine, 2012), the certainty principle process, thought to be operating when 
jurors form a particular decision, is yet to be evidenced empirically. The lack of research directly 
testing such core principles and underlying pathways, which the model proposes, therefore remains 
one of the most prominent limitations of the Story Model explanation. For a complete review and 
explanation of Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model, refer to Chapter 2. 
 The rationale for this research considers such criticisms, current gaps in knowledge, and 
the literature displaying the apparent ease with which jurors’ decisions can be biased by factors 
outside of the evidence. This, alongside a clear need for reliable scientific research exploring any 
identifiable relationship between juror characteristics and verdict decisions, supports the main 
focus, which is to examine the relationship between juror characteristics, psychological constructs, 
and crime specific attitudes upon verdict decisions made within English rape trials. Despite a 
plethora of past research arguing against the existence of such a relationship, finding only weak 
and inconsistent evidence that factors, such as personality traits, may be associated with verdict 
decisions, the present study seeks to explore this relationship within the context of a rape trial. 
Adopting a methodological approach which vastly improves upon previous simulated jury trial 
procedures, high in ecologically validity, alongside advanced analytical procedures never 
previously tested within the domain of jury research, the influence that jury characteristics may 
have upon juror decisions will be directly tested and presented. 
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1.4 THESIS AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 Previous research has indicated the role of personality traits and psychological constructs 
to have a weak and inconsistent relationship upon juror decision making at best. However, 
recognition of the weak methodological designs typically utilised within mock simulations, 
exhibiting low ecological validity and drawing largely upon student samples in isolation, may in 
itself explain such findings. A failure to adopt any form of advanced statistical procedures is also 
considered to be a limitation of previous research endeavours and arguably one reason why it has 
proved difficult to establish such a relationship. Also noteworthy, is the apparent lack of attention 
paid to psychological traits seemingly more relevant to the decision making task that jurors face. 
Therefore, the first objective of the current research was to examine the relationship between 
psychopathic personality traits, namely; affective responsiveness, cognitive responsiveness, 
interpersonal manipulation, and egocentricity (PPTS model; Boduszek, Debowska, Dhingra, & 
DeLisi, 2016), upon mock juror verdict decisions across two time-points: pre-deliberation and 
post-deliberation. Furthermore, in accordance with the experimental design adopted, purposely 
designed to be high in ecological validity so that reliable empirical exploration can be sought, the 
relationship between psychopathic personality traits and juror decisions were examined utilising 
latent variable modelling procedures. Specifically, latent profiling analyses were conducted using 
two independent samples: an opportunity student sample and a systematically randomly selected 
community sample (Chapter 4.1). 
 Previous mock jury studies indicate the importance of rape supportive attitudes upon 
verdict outcomes, displaying high levels of rape myth acceptance to negatively bias jurors’ 
perceptions of the complainant. Yet the rape attitude scales typically used within past research 
have been criticised for their lack of subtlety. More importantly, the methodological procedures 
utilised in such explorations have, for the most part, lacked external and ecological validity, 
resulting in a general disregard for the findings and lack of uptake by policy makers. Research is 
also yet to examine the role of previous victimisation upon juror decision making, examined 
alongside rape attitudes and juror demographics. Therefore, the second objective of the research 
sought to verify whether psycho-social factors were significant predictors of juror decisions within 
the context of a realistic mock rape trial. To do this, a scale specifically developed to be a more 
subtle measure of rape myth acceptance, termed the Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual 
Aggression (AMMSA; Gerger, Kley, Bohner, & Siebler, 2007), was utilised alongside 
victimisation and demographic variables. This aim was tested using binary logistic regression 
analysis, again upon the two independent samples: an opportunity student sample and 
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systematically randomly selected community sample, both across two individual juror decision 
points: pre-deliberation and post-deliberation (Chapter 4.2). 
 Due to a lack of empirical evidence testing, an important underlying feature of the story 
model, the dominant explanation of juror decision making, the third objective of the current 
research sought to develop and validate a measure of the core component of the theory. Therefore, 
in order to devise and validate a measure of individual juror decision making relative to criminal 
trials, directly integrating the theoretical certainty principle features within an empirically testable 
scale, construct validity and dimensionality of the Juror Decision Scale (JDS) was investigated, 
using confirmatory factor analysis (Chapter 4.3). 
 Whilst a direct relationship between juror characteristics and verdict decisions was tested 
within the aforementioned objectives, what was missing within the current exploration was an 
examination of the directed dependence of all constructs used in the study upon the Jury Decision 
Scale (JDS) sub-scales factors (emerging from the CFA conducted above), and the subsequent 
dependence of the three JDS factors upon the verdict decisions jurors ultimately make. In other 
words, conducting a path analysis allows the relationship between psychopathic personality traits, 
rape attitudes, witness believability, decision confidence, and verdict outcomes to be examined 
within a structured model. Therefore, the main objectives of the current analyses were firstly, to 
test whether psychopathic personality traits (PPTS) and attitudes towards sexual aggression 
(AMMSA) were significantly correlated with juror beliefs in a complainant and defendant’s stories 
and confidence in verdict decisions (measured through the three factors of the JDS). Secondly, it 
aims to test whether the three JDS factors were significantly correlated with individual juror 
verdict decisions at both verdict decision time points (pre-deliberation and post-deliberation) and 
between experimental samples (student and community jurors) (Chapter 4.4). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
ABSTRACT 
 This chapter introduces the literature which surrounds jury decision-making. Relevant for 
understanding the background to the research, an overview of the discipline, methodologies 
employed, and circumstances under which jury research began, are outlined briefly. The sub-
discipline of scientific jury selection, popular within North America and in particular the United 
States, is also discussed. More pertinent to the present study objectives, the problem of juror bias 
is explained, reviewing literature which discusses areas where detailed understanding now exists 
and, more importantly, the problem of inherent juror bias, which remains under-developed. 
Specifically, research surrounding the extent to which psycho-social juror characteristics may 
directly impact upon impartiality and, in fact, predispose jurors towards particular verdict 
decisions is reviewed in depth. Dominant theoretical accounts of jury decision-making are also 
discussed, reviewing the evidence base underlying juror-level models and highlighting where gaps 
in current empirical support for those most commonly adopted occur, in turn providing an 
opportunity for further development. Finally, a more holistic review of the methodological 
procedures that jury research typically employs is also conducted, highlighting intrinsic limitations 
therein, and again outlining the need for advancements within future research, a premise which 
remains central throughout the thesis.   
2.1 JURY DECISION MAKING 
 Whilst the first documented use of jury trials dates back to ancient Egypt more than four 
thousand years ago (Kapardis, 2014), the scientific study of the process is a more modern 
enterprise. Yet, despite being somewhat in its infancy when compared to other disciplines, over 
the past seven decades the application of psychological principles within the field of jury decision-
making have led to significant developments in understanding. Studies examining a multitude of 
factors have displayed a wide range of psychological phenomena are capable of influencing jury 
decisions during trial. In fact, despite some research focusing upon procedural functionality of the 
jury system from a legal-economic perspective (for example, what number of individuals are 
optimal for a jury panel to operate effectively – see Devine et al., 2001), the primary endeavour of 
almost all jury research today is to better understand the influence of psychological factors upon 
deliberations and decision formation. A vast array of sub-disciplines of jury decision-making 
research exist and have become distinct research domains in themselves, including studying the 
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effects of pre-trial publicity, judges’ instructions and legal directions, witness appearance, 
minority-majority juror influence, inadmissible evidence, and preconceived bias (for a review, see 
Daftary-Kapur, Dumas, & Penrod, 2010). Despite this, a myriad of uncertainty and disagreement 
continues to surround fundamental assumptions of the jury process. Whether jury decisions can be 
considered fair and impartial, and whether verdict outcomes are underpinned by an unbiased 
assessment of the evidence, continues to divide psycho-legal opinion. More specifically, the extent 
to which preconceived factors can influence, and may actually predict the verdict decisions that 
jurors ultimately make, remains a staunch source of disagreement within the literature. 
2.1.1 Research Origins 
 Beginning in the 1950s, the Chicago Jury Project constituted the earliest empirical 
exploration of jury decision-making (cf. Zeisel, Kalven, & Buckholz, 1958; Kalven & Zeisel, 
1966) and was considered somewhat revolutionary at the time, in its attempt to better understand 
the functionality of jury trials, whilst making use of social science methodologies. Central to the 
project’s objectives was to bring lawyers and social scientists together, to try to comprehend the 
efficacy of the jury decision-making process (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Unprecedented access led 
to the researchers involved obtaining data from 3576 criminal jury trials, which was later used to 
compare genuine jury verdict outcomes with hypothetical verdicts rendered by real judges, based 
upon the same cases. Results revealed judge-jury agreement occurred in more than 75% of trial 
outcomes, a figure which at the time was offered as strong evidence in support of the jury system’s 
effectiveness (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Arguably, however, such results may not have been 
interpreted in the same way today. With advancements made in understanding the apparent biasing 
influence that judicial directions and a judge’s summary instructions in particular, can have upon 
juror decisions (Gray, 2006), alongside changes in societal attitudes towards criminal justice 
(Gottlieb, 2017), judge-jury disagreement at a rate of one in four criminal trials would perhaps no 
longer be considered an acceptable rate of tolerance for potential miscarriages of justice.  
 Despite being widely recognised for its early attempts to empirically examine the jury 
decision-making process, the end of the Chicago Project led to a temporary pausation in research 
surrounding jury functionality (DeMatteo & Anumba, 2009). One explanation for this, as 
suggested by Greene et al. (2002), was the uncertainty that emerged as a result of the projects 
findings, which seemingly highlighted the issue of defining where the study of jury decision-
making belonged within the social sciences. Moreover, attempting to understand whether the study 
of group dynamics and functioning, individual mental processing, and evaluative reasoning within 
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the context of a deliberating jury panel belonged to the domain of social, cognitive or forensic 
psychology, left the phenomenon largely absent from research exploration until its revival during 
the 1970s (Green et al., 2002). 
 Perhaps more significantly, the experimental explorations of Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966) 
Chicago Project also involved accessing genuine jury panel deliberations within American federal 
court cases. However, after it emerged that the secret recording of the deliberation process without 
jurors’ prior knowledge was a feature of the research, both federal and state law began heavily 
restricting research access into the jury room thereafter (Devine et al., 2001). Many of the resulting 
restrictions imposed then, still remain throughout the US today (Lieberman & Krauss, 2009). 
Notably, with similar restrictions enshrined within Canada’s 1985 Criminal Code legislation and 
England’s 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which for the most part prohibits jurors from disclosing 
any element of their deliberations publicly, research high in ecological validity has remained 
largely absent in the literature. Particularly within the United Kingdom (UK) and England more 
specifically (Zander, 2005), where legislation prevents jurors and researchers from discussing 
almost every aspect of the decision-making process (see Chapter One for a more comprehensive 
review). However, whilst such restrictions undoubtedly hindered research in the area, they also led 
researchers to develop a number of alternative approaches in which jurors could be studied and 
forced the differing psychological disciplines to begin more focused empirical investigation into 
particular features of the jury decision-making process – for the most part focusing upon bias. 
2.1.2 Research Methodologies  
 Most research surrounding jury decision-making has adopted one of four principal 
methodological approaches including; field studies, examination of archival records, post-
deliberation interviews, and mock jury simulations (Abbott & Batt, 1999; Devine et al., 2001). 
Field Studies involve natural observations of real jurors during trial (Kerr & Bray, 2005). Whilst 
rarer than other methods used, due to the difficulties that researchers experience in these settings, 
with access to jurors being heavily restricted so as not to interfere with the trial outcome, field 
studies typically ensure a greater degree of ecological validity is found within the research 
(DeMatteo & Anumba, 2009; Willmott, 2017). Moreover, studies examining the relationship 
between initial verdict preferences and final verdict decisions, by observing genuine juror 
deliberations, were able to reliably demonstrate that in 90% of cases examined, the initial verdict 
favoured by the majority of the jurors was found to be the final verdict returned (Kalven & Zeisel, 
1966; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995). Yet, whilst reliable and high-in-ecological validity, many 
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commentators outline limitations of such studies relate not only to a lack of cohesion between jury 
field study findings and laboratory based simulations (Keller & Weiner, 2010; Weiten & Diamond, 
1979), but the often lack of generalisability such field studies have, resulting from the small sample 
sizes achievable when using such an approach (Kerr & Bray, 2005). 
 In contrast, archival records are a form of secondary data, initially recorded for another 
purpose (Willmott, 2017). As well as police records and prosecution case files, courtroom 
transcriptions of a trial are used by researchers to study judicial decision making. Trial transcripts 
are, however, the most frequent form of archived material used to study jury functionality 
retrospectively, involving researchers coding transcripts in an attempt to identify relationships 
between certain case characteristics and verdict outcomes (Dunn, 2003). Although archived 
materials provide a rich source of information surrounding jury trials, they can be difficult and 
expensive to access. In England, for example, trial transcriptions are typically outsourced by each 
criminal court to private companies. As such, accessing trial recordings are often charged by the 
hour of transcription requested and can be subject to legal embargos depending upon the case 
requested (cf. Her Majesties Courts and Tribunal Service [HMCTS], n.d.). Further limitations with 
this method of investigating jury decision-making surround the lack of control researchers have 
over what data has been recorded, with studies reporting that gaining access to important 
information missing from the case transcripts proves extremely difficult and often impossible to 
obtain retrospectively (Kerr & Bray, 2005). Perhaps more importantly, such transcripts also 
provide no direct insight into the deliberative process itself or individual juror’s decision formation 
– only what information they were exposed to prior to making such decisions.  
 Post-deliberation interviews are another highly rich source of information, allowing 
researchers to directly ask genuine jurors questions about their decisions, alongside what occurred 
during deliberations. However, as highlighted previously, this method is not permitted in most 
countries which utilise the jury system and generally only takes place within the US. Even then, 
research suggests such interviews are likely to be affected by inaccuracies and biases in juror 
memories (Schuller & Yarmey, 2001). Another notable limitation is that rarely are all jurors on a 
particular jury panel interviewed about what took place. This therefore results in data seemingly 
equating to little more than an uncorroborated and subjective interpretation of the deliberative 
process, according to a small number of the jurors that were present. Nonetheless, any access or 
insight provided by genuine trial jurors is beneficial to the development of current understanding 
of the decision-making process undertaken during trial. Something which Dunn (2003) suggests 
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is likely to prove increasingly useful, as the method continues to grow in popularity in countries 
around the world. 
 Finally, mock jury trial simulations are by far the most common methodology used to study 
juror behaviour, typically involving the recruitment of individuals asked to take on the role of a 
juror, who subsequently partake in some form of simulated trial (Willmott, 2017). Whilst likely 
the furthest removed from a genuine trial environment, mock simulations allow researchers to 
employ experimental control over important aspects of the jury process, thereby offering a greater 
degree of insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying juror thinking and decision 
making. In fact, recent reviews have shown the systematic manipulation of variables of interest, 
alongside methodological controls employed, have produced empirical evidence of numerous 
psychological phenomenon influencing juror decision-making (Daftary-Kapur, Dumas, & Penrod, 
2010; Devine et al., 2001). However, as attempts to verify and validate the reliability of such 
simulation research have increased, so too have criticisms of the approach.  
 Central to the debate is the extent to which mock trial simulation research findings exhibit 
external and ecological validity, and should therefore be used to inform understanding of genuine 
juror behaviour. A notable strength, but equally a limitation of the mock simulation methodology, 
is the diverse range of experimental factors that can be varied and controlled. Bray and Kerr’s 
(1982) early meta-analysis found wide variation between studies relative to the following: the 
subject populations used (students vs community); research settings adopted (classroom, 
laboratory, courtroom); evidence presentation format (written vignette, video, live); extent of 
evidence included (case summary vs full recreation); and variable level of measurement 
(dichotomous vs continuous). Similarly, attempts to re-evaluate more contemporary mock trial 
research have displayed a largely consistent pattern of variation in the experimental designs 
employed (Bornstein, 1999; Keller & Weiner, 2011).  
 While mock trial simulations undoubtedly permit greater researcher freedom surrounding 
the experimental design and enable extraneous variables to be more readily controlled, such 
variation also makes direct comparison between studies difficult to conduct. Consequently, 
deviation from genuine trial environments, within which jurors would ordinarily undertake their 
decision-making duties, has led to an apparent reluctance among many legal practitioners to adopt 
the findings obtained. This is perceived to be the product of unrealistic and artificial settings rather 
than the jury process itself (Darbyshire et al., 2002; Ellsworth, 1993). Nonetheless, whilst 
legislative restrictions continue to limit research access into the jury room, mock trial simulation 
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studies remain the dominant research method adopted by jury researchers (Lieberman & Krauss, 
2009), something arguably necessary, if any development in current understanding of jury bias 
influence is to be attained. For a more comprehensive review of the methodological shortcomings 
evident within past jury research, refer to the ‘methodological limitations’ section below. 
2.1.3 Variants of Jury Bias 
 Despite being a defining principle underlying the jury model of criminal justice, the notion 
that individual juror decisions and collective jury verdicts are free from bias, is a concept widely 
considered to be ideological and unrealistic in practice. Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) concluded 
early on that eliminating non-evidential sources of bias from the jury process is rarely, if at all, 
achievable, with Marshall (1980) suggesting that the notion equates to no more than a “legal 
fiction”. Accordingly, attempts to measure, define, and reduce varying forms of bias have 
remained central to psychological research endeavours. The domain of cognitive psychology has 
sought to understand how information is processed by jurors, attempting to uncover how decisions 
are reached, the schematic mechanisms triggered when hearing evidence in a case, and, therefore, 
where bias is most likely to preclude impartial decision making. In fact, application of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) theorising around biases associated with heuristic shortcuts has led to a 
wealth of exploration of cognitive bias within the jury room (Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 
2003; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Pennington & Hastie, 1988).   
 The field of social psychology has focused instead upon group processes that occur during 
deliberation, examining the impact of majority and minority influence (Castelli, Vanzetto, 
Sherman, & Arcuri, 2001; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994), as well as 
bias in judgement as a product of social conformity (Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996; Liberman 
& Arndt, 2000). More broadly, forensic psychology - as a discipline - has drawn upon principles 
from varying and combined approaches, in order to examine the influence and implications that 
bias can have upon verdict outcomes (see Tinsley, 2000). However irrespective of the underlying 
theoretical principles or methodological procedures adopted by researchers from any given 
approach, the existence of two overarching variants of pre-trial bias has been universally agreed 
upon. Firstly, external situational biases that have specific influences upon a given case and, 
secondly, internal bias occurring as a direct result of relatively enduring personal characteristics 
of the jurors themselves (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). 
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2.1.3.1 External Jury Bias and Extra-legal Factors 
 Contemporarily, external bias effects within the legal system have become synonymous 
with what are termed extra-legal factors, in that external bias is said to emerge from factors outside 
of the law or legally irrelevant characteristics (O'Neal, Tellis, & Spohn, 2015). Moreover, 
receiving substantial attention within the literature, research examining external bias or extra-legal 
influence has centred upon numerous factors that may impact upon the impartiality of the decisions 
that juries make during trial, outside of the direct influence of evidence heard within the case. For 
example, studies have reported exposure to pre-trial publicity in a case can have important 
implications upon jurors’ assessments of the evidence heard during trial, as well as upon the final 
decisions made by jurors (Ruva, McEvoy, & Bryant, 2007). Moreover, pre-trial publicity, whereby 
jurors come to court with some prior knowledge or exposure to a case (typically derived from the 
media), is considered to be well-established in its influence upon jurors’ impartiality, identified as 
biasing jurors to both factual and emotive elements of a trial (Gavin, 2014). Importantly, research 
has reported that exposure to pre-trial publicity significantly influenced jurors’ inclination towards 
guilty verdicts and lengthy sentences (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Daftary-Kapur, Penrod, 
O’Connor, & Wallace, 2014; Ruva et al., 2007).  
 Similarly, research examining the effects of inadmissible evidence, whereby jurors 
exposed to information that the court subsequently deemed should not have been presented during 
trial, has also been shown to have unfairly influenced juror decision-making irrespective of the 
judge’s instructions to disregard such information during deliberations (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; 
Smith & Caldwell, 1973). Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, and McWethy’s (2006) meta-analytic review 
of 48 studies, whereby jurors were instructed to disregard information that had been heard but later 
deemed inadmissible by a judge, demonstrated that judicial instructions did not effectively 
eliminate the biasing impact of such evidence. The authors concluded that contested evidence, 
later ruled inadmissible, in fact accentuates that evidence in the decision making process, and was 
found to directly increase the likelihood of the jury convicting the defendant.  
 Other extra-legal biases found to unfairly predispose juror decisions during trial include 
the ‘CSI effect’, whereby jurors’ pre-existing, often misinformed, presumptions surrounding what 
scientific evidence is typically retrieved when a crime takes place (derived from popular culture), 
appear to directly influence their decision-making (Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). Cooley (2007) 
found inaccurate assumptions surrounding the extent to which DNA, fibre, and trace evidence are 
typically found at a crime scene, directly led mock jurors to conclude that the accused must 
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therefore be innocent. Alongside this, research has also found factors such as witness 
attractiveness, defendant sympathy, complainant likability, as well as the extent to which witnesses 
smiled whilst giving their testimony, to externally bias jurors’ decision-making, beyond evidence 
presented in the case (Abel & Watters, 2005; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997; Virj & Firmin, 2001). 
 In a major meta-analytic review conducted by Daftary-Kapur et al. (2010), the authors 
examined the influence of external bias effects upon juror decision making within a large body of 
research conducted over the past fifty years. Importantly, the authors concluded that the negative 
impact of external biases have been so well documented to date, that the legal system’s assumption 
that jurors are able to hear conflicting accounts and varying evidence before processing it in a 
rational and unbiased manner is, for the most part, inaccurate. Yet, despite the success of external 
bias research in displaying the negative impact upon juror decisions, the extent to which internal 
juror bias has been found to unfairly influence verdict decisions related to the personal 
characteristics and psychological constructs of the jurors themselves, has been less reliably 
evidenced.  
2.1.3.2 Internal Juror Bias and Scientific Jury Selection  
 Internal juror bias relates to the assumption that particular demographic, attitudes and 
broad personality characteristics can predispose jurors towards preferred verdict decisions 
(Willmott & Oostinga, 2017). These characteristics manifest differently both within and between 
jurors, something that may account for the lack of unified agreement in the literature surrounding 
the importance of such juror features upon verdict decision formation. Moreover, whilst defined 
here as internal biases, due to such characteristics emerging from aspects within the juror 
themselves (rather than external influence), such biases can also be alternatively classified. Internal 
biases can be both explicit, in that they are reflective of attitudes or beliefs held at a conscious 
level, and implicit, whereby attitudes and stereotypes are held without conscious awareness but 
influence judgement nonetheless (Casey, Warren, Cheesman, & Elek, 2012). Whilst explicit bias 
can manifest itself in ways such as overt racist views, implicit bias relates more to unintentional 
associations that individuals make between an object and its evaluation, such as automatically 
associating a particular race with criminal behaviour (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hudson, 
2002; Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010). Internal juror bias may also be considered to be inherent, 
particularly when emerging from observable fixed juror characteristics and variables, such as 
demographic features that have previously been linked to certain views and behaviours (Furnham 
& Alison, 1994; Ward, 1995). 
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 Seeking to assist justice systems in their selection of jurors at trial and reduce the effects 
of varying forms of internal bias upon trial verdicts, social scientists have attempted to measure 
and predict internal bias through assessment of the jurors themselves, at the onset of a case. This 
process, commonly known as Scientific Jury Selection, involves trying to identify what views are 
likely to be held by the individuals comprised on a jury panel and eliminating those people thought 
to be undesirable to the evidence in the case. In theory, such jury selection procedures were 
designed to remove biased jurors from criminal trials; those who are considered to be incapable of 
making fair and impartial decisions (Fulero & Wrightsman, 2009). However, in practice, trial 
consultants typically advise defence lawyers which jurors are most likely to favour their 
explanation of the evidence, whether considered to be unfairly biased or not (Lieberman & Olson, 
2009). This has led many to question the ethics behind scientific jury selection, particularly when 
considering that high trial consultancy costs often means only the wealthiest of defendants can 
afford to make use of their services. 
 Emerging during the 1970s, scientific jury selection was first used within the United States 
during the Harrisburg Seven trial in 1972. Accused of crimes against the state, and with 
considerable pre-trial publicity and political interest in the case, some felt the defendants accused 
would not receive a fair trial. As such, a team of social scientists began conducting interviews with 
local residents where the trial was to take place in an attempt to identify juror characteristics that 
would be both beneficial and detrimental to the defence case during later jury selections 
(Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich, & Christie, 1973). Despite the government spending more 
than two million dollars trying to ensure the Harrisburg defendants were convicted, the use of 
social science research is widely thought to have prevented this from occurring, as the trial resulted 
in a hung jury (Barber, 1993; Fischoff, 1979). Since then, trial consultants have become widely 
used in the selection of jurors within the United States. They are now involved in almost all major 
lawsuits and, whilst originally developed to restrict government influence in criminal trial 
outcomes, consultants are today more likely to offer advice in civil disputes (Lieberman & Sales, 
2007). Elsewhere in the world, tighter legal restrictions which prevent lawyers from interfering 
with the selection of jurors, has meant use of scientific selection procedures within countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, have been limited (Willmott, 2016), and throughout Europe, often not 
utilised at all (Lieberman & Olson, 2009).   
 The general approach of trial consultants is to use community surveys and, occasionally, 
concurrent mock trials to measure the impact that factors, such as occupation, socioeconomic 
status, age, race, and attitudes towards the law, are likely to have upon jurors’ reactions to the 
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evidence. However, the extent to which such characteristics offer reliable predictions of the 
verdicts jurors will choose remains unclear within scientific research settings, and therefore use of 
such procedures within actual criminal cases, prior to a reliable empirical evidence base being 
established, remains highly criticised (Kovera & Austin, 2016; Lieberman & Sales, 2007; Saks, 
1976; Willmott & Boduszek, 2016; Willmott & Oostinga, 2017; Willmott, Boduszek & Booth, 
2017). Research has thus far offered only mixed and inconsistent findings surrounding the 
predictive relationship between demographic features and legal attitudes on the votes cast by jurors 
during trial (Abbott & Batt, 1999; Lieberman & Sales, 2007). Accordingly, many critics continue 
to argue that trial consultants are therefore making crude presumptions about the influence that 
juror characteristics have on the decisions made in a case, while little scientifically reliable 
evidence underpins such a relationship (cf. Finkelman, 2010). 
 Whilst scientific jury selection operates from the assumption that certain individual 
characteristics not only influence the decisions jurors make during trial, but, when measured 
effectively, can be used to predict what verdicts are likely to be returned in a given case. Although 
developing out of a need to remove biased jurors from criminal cases, trial consultants are now 
largely employed within civil cases helping to select jurors biased in favour of the client’s version 
of events. This, alongside a general lack of sustained and reliable empirical support that juror 
characteristics can accurately predict verdict outcomes, has led to on-going debate surrounding the 
credibility of scientific jury selection as a discipline. In fact, the need for a stronger scientific basis 
permeates throughout criticism of the methodological procedures that trial consultants employ, 
and undoubtedly serves as the foundation from which future scientific jury selection research 
should begin. Importantly, as the scientific nature of jury selection continues to be questioned, the 
effectiveness of trial consultancy will remain contested. The need for greater use of social science 
research grounded in strong methodological designs, and utilising advanced analytical procedures, 
is undoubtedly called for (Willmott, 2017). More reliable findings, discussed and critiqued within 
the peer-reviewed academic community, may provide the scientific advances in knowledge so 
desperately needed within a discipline that is crucial for ensuring justice is delivered fairly. Yet, 
while a culture of gaining profit, rather than producing justice, remains at the heart of the industry, 
improvements made are likely to be slow and not without resistance (Willmott & Oostinga, 2017). 
Clearly the need to establish an empirical evidence base, underpinned by ecologically valid 
methodologies and utilising advanced analytical procedures, is needed before a relationship 
between juror characteristics and verdict decisions can be reliably determined.   
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2.2 THE ROLE OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN JUROR DECISION MAKING 
 The role of the individual juror’s personal characteristics and psychological make-up upon 
the verdict decisions made during trial remains both complex and unclear. As highlighted above, 
in the context of trial consultancy and scientific jury selection, debate continues regarding whether 
demographic and psychological characteristics have any significant impact upon the verdict 
decisions jurors make during trial. In fact, dominant theory maintains the sway of the evidence to 
be greatest factor impacting verdicts returned (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 2002; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992). However, as Ellsworth (1993) naturally pointed out, where individual jurors draw 
different conclusions surrounding which verdict is most appropriate despite having heard the exact 
same testimony in a case, the evidence alone appears unlikely to be the only factor impacting 
decisions made. This, alongside the fact that jurors are required to deliberate at all, tends to suggest 
that preconceived ideas and inherent characteristics within each individual juror have some bearing 
upon the verdict decisions they construct.   
2.2.1 Demographic Predictors  
 Numerous research has sought to examine the predicative ability of demographic factors 
upon juror decision-making during trial. Moreover, popular within the domain of trial consultancy 
and scientific jury selection due to the ease with which juror demographics can be measured and 
observed, research explorations have attempted to find predictive relationships across a host of 
demographic variables including; age, gender, ethnicity, education, and socio-economic status.  
2.2.1.1 Age 
 Acknowledging that variations in thoughts, opinions and experiences are likely to be in 
some way associated with age, it stands to reason that differences may occur in the way in which 
varying aged jurors interpret evidence and form opinions during trial. In fact, support for this 
notion is not lacking, with Rothman, Dunlop, and Ramboli (1999) highlighting the importance of 
historical personal experiences in shaping older jurors’ world views, finding jurors over seventy 
years old to be more tolerant, accepting, and spiritually aware than jurors just ten years younger. 
A number of studies sought to directly examine the existence of a relationship between juror age 
and verdict preferences. Sealy and Cornish (1973) and Weiner and Stolle (1997) both reported 
finding that age was significantly related with verdict decisions, in that older jurors were shown to 
be generally more conviction prone than their younger counterparts. Recent research using data 
drawn from more than 700 genuine jury trials within the US state of Florida appears to support 
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such an assertion, again finding evidence that older jurors were significantly more likely to convict, 
irrespective of the type of case being heard (Anwar, Bayer, & Hjalmarsson, 2014). However, other 
studies have not been so supportive, with similar research endeavours failing to obtain any 
evidence of such age related associations (Baldwin & McConville, 1979; Moran & Comfort, 1982; 
Reed, 1965) and others refuting that any relationship exists at all between verdicts and the 
demographic (Diamond, Saks, & Landsman, 1998; Liberman & Krauss, 2009).  
2.2.1.2 Gender 
 The importance of gender upon juror decision-making again has some intuitive appeal, in 
that research has consistently found gender differences across a wide range of emotive forensic 
phenomenon, including: tendencies to report evidence of child sexual abuse (Humphries, 
Debowska, Boduszek, & Mattison, 2016); empathy shown towards complainant testimony at trial 
(Bottoms et al., 2014); and emotional responsiveness more generally (Debowska, Mattison, & 
Boduszek, 2015), all of which demonstrated that females scored higher than males. In fact, some 
studies have reportedly found a direct association between juror gender and verdict preferences 
based upon particular types of cases. Females were found to be more conviction prone than males 
in rape cases (Brekke & Borgida, 1998; Kovera, McAuliff, & Hebert, 1999), cases of child sexual 
exploitation (Bottoms et al., 2014; Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Kovera et al., 1997) and murder 
trials (Mills & Bohannon, 1980). Likewise, a recent study conducted within a Canadian judicial 
context also found evidence that female mock jurors perceived the alleged victim more favourably 
that male jurors and overall were more likely to vote in their favour (Pettalia, Pozzulo, & Reed, 
2017). Additionally, whilst previous research has suggested this relationship to be mediated by 
victim gender (Waterman & Foss-Goodman, 1984), the present study found such an effect was not 
present with child victims. Despite this, other studies have found evidence of a reverse effect, as 
well as no relationship at all. Baldwin and McConvilles’ (1979) examination of 276 genuine trial 
deliberations found males to be significantly more punitive and conviction prone than females. 
Further, Sealy and Cornish’s (1973) mock trial simulation studies found no significant association 
or differences occurring between gender and verdict outcomes. Reviewing a large body of 
research, which examined the importance of gender upon juror verdict preferences, led Lieberman 
and Sales (2007) to conclude the demographic was overall an unreliable predictor of verdict 
outcomes. 
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2.2.1.3 Ethnicity 
 Somewhat more encouragingly, the relationship between racial characteristics and juror 
behaviour has obtained greater empirical support within the literature. Early studies, examining 
the impact of jury eligibility changes in the US state of Baltimore during 1969, found that when 
home ownership was no longer the pool from which jurors were selected (with jurors more fairly 
draw at random from the electoral voting register), jury composition changed from 70% 
Caucasian, to 44% Afro-American. Whilst lacking experimental controls, examination of 
conviction rates over a three-year transitional period displayed that guilty verdicts decreased from 
84% to 70%, suggesting white jurors to be more conviction prone that their black counterparts (cf. 
Darbyshire, Maughan, & Stewart, 2002).  
 Laboratory based explorations - mock trial simulation research, and examination of 
genuine trial outcomes - have also led to the emergence of empirical evidence, indicating a direct 
relationship between ethnic background and verdict decisions. The general pattern found suggests 
an own race leniency bias, and an increased rate of conviction for defendants of a different race to 
the juror deciding (Fukurai, Butler, & Krooth, 1993; King, 1993; Levine, 2000; Sommers & 
Ellsworth, 2000; Ugwuegbu, 1979). Importantly, however, despite the apparent causal relationship 
displayed, findings have again displayed opposing relationships between studies (Cutler, Moran, 
& Narby, 1992; Mills & Bohannon, 1980; Williams & McShane, 1990) and seemingly found such 
a relationship to be reliant upon a range of other factors, including the racial composition of other 
jurors on the panel, the complainant-defendant race similarity, as well as crime seriousness (King, 
1993; Sommers, 2006; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000, 2009). Complicating matters further, some 
studies have also found evidence of an own-race bias. Known as the ‘black sheep effect’, studies 
indicate that once a juror feels the accused has brought shame or negative affect upon their shared 
ethnicity, jurors become more punitive and conviction prone towards the defendant (cf. Kerr, 
Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995). Whilst a greater degree of empirical support underpins the 
association between juror ethnicity and verdict decisions, the range of complexities and lack of 
causal clarity continues to distort any relationship that exists.  
2.2.1.4 Education and Socio-economic Status  
 Much less research has sought to examine the relationship between juror decisions and 
education, despite the intuitively important relationship intelligence may have in the impartial and 
balanced assessment of evidence. Nonetheless, Sealy and Cornish (1973) directly examined the 
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effects of educational attainment, occupation, and socio-economic status (SES) upon genuine juror 
decisions within criminal trials in the UK, and found low skilled workers were most likely to 
convict of all jurors present within jury trials. This led the authors to suggest that a negative 
relationship exists between educational attainment and conviction proneness. However, directly 
conflicting with such findings, Reed’s (1965) examination of such a relationship reported higher 
educational attainment to be positively associated with guilty verdicts. More recent studies have 
only further complicated matters, suggesting greater educational attainment to increase acquittals 
(Denove & Imwinkelried, 1995; Eisenberg et al., 2005) alongside having no effect at all 
(Bridgeman & Marlowe, 1979). Studies examining the influence of SES in isolation have found 
evidence of a relationship with verdict preferences at trial. Results showed that, in civil cases, 
jurors from low SES backgrounds were both more likely to return verdicts in favour of the accused 
(Bornstein & Rajki, 1994) and more likely to award greater amounts of compensation overall 
(Darden, DeConinck, Babin, & Griffin, 1991). However, again, other studies have obtained results 
suggesting the importance of high SES in both civil and criminal cases, alongside explorations 
where no significant main effect was obtained at all (cf. Lieberman & Krauss, 2009). Whilst 
perhaps more favourable than other demographics discussed, clearly inconsistent and infrequent 
explorations of the relationship between education, SES, and voting preferences warrants further 
exploration before trial consultants seek to exclude jurors from trial, on either basis. 
 Across the wealth of studies that sought to investigate the relationship between juror 
demographics and verdict preferences, including ethnicity, gender, age, occupation, socio-
economic status, income, intelligence, and marital status, despite obtaining some empirical 
support, overall findings have suggested such a relationship to be unreliable and inconsistent at 
best (cf. Cronin, 2006; Lieberman & Sales, 2007; Lieberman & Krauss, 2009). Quantitative 
estimations suggest that demographic factors amount to only weak predictors of the decisions 
jurors will return and, on their own, accurately predict as little as two percent of trial verdicts 
(Abbott & Batt, 1999). However, notably, such findings emerged largely from the examination of 
juror demographics in isolation, despite some research displaying apparent improvements in the 
predictive ability of demographic characteristics, when measured in conjunction within attitudinal 
characteristics. Clearly, the need to establish the importance of a combination of juror variables 
upon the decisions made during trial, requires further more rigorous investigation.  
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2.3.2 Psychological Predictors  
 Reviewing the literature around more psychologically grounded broad personality 
characteristics and attitudinal effects upon verdict predictability, research explorations have 
offered slightly more positive results. Thought to be the primary endeavour of early jury 
researchers and remaining centrally important to trial consultants’ work today, predicting how 
jurors will vote based upon their psycho-social make up is still regarded as a central debate within 
the fields of psychology and law. Whilst some argue exploration of such a simplistic relationship 
has preoccupied jury researchers for too long (Kovera & Austin, 2016), where lack of a resolution 
or conclusive empirical evidence has been obtained, researchers are unlikely to abandon such a 
pursuit. Considering the existence of such a relationship suggests either that jurors are predisposed 
towards making certain verdict decisions, bringing the entire impartiality premise of the jury 
system into question, or alternatively - where no relationship exists - potential jurors may be being 
unfairly dismissed from cases due to US lawyers’ utilisation of voir dire (Kovera & Culter, 2013). 
2.3.2.1 Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Personality Traits 
 Studies examining the concept of authoritarian personality, characterised by conformity to 
social norms and authority, have reported some evidence of a relationship between the trait and 
juror decisions. Research has shown that mock jurors who scored highly in authoritarianism were 
significantly more conviction prone and recommend harsher sentences than jurors scoring low in 
associated traits (Moran & Comfort, 1982; Kravitz et al., 1993). Moreover, research has also found 
jurors who score high on dogmatism, as well as those with a high internal locus of control and just 
world beliefs, were significantly more likely to return a guilty verdict than low scoring jurors, in 
both criminal and civil trials (Phares & Wilson, 1972; Sosis, 1974; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). The 
common link between such traits is thought to be the general behavioural tendency to recognise 
wrongdoing, adhere to authority, and actively encourage the punishment of those who succumb to 
transgressions. Taken together, these traits are collectively thought to constitute the personality 
trait authoritarianism (Kovera & Culter, 2013).  
 Whilst a multitude of psychological traits have been the focus of isolated research 
endeavours seeking to evidence a relationship with verdict decisions, none have been so widely 
investigated and repeatedly drawn upon as authoritarian personality. In fact, some authors have 
argued the relationship between authoritarianism personality traits and juror voting preferences 
have now been so reliably evidenced, that a predisposition effect of psychological traits upon trial 
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outcomes can no longer be disputed (Cronin, 2006). However, the position elsewhere in the 
literature has been much less supportive. Narby, Cutler, and Moran’s (1993) meta-analysis 
examining the association between authoritarianism and jury decisions found that, although high 
scoring jurors did tend to be more conviction prone, the overall ability of the personality trait to 
predict verdict outcomes was weak. Furthermore, the authors purported that any existence of a 
discernible relationship was confounded by elements such as variation in how much jurors 
perceived the defendant themselves to be a figure of authority. Therefore, despite studies often 
obtaining evidence of relationships between particular characteristics and verdict preferences, 
systematic connections between personality traits and constructs which consistently account for 
verdict variance in juror decisions, have thus far proved more difficult to obtain (Cutler et al., 
1992: Lieberman & Sales, 2007). In considering the weak predictive ability that broad personality 
characteristics have attained to date, it seems important to reconsider the emphasis placed on traits 
which researchers have previously considered important, such as how jurors interact with the law 
and perceive the world around them more generally.  
2.3.2.2 Psychopathy and Psychopathic Personality Traits 
 A review of the literature displays that few explorations have focused upon more implicit 
psychological constructs directly relevant to the decision-making task that jurors undertake and 
which intuitively appear important for the deliberative process itself. Research is yet to explore 
how psychopathic personality traits, such as egocentricity and interpersonal manipulation, may 
impact upon the verdict decisions that individual jurors make during trial. Rather than broad views 
on the law, measures of an individual juror’s sense of self-importance alongside the ability to 
control and manipulate others have clear practical relevance within the context of a deliberating 
group. This seems particularly important when recognising the pressure that juror’s likely face in 
countries such as England, where returning unanimously agreed verdicts will typically require 
some jurors to compromise on their initial decisions (Larsen, 2011).  
 Also seemingly important for individual decision formation is the ability to empathise with 
those involved in a case and in particular, an alleged victim. A number of studies have shown juror 
empathy for a complainant directly influenced pro-victim judgements of discrete pieces of 
evidence during decision-making (Bottoms et al., 2014; Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, & Bentley, 
1982). More broadly, difficulties in understanding a broad spectrum of emotions have been found 
to be directly associated with increased scores in psychopathic traits (Brook & Kosson, 2013), 
while others found core affective traits of psychopathy (i.e. Callus Affect) were shown to be 
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significantly associated with negative perceptions of rape victims (Debowska et al., 2015). Yet, 
with recent advancements displaying empirical evidence of a qualitative distinction between the 
ability to cognitively recognise emotions and affectively feel empathy (Boduszek, Debowska, 
Sherretts, Boulton, & Willmott, 2017a; Boduszek, Debowska, & Willmott, 2017b), further 
exploration that accounts for such a distinction, and which directly examines the importance of 
empathic responsiveness upon juror decision making, is clearly warranted. In fact, the advent of a 
newly developed and validated model of psychopathy, termed the Psychopathic Personality Traits 
Model (PPTM - Boduszek, Debowska, & Willmott, 2017b), which integrates the four core 
psychopathic personality components alluded to above (see Figure 1.1 within Chapter 1), provides 
an opportunity for the relationship between psychopathic personality traits and juror decisions to 
be directly and comprehensively investigated for the first time. 
 Despite difficulties associated with operationalising the concept, psychopathy has long 
been of interest within the criminal justice system. An early conceptualisation of psychopathy 
often cited as the first comprehensive account of the ‘prototypical psychopath’ was put forward 
by Cleckley (1941). Characterised by sixteen traits including: pathological egocentrism; poverty 
in affective reactions; unresponsiveness in interpersonal relations; antisocial behaviour; and 
superficial charm, Cleckley’s representation served as the foundation for psychometric assessment 
tools commonly used within forensic settings to this day (i.e. Psychopathy Checklist Revised 
[PCL-R] Hare, 1991, 2003). However, whilst psychopathy (as conceptualised using the 
aforementioned assessment tool) continues to be drawn upon to account for the perpetration of 
violent and sexual offending, alongside criminality more broadly (Hart, Kropp, & Hare, 1988; 
McCuish, Corrado, Hart, & DeLisi, 2015; Olver & Wong, 2015; Seigfried-Spellar, Villacís-
Vukadinović, & Lynam, 2017; Serin & Amos, 1995), a growing body of evidence has begun to 
display the apparent importance of psychopathic personality traits in non-criminal environments.  
 Recent research found the existence of psychopathic traits to be greater in corporate 
samples than community samples (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010), a finding also reflected in a 
later study where business students again exhibited increased psychopathy scores in comparison 
to psychology undergraduates (Hassall, Boduszek, & Dhingra, 2015). Further supporting the 
notion that psychopathic personalities not only exist but may in fact thrive in non-offender 
samples, Lilienfeld et al. (2012) reported heightened psychopathy scores in US presidents were 
found to be positively correlated with perceptions towards a successful presidential performance.  
Accounting for such findings, Boduszek et al. (2016) explain that where criminal and antisocial 
tendencies equate to merely one manifestation of psychopathy, as appears to be the case 
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(Debowska et al., 2017; Skeem & Cooke, 2010), alternative non-criminal endeavours and 
behaviours in which psychopathic personality traits may have relevance, also need to be examined.  
 Accordingly, emerging directly out of the need to develop a clean measure of psychopathic 
personality uncontaminated with behavioural items, which relate only to criminal and antisocial 
outcomes of such traits, and utilising Cleckley’s early conceptualisation of egocentricity as a core 
component of psychopathy, Boduszek and colleagues devised the brief self-report Psychopathic 
Personality Traits Scale (PPTS; Boduszek, Debowska, Dhingra, & DeLisi, 2016). Underpinned by 
the specific model of psychopathy, as set out within the aforementioned PPTM (see Figure 1.1 
within Chapter 1), the scale allows researchers to specifically assess the essence of psychopathic 
personality across four core components, namely: affective responsiveness; cognitive 
responsiveness; interpersonal manipulation; and egocentricity, regardless of an individual’s 
cultural or criminal background (Boduszek et al., 2016).  
 Notably, with the validity of the scale displayed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
techniques, corroborating the factorial composition of the PPTS and use of composite reliability 
further indicating the measure’s internal reliability (Boduszek et al., 2016), the scale offers a 
reliable means through which the association between core psychopathic personality traits and 
juror decisions can be tested. Likewise, empirical explorations of such a four-factor 
conceptualisation of psychopathic personality have also been supported within diverse forensic 
and non-forensic samples. In fact, to date, the model’s utility has been tested and evidenced with 
more than 1,700 incarcerated offenders and in excess of 3,000 participants from the general 
population, including children, university students, and community adults (Boduszek, Debowska, 
Sherretts, Boulton, & Willmott, 2017a). Utilisation of person-centred, rather than variable-centred, 
analysis upon data gathered using the PPTS showed five alternative meaningful classes or groups 
of psychopathic traits, each of which were qualitatively distinct in terms of the four psychopathic 
personality traits (Boduszek, Debowska, & Willmott, 2017b). The findings further support the 
assertion that psychopathic personality is multi-dimensional in nature and should be interpreted as 
a continuum, whereby scores on each trait vary between individuals.  
 Surprisingly, to date, little research has sought to examine the importance of psychopathic 
traits upon jury decision-making. In fact, where studies were identified, they sought instead to 
examine how jurors’ judgements were affected by defendants presented as high in associated 
psychopathic traits (Edens et al., 2013). Therefore, considering the lack of research systematically 
exploring the association between psychopathic personality and juror decision making (although 
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see select trait associated research below), alongside results displaying the utility of the newly 
devised Psychopathic Personality Traits Scale (PPTS) for measuring such psychological traits, 
further exploration of such a relationship is warranted. The four core dimensions of the PPTS are 
subject to closer scrutiny and review below.  
2.3.2.2.1 Affective Responsiveness  
 Conceptualised as a lack of affective responsiveness within the PPTS, this trait is thought 
to be reflective of low levels of affective empathy and a general emotional shallowness (Boduszek 
et al., 2016). As this component is scored on the basis of a deficit in affective empathy, high scores 
are characterised by a general inability to emotionally respond to the feelings of others. Notably, 
a lack of affective responsiveness most closely resembles the callous affect factor examined in 
past research and comprised within the clinical psychopathy assessment tool - the PCL-R, widely 
and consistently reported to be a fundamental component of psychopathic personality (Boduszek, 
Debowska, & Willmott, 2017b). As previously highlighted, past research utilising the callus affect 
component of the PCL-R found increased scores for the trait were significantly associated with 
high scores in both rape myth acceptance and general negative attitudes towards rape victims 
(Debowska et al., 2015). Similarly, although no conceptual distinctions were made between 
variants of empathic responsiveness, taken together greater empathy for child victims of sexual 
victimisation were found to increase the likelihood of jurors making pro-victim judgements of 
evidence during mock trials (Bottoms et al., 2014). Clearly further exploration surrounding the 
importance of empathy and, more specifically, affective responsiveness upon juror assessments of 
the evidence, and directly upon ultimate verdict decision formation, is required. 
2.3.2.2.2 Cognitive Responsiveness  
 Again, characterised as a lack of cognitive responsiveness within the PPTS, this trait 
centres upon a general inability to understand the emotional state of others, mentally represent 
other people’s emotional processing, and emotional engagement with others at a cognitive level 
(Boduszek et al., in press). As previously highlighted, whilst others have generally neglected such 
a distinction in empathic responsiveness relative to psychopathic personality, Boduszek et al. 
(2016) argued such variants to be of central importance. This is something which subsequent 
empirical exploration bore evidence of with person-centred (rather than variable-centred) 
modelling approaches displaying clear qualitative distinctions in psychopathy personality profiles 
when examining scores on affective versus cognitive responsiveness (Boduszek, Debowska, & 
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Willmott, 2017b). Likewise, Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, and Levkovitz’s (2010) 
study displayed that incarcerated offenders with increased scores in psychopathic traits, although 
lacking in their understanding of affective states, were not deficient in cognitive states. Despite 
this, to the author’s knowledge, no research has explored such a distinction between cognitive and 
affect responsiveness/empathy within jurors. Whilst a review of the body of research examining 
the relationship between juror emotional responsiveness during trial does distinguish between 
integral emotions (i.e. prompted by certain features of the case) and incidental emotions (i.e. 
promoted by sources extrinsic to task being judged), no distinction is made in the effective 
measurement of cognitive versus affective empathy (Feigenson, 2016). Again, the totality of which 
further supports the need for such a distinction to be made when examining empathic 
responsiveness within presiding jurors.   
2.3.2.2.3 Interpersonal Manipulation  
 The third component of the PPTS is interpersonal manipulation, thought to be reflective of 
characteristics including grandiosity, superficial charm, and intentional deceitfulness (Boduszek 
et al., 2016). Such features, included in Cleckley’s initial conceptualisation, and accounted for in 
many additional models of psychopathic personality, are scored positively, whereby heightened 
interpersonal manipulation scores represent a greater propensity to manipulate others, largely 
viewed as a malicious and destructive of human relations (Boduszek, Debowska, & Willmott, 
2017b). Empirical explorations of this trait have displayed increased scores to be significantly and 
positively associated with greater acceptance of child sexual abuse myths and negatively 
associated with self-esteem (Boduszek et al., 2016). Whilst social psychological studies have 
broadly explored group characteristics, important within the context of a deliberating jury, 
including social conformity influence (Castelli, Vanzetto, Sherman, & Arcuri, 2001), the 
importance of shared group norms (Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000), and even juror bullying 
(Renaud, 2010), to date no explorations have focused specifically upon the more subtle role of 
interpersonal manipulation. Again, the need to investigate the role of such an intuitively important 
trait, remains apparent.  
2.3.2.2.4 Egocentricity  
 Finally, the egocentricity component of the PPTS relates to an individual’s tendency to 
focus upon their own beliefs, attitudes, and self-interests, rather than those of others. In line with 
Cleckley’s (1941) original conceptualisation, Boduszek and colleagues suggest high levels of 
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egocentricity are considered centrally important to psychopathic personality, whereby self-
centeredness and self-love is pathological and described as non-comparable to that observed in 
low scoring psychopathic individuals (Boduszek et al., 2016). Such self-centeredness is thought 
to be closely associated with an incapability to love outside the self, although positive feelings can 
be expressed towards those considered to be an ‘extension of the self’, such as off-spring or parents 
(Boduszek et al., 2016). Conceptually, an interaction between increased egocentricity and reduced 
affective responsiveness appears to influence the ability to recognise the emotional state of others, 
thus increasing scores in the lack of cognitive responsiveness component of such psychopathic 
personalities (Boduszek et al., 2016; Boduszek, Debowska, & Willmott, 2017b). The importance 
of egocentricity is evidenced in alternative models of psychopathic personalities inclusion of 
related items within their conceptualisation (PCL-R Hare, 2003; Psychopathic Traits Inventory – 
Revised [PPI-R]; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). However, as such items were not thought to 
constitute a distinct component of psychopathic personality, the importance of egocentricity within 
a jury context has never been systematically tested. Whilst studies have displayed qualitative 
distinctions in egocentricity when examining different latent classifications of the trait, specifically 
between psychopathy personality profiles, (Boduszek, Debowska, Sherretts, Boulton, & Willmott, 
2017a; Boduszek, Debowska, & Willmott, 2017b), whether egocentricity is directly associated 
with juror decision making during trial, remains untested. 
 Overall, past research directly investigating the role of personality traits and psychological 
constructs upon juror decisions has generally displayed evidence of a weak and inconsistent 
relationship. Recognition of the poor methodological designs typically utilised within mock 
simulations, and lack of advanced statistical procedures employed, may explain why it has proved 
difficult to establish such a relationship. However, also noteworthy, is the apparent lack of 
attention paid to psychological traits seemingly more relevant to the decision-making task that 
jurors face. Measures of an individual juror’s sense of self-importance alongside the ability to 
control and manipulate others have clear practical relevance within the context of a deliberating 
group, as does the ability to empathise with those involved in a given case and, in particular, an 
alleged victim. Therefore, with clear practical relevance within the context of jury decision-
making, the need to examine the role that psychopathic personality traits may have upon individual 
decision formation remains apparent. Recent advancements in the domain of psychopathy research 
alongside the advent of a newly devised PPTS scale, provides a unique opportunity to 
systematically explore the association between psychopathic personality and juror decision-
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making, where utilisation of person-centred, rather than variable centred analysis, allows such a 
relationship to be investigated more readily than past research has endeavoured to. 
2.3.3 Attitudinal Predictors  
 Interestingly, one area where scientific jury selection research (despite the limitations 
highlighted above) has displayed greater associations between juror characteristics and verdict 
inclinations has been when measuring juror attitudes towards case-related factors. Moreover, 
assessing genuine jurors and, more commonly, mock jurors’ attitudes towards factors relevant 
within a given trial, such as drug control before presiding as a juror in a drug trafficking case 
(Moran et al., 1990) or attitudes towards psychiatrists before sitting as a juror in an insanity defence 
case (Cutler et al., 1992), have displayed much greater predictive ability in terms of the verdict 
decisions jurors are likely to make. Cutler et al. (1992) have suggested that attitudinal factors may 
actually increase the accuracy of individual verdict predictions by up to 78%, with other research 
even showing an increase in the predictive ability of demographic factors (previously weak 
indicators of verdict decisions) when measured in combination with case-relevant attitudes 
(Kovera et al., 2003). Accordingly, it stands to reason that types of crime, which are themselves 
affected by strong societal attitudes, may be at an increased risk of such predisposed and biased 
juror decision making. An example of one such crime is rape. 
2.3.3.1 Rape, Rape Attitudes, and Jury Decisions 
 Sexual violence remains a serious problem globally, described by the World Health 
Organisation [WHO] as one of the most pervasive human rights violations of modern times (WHO, 
2013). Within England and Wales alone, national crime surveys display that around 404,000 
women and 72,000 men disclose being a victim of sexual violence each year (MOJ, 2013). English 
surveys also display that, on average, as many as 85,000 females report being a victim of rape 
annually, yet only 15% of victims surveyed stated that they actually reported the offence to the 
police (MOJ, 2013). Studies unsurprisingly display the impact of rape to be particularly damaging 
(Pickel & Gentry, 2017), with victims experiencing wide ranging sexual and emotional violations, 
which vary in extent and intensity (Canter, Bennell, Laurence, & Reddy, 2003). Whilst 
acknowledging that rape is perpetrated against both males and females, figures continue to 
highlight the gendered nature of the offence. Recent statistics for England and Wales display that 
throughout the 2015/16 financial year, 98.6% of defendants prosecuted for the crime of rape were 
male (CPS, 2016). More pertinent to the present study objectives, however, report-to-convict 
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figures display a worrying picture. During the 2015 calendar year, police forces throughout 
England and Wales recorded a total of 34,741 allegations of rape. Of these allegations, only 3,706 
cases (11%) progressed to trial in Crown Court, with rape convictions obtained in just 1,297 cases 
- 4% of all rapes recorded that year (MOJ, 2016).  
 Figures such as these are indicative, at least in part, of wider problems surrounding rape as 
a crime. For example, despite many people assuming rape is a crime committed largely by 
strangers lying in wait for a suitable victim, statistics reveal that the vast majority of rapes – around 
90% – are committed by people already known to the victim (MOJ, 2013). Of these, 56% are 
committed by a partner or ex-partner, making what is commonly termed acquaintance and 
domestic rapes much more prevalent than those committed by strangers (Willmott, 2016). This 
adds to the difficulty of the jury’s role if a case reaches trial, in that as these disputed “sexual acts” 
(to use a deliberately neutral description) tend to take place in private, little witness or CCTV 
evidence are often available. Also, unlike in other crimes, DNA evidence in rape cases, where the 
accused is known to the victim, can also often be of little value, demonstrating only that a sexual 
act happened, not whether this took place with consent (Willmott, 2016). Yet, even considering 
further complications which surround differences in recording practices between alternate criminal 
justice organisations (i.e. Police, CPS, MOJ, HMCTS), the role of jury decision making is clear to 
see. Even drawing upon recent statistics, that are among those most favourable to the jury system, 
suggests English juries convict in just 47% of contested rape cases (CPS, 2016). A figure which 
constitutes an increase upon previous years and which appears to decrease further when isolating 
only those cases where the defendant and complainant were known to one another prior to the 
alleged offense (Temkin & Krahe, 2008). 
 Attempts to account for jurors’ apparent reluctance to convict defendants accused of rape 
have led many researchers consider the role of rape attitudes. Like other biases identified, those 
associated with prejudiced and preconceived views towards rape have been well documented in 
their effect upon jury decision-making and throughout society more generally. Within the 
literature, these biases termed ‘rape myths’, equate to unsubstantiated common misconceptions 
surrounding what occurs during a ‘typical’ rape (Burrowes, 2013) and serve to undermine the 
legitimacy of rape as a serious crime, questioning the culpability of the victims themselves 
(Debowska et al., 2015). The term ‘rape myth’ was coined early on by Burt (1980) describing such 
myths to be “prejudice, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists” (p.217). 
One example of such stereotypical, inaccurate presumptions, drawing into question the 
authenticity of victim allegations, was displayed by Taylor and Joudo (2005). Undertaking 
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eighteen mock jury trial simulations involving a total of 210 participants, who were exposed to 
video testimony of a complainant’s allegations of sexual abuse, the authors found that despite all 
participants observing identical footage, wide ranging variation in mock jurors’ assessments of the 
complainant’s veracity were displayed. After analysis, it was concluded that such variation was 
largely influenced by participants differing beliefs surrounding how a ‘real’ victim of rape would 
have behaved following such an attack (Taylor & Joudo, 2005).  
 Similarly, McGee, O’Higgins, Garavan, and Conroy (2011), attempting to examine the 
prevalence of such assumptions more broadly within society, found high levels of rape myth 
acceptance and, specifically, inaccurate beliefs surrounding what the public believed the principle 
motivation for rape to be. The authors outlined that from over 3000 participants interviewed, 40% 
believed rape occurred as a result of the defendant’s overwhelming uncontrollable sexual desires 
and that allegations of rape were often false. Both assertions serve to undermine the culpability of 
the defendant and credibility of the complainant’s account. In fact, numerous studies and crime 
statistics have now shown these assumptions to be factually inaccurate (Beech, Ward, & Fisher, 
2006; Burrowes, 2013; Debowska, Boduszek, & Willmott, 2017; Dinos, Burrowes, Hammond, & 
Cunliffe, 2014; Johnson & Beech, 2017; Kelly, Lovett, Regan, & Britain, 2005). 
 Moreover, whilst it is important to recognise that false allegations of rape do occur, Dinos 
et al. (2014) outlined that establishing the extent of false reporting remains both a complex and 
controversial process. Nonetheless, examining data from over 2000 genuine reported cases led 
researchers Kelly et al. (2005), acting on behalf of the UK’s Home Office, to assert that the figure 
is likely to be between 0.2% - 8% of all allegations reported. Clearly, whilst accepting the various 
difficulties associated with such calculations, figures nonetheless suggest routine assumptions that 
rape allegations are likely to be false appear largely unfounded, occurring at best in a minority of 
allegations. 
2.3.3.1.1 Rape Attitudes and Personal Characteristics 
 Research has attempted to better understand rape myths by exploring individual differences 
in the likelihood of subscribing to them. In terms of demographic features, some research has 
demonstrated a degree of association between observer age (Yarmey, 1985), ethnicity (Mori et al., 
1995), and religiosity (Barnett et al., 2016), although notably these factors are not found to be 
consistently strong predictors elsewhere in the literature (Hockett, Smith, Klausing, & Saucier, 
2016). Attempting to profile important characteristics, research has displayed the greatest 
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prevalence occurred within older males, from a low socio-economic background, and who exhibit 
pre-existing racist beliefs (Suarez & Gadalla, 2010; Anderson, Cooper, & Okamura, 1997). Other 
studies explored rape myth existence more broadly finding evidence of the existence of such biased 
views across an extensive range of countries, societies, and cultures (Ward, 1995), again tending 
to be more pervasive within males than females (Burt, 1980; Reling, Barton, Becker, & Valasik, 
2017). In fact, whilst clearly a complex relationship, found to be moderated by numerous factors 
(cf. Hockett et al., 2016), studies commonly link gender with rape myth acceptance. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, due to the disproportionate rate at which females are sexually victimised, men 
consistently score higher than women in rape myth acceptance (RMA) within community settings 
(Grubb & Turner, 2012; Johnson, Kuck, & Schander, 1997), student samples (Hayes, Lorenz, & 
Bell, 2013; Kopper, 1996) and in particular, hypo-masculine settings including college fraternities 
(Hayes, Abbott, & Cook, 2016), and the military (Carroll et al., 2016).  
 The gendered nature of rape attitudes provides some insight into exactly how such attitudes 
emerge and equally may explain high rates of sexual violence perpetration. Research with male 
students and men within the general community consistently displays a relationship between the 
acceptance of myths surrounding rape with general negative attitudes towards the treatment of 
women and their sexual objectification. Those high in RMA and holding sexually aggressive 
attitudes have commonly been found to report having used verbal coercion, deception, physical 
force, and sexually aggressive behaviour to obtain sex in the past (Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; 
Koss & Dinero, 1988; Wright & Tokunaga, 2016). Exemplifying the apparent views held, Briere 
and Malamuth (1983)conducted a study whereby undergraduate students were asked whether they 
would rape a woman if they knew they would not be caught and found 30% stated that they would 
- a figure later replicated in other studies (cf. Hamilton & Yee, 1990).  
 In fact, Johnson and Beech (2017) in their systematic review of research examining RMA 
rates in convicted rapists note that such cognitive distortions (i.e. attitudes supportive of sexual 
offending), were previously found to be a significant risk factor with predictive validity 
surrounding sexual re-offending. Commenting on the societal influence of rape myths, the authors 
draw attention to numerous studies which found high RMA to be strongly associated with an 
individual’s likelihood or tendency to commit rape, termed rape proclivity (Johnson & Beech, 
2017). Notably, despite the intuitive association, Debowska, Boduszek, and Willmott’s (2017) 
exploration with a large sample of inmates demonstrated that general (non-sexual) violence 
perpetration was not necessarily predictive of sexually violent attitudes or offending.  
56 
Distinguishing inmates based upon the offence for which they were incarcerated revealed property 
crime offenders were significantly more likely to condone sexual violence compared with 
homicide offenders, indicating that convicted violent criminals (including assault, battery, and 
homicide) were not automatically prescriptive of sexually violent views. 
 Other characteristics found to be associated with the subscription of rape myths are 
psychopathic personality traits. Despite limitations surrounding the measurement tools utilised 
within some past research, studies such as Mouilso and Calhoun (2013) found a significant positive 
correlation between psychopathy and RMA scores. Likewise, utilisation of more sophisticated 
statistical methods led Debowska and colleagues to obtain further evidence of an association 
between a lack of empathy and the extent to which an individual is accepting of rape myths. 
Moreover, alongside enhanced scores in callous affect (Debowska et al., 2015), greater deficits in 
affective and cognitive responsiveness were found to significantly predict sexually violent 
attitudes among inmates (Debowska et al., 2017). Although differing associations were found 
according to the offence for which they were incarcerated, it appears that the inability to empathise 
with victims on both an emotional and cognitive level generally results in greater acceptance of 
sexual coercion.  
 With regards to prior victimisation, whilst it might be expected that RMA scores would be 
negatively associated with personal victimisation, research does not necessarily support such a 
notion. An early study examining the relationship between sexual victimisation and rape 
attributions made within a series of hypothetical vignettes, found no significant differences 
between victims and non-victims (Jenkins & Dambrit, 1987). Likewise, somewhat surprisingly the 
same lack of association was also reported in a number of other studies (Burt, 1980; Carmody & 
Washington, 2001; Lefley, Scott, Liabre, & Hicks, 1993). Further distorting this intuitive 
relationship between sexual victimisation and reduced rape attitudes, recent research found 
evidence of a positive relationship between self-reported sexual victimisation in childhood and 
rape attitudes held in adulthood, suggesting personal experience may in fact increase the 
acceptance of such attitudes (Debowska et al., 2017). However, notably this association was 
established in a sample of male inmates who may react to trauma and engage with recovery 
pathways differently to that of female victims from student and community samples.  
 Surprisingly, to the author’s knowledge, no research to date has attempted to examine the 
role of personal sexual victimisation upon juror decision-making within related trials. Likewise, 
no research appears to have examined the interaction between sexual victimisation, rape myth 
57 
acceptance, and juror decision-making. Dunlap et al.’s (2015) recent study did, however, examine 
the role of personal stalking experience upon mock juror assessments of complainant credibility 
within a stalking case. Yet, despite the author’s priori hypothesis, and in line with findings 
highlighted above, personal victimisation experience had no significant effect upon mock juror 
ratings in the case. With no research specifically examining the presence of such a relationship 
between sexual victimisation and juror voting preferences in the context of a case-relevant trial 
(i.e. rape), further exploration is undoubtedly warranted.  This is made all the more apparent when 
considering Ward (1995) reported finding the prevalence of negative attitudes towards rape to 
feature within 18% of the UK population. Importantly, despite being significantly lower than many 
other countries examined, when considering jurors are randomly selected from the general 
population and, for the most part, the only qualifying characteristics are that a person be registered 
to vote and between the ages of 18-75, tends to suggest bias as a product of rape myth acceptance 
will, to some extent, make its way into the deliberation room.  
2.3.3.1.2 Measures of Rape Myth Acceptance  
 A number of self-report scales have been developed in an attempt to measure an 
individual’s endorsement of rape myths. However, two cross-sectional scales are frequently used 
within the literature to measure RMA within research examining the impact of such attitudes upon 
mock juror behaviour. Firstly, Burt’s aptly named (1980) Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (RMAS) 
was developed as a direct attempt to establish the prevalence of such distorted beliefs around the 
sexual assault of adult women. Measured on a Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to 
‘strongly disagree’, the instrument contains nineteen items that pertain to myths such as “many 
women have an unconscious wish to be raped, and may then unconsciously set up a situation in 
which they are likely to be attacked” (Burt, 1980, p. 223). Research, utilising the measure, obtained 
evidence that sexually aggressive men, alongside men who hold a greater number of traditional 
sex role stereotypes, endorse more distorted beliefs about rape than men who do not (Burt, 1980; 
Muehlenhard, & Linton, 1987). Notably, however, criticism surrounding inclusion of a large 
number of items that do not specifically measure RMA but relate to more general gender and racial 
biases, alongside an apparent social desirability crisis evidenced by the lack of discriminate 
predictive ability between offenders and non-offenders (Bumby, 1996), has led to a decline in the 
measure’s use.  
 A second scale, developed directly as a result of criticism surrounding the RMAS and the 
assertion that the importance of rape myths lies more in their psychological-societal function, is 
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Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald’s (1999) Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (IRMA). The 
initial IRMA was comprised of forty-five items, pertaining to myths surrounding females as 
(non)victims of rape, perpetrator motivations, and general acceptance of interpersonal violence. In 
fact, in a series of studies Payne et al. (1999) revealed the existence of seven distinct myth 
components: (1) She asked for it; (2) It wasn’t really rape; (3) He didn’t mean to; (4) She wanted 
it; (5) She lied; (6) Rape is a trivial event; (7) Rape is a deviant event (p. 61). Despite wide usage 
in the literature and supportive findings of both the scales factorial structure, as well as ability to 
reliably assess several distinct cultural components of RMA (Johnson & Beech, 2017; Payne et 
al., 1999), again criticism has surrounded the measure. Concerns again surround the subtlety of 
question items in the scale, as well as the fundamental definitional position the authors take 
surrounding what constitutes a rape myth, criticised for being overly restrictive in the IRMA 
conceptualisation (Bohner, 1998). 
 Based upon an alternate definition where Bohner posits rape myths to be “descriptive or 
prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e. its causes, context, consequences, perpetrators, victims, and 
their interaction) that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit against 
women” (Bohner, 1998, p. 14), a new measure of RMA was devised. Termed the Acceptance of 
Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression (AMMSA), Gerger, Kley, Bohner, and Siebler’s (2007) 
scale was developed to more subtly measure attitudes held towards rape and sexual aggression, 
than the more overt rape myth acceptance inventories which preceded it. Comprised of thirty items 
and scored as a unidimensional construct, the scale which emerged directly out of research 
examining modern day sexism across the West (cf. Gerger et al., 2007) includes items such as 
“alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a woman” and “when a single woman invites a 
single man to her flat, she signals that she is not averse to having sex”. Responses are measured 
on a seven point Likert scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’, with higher 
scores indicating greater acceptance of myths about sexual aggression and rape. Within a series of 
previous studies, exploratory factor analysis displayed the scale’s single factor conceptualisation 
was supported (Gerger et al., 2007; Hantzi, Lampridis, Tsantila, & Bohner, 2015) as was its cross-
cultural validity when translated within a Spanish and Greek context (Megias, Romero-Sánchez, 
Durán, Moya, & Bohner, 2011; Hantzi et al., 2015). Whilst some researchers have outlined the 
need for further studies in order to confirm the scale’s internal and predictive validity (Debowska 
et al., 2014), the measure’s subtlety in questionnaire items makes use within a jury context 
particularly appealing. Despite this, research is yet to systematically employ the measure within a 
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realistic mock rape trial scenario, which offers an opportunity for the relationship between RMA 
and verdict outcomes to be more readily examined. 
 Therefore, despite some criticisms surrounding the subtlety of measures used to assess 
RMA (Bumby, 1996; McMahon & Farmer, 2011), the refined use over time, alongside the advent 
of newly developed scales, have undoubtedly contributed to understanding the extent to which 
such biases can impact decisions at trial and more broadly. In fact, an array of factors have now 
been consistently displayed to negatively impact jurors’ impartial decision making in rape cases. 
Factors range from victim blame attribution as a result wearing provocative clothing (Whatley, 
1996) and behaviour viewed as incautious (Pollard, 1992), through to a lack of belief surrounding 
the veracity of victim’s claim, based upon delayed reporting (Raitt & Zeedyk. 1997), lack of 
physical injuries (Temkin & Krahe, 2008) and a calm demeanour whilst in court (Finch & Munro, 
2005). In fact, the impact of negative attitudes surrounding rape have been so well documented 
within empirical research that judges in England are now encouraged to instruct jurors in related 
trials, to avoid drawing upon rape myths when forming decisions during trial (Ellison & Munro, 
2010). However, the extent to which instructions alone prevent such seemingly deep routed 
societal attitudes from affecting the impartiality of juror decisions, intuitively offers little 
resolution. Likewise, despite previous mock jury studies indicating the importance of rape 
supportive attitudes upon verdict outcomes, displaying high levels of rape myth acceptance to 
negatively bias jurors’ perceptions of the complainant, the RMA scales typically utilised have been 
criticised for their lack of subtlety. With questions surrounding the reliability of associated 
measurement scales, and the findings emerging from such, clearly further explorations making use 
of newly constructed subtler rape attitude scales is warranted. 
 Overall, the plethora of research that has amassed, both historically and more 
contemporarily, has consistently displayed the negative impact that rape myths have upon juror 
impartiality. Even where study procedures vary and participant samples differ, the negative 
influence of rape attitudes appears consistent (Dinos et al., 2014). Importantly, however, despite 
this empirical support, such a body of research has been significantly confounded by the lack of 
ecological validity present within many explorations, limiting the practical impact and uptake of 
the findings by policy makers. Furthermore, despite recognition of the pervasiveness of rape and 
sexual violence victimisation throughout the world (WHO, 2016), as well as within England (CPS, 
2016), to date no research has systematically explored the possible importance of personal 
victimisation upon the impartiality of juror decision-making. The need for additional research, 
whereby such effects are examined alongside the role of previous victimisation and general juror 
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demographics within highly realistic trial scenarios, remains apparent. Further investigation is 
clearly warranted to improve understanding of exactly how rape myths may impact upon the 
individual juror’s decision-making, so that any evidence of a direct relationship that exists can be 
more readily displayed, and tackled.  
2.3 THEORIES OF JURY DECISION MAKING 
 A number of theoretical models have been advanced and adopted in an attempt to explain 
how jurors make decisions during criminal trials. Competing models differ across several 
dimensions, including, primarily, whether they attempt to account for individual juror decision 
formation or whether they attempt to understand jury decision making within the collective group. 
Whilst jury-level decision-making is perhaps more readily understood, in that group deliberations 
and interactions between jurors can be directly observed, the processes underlying group decision 
making are arguably much more complex and varied. In part, this relates to the need to understand 
the interaction between the twelve individual jurors’ cognitive processing, operating in 
conjunction with social group processors and dynamics. Whilst distinctions are made between 
theoretical accounts of jury decision-making at the juror versus jury level, the vast majority of 
theorising to date has centred upon juror-level processing and decision making. Accordingly, as 
the main objective of the present research attempts to examine the predictive relationship between 
individual juror characteristics and verdict decisions, it is necessary to review common juror-level 
explanations in more detail. 
2.2.1 Competing Juror-level Explanations  
 Numerous theoretical accounts attempt to explain both descriptively (for example, 
examining how jurors specifically make verdict decisions) and prescriptively (for example, 
examining how jurors’ decision-making fits within a prescribed set of logical decision making 
rules) how individual decision formation occurs during trial (Devine, 2012). From general 
cognitive decision-making theories, such as dual process models including Epstein’s (1994) 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and Heuristic models (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), through 
to mathematical probability based Bayesian models (Hastie, 1993).  
2.2.1.1 Bayesian Explanations 
 Bayesian models are based upon mathematical probabilities and, when applied to the jury 
context, generally relate to the weighting that jurors apply to specific and discrete segments of 
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evidence heard during trial. Evidence-based weightings, which are subsequently used to inform 
jurors’ final decisions. Moreover, Bayesian models assume that jurors reach verdict decisions 
through a process of judging each individual piece of information or evidence presented at trial 
upon a continuum of guilt (Pennington & Hastie, 1981). With every new piece of evidence heard, 
the prior opinion is thought to be multiplied, leading to an overall probability of guilt being formed 
(Hastie, 1993). Jurors are assumed to begin with an initial assumption surrounding the probability 
of guilt at the onset of trial, which is thereby adjusted and updated in terms of the diagnostic value 
each new piece of evidence is judged to offer, relative to a verdict (Devine, 2012). It is believed 
that each piece of evidence is assessed in terms of its likelihood ratio, whereby the juror assesses 
whether such evidence would exist if the accused was truly guilty versus whether they were truly 
innocent (Hastie, 1993; Pennington & Hastie, 1981). Early empirical research offered some 
support for such an explanation, finding that when the crime type and degree of evidential support 
for either side varied, jurors still reported beginning with an assumption of innocence, which varied 
based upon individual segments of evidence (Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 1978). Whilst intuitively 
appealing and with qualitative accounts from genuine jurors appearing to support such a weighted 
decision-making process (see Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2015), Groscup and Tallon (2009) state 
that, overall, a lack of reliable empirical evidence to date substantiates a Bayesian explanation of 
juror-level decision making. 
2.2.1.2 Dual Process Explanations 
 Contrastingly, dual process models of information processing have been considered a more 
useful account of juror decision-making. Despite variations between models, all dual process 
models are based upon the underlying assumption that individuals process information in one of 
two ways. Carefully and systematically, if motivated to do so, or alternatively with a lesser degree 
of effort, particularly when the decision maker feels the information at hand is ambiguous or 
confusing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Clearly it seems optimum for decisions at trial to be based 
upon a systematic assessment of the evidence at hand, especially when decisions made are high 
stake, having important implications for both the defendant’s and complainant’s futures. Also 
apparent, however, is the pressure associated with making such verdict decisions, with jurors often 
presented with conflicting information during trial that causes a degree of uncertainty and conflict 
within the decision maker. Conditions under which Chen and Chaiken (1999) have found 
commonly leads to the rapid and careless processing of information, based upon heuristic biases 
rather than the logical assessment of the facts.  
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2.2.1.2.1 Heuristics 
 Heuristics, described as cognitive shortcuts drawn upon by individuals to make rapid 
decisions in complex or fast-moving situations, can lead to erroneous judgements being made 
where individuals have difficulty compartmentalising their prior knowledge (Fisk & Taylor, 
1991). Moreover, while use of heuristics can be beneficial in circumstances where rapid decisions 
are required and careful information processing is difficult, drawing upon assumptions made from 
past experiences and attitudes introduces bias into the decision-making process. Operating as 
automated responses through which information is processed, cognitive heuristics are thought to 
be relied upon by jurors when complicated judgements about the value of evidence in relation to 
the trial outcome, needs to be made. Bornstein and Greene (2011a) suggest this is particularly true 
for jurors when the evidence they are required to judge relates to something they have little 
knowledge or experience of.  
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identified several heuristics which typically affect the 
decision-making process, many of which have been used to explain juror-level decision making, 
and which research has suggested jurors make use of when information processing becomes 
complex. When required to decide compensation awards during civil cases jurors have been found 
to rely heavily on financial estimates provided by the court due to the difficulty posed in 
calculating a monetary value to personal injury, known as an anchoring bias (Bornstein & Greene, 
2011b). Other heuristics, including representativeness, where jurors over attend to salient features 
of the case which they are more able to comprehend or relate to (Kovera et al., 1999) and 
availability, where jurors assign greater probative value to the likelihood of an event occurring 
based upon the ease with which information which supports this outcome is retrievable (rather 
than predictive of its probability of occurring) (Brekke & Borgida, 1988). 
2.2.1.2.2 Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
 Another example of a dual-process model that has been applied as an explanation of juror-
level decision making is Epstein’s (1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST). In a similar 
way to other dual-process explanations, CEST suggests information is processed either effortlessly 
(experiential mode) or analytically (rational mode) (Epstein, 1994). The experiential mode is 
thought to be characterised by the crude automatic and rapid processing of information whereas 
the rational mode, is conceptualised as an information processing system underpinned by 
deliberate effortful cognitive appraisal of the circumstances within which an individual finds 
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themselves. An important feature of CEST, when compared to other dual-process models, is the 
assumption that the default experiential mode of processing only becomes rational, where a 
conscious effort to implement the higher level effortful processing is made (Epstein, 1994). 
Integrating heuristic theorising, empirical evidence appears to suggest that within the experiential 
mode of processing heuristic biases are relied upon, however, transitioning into an apparent higher 
level of processing (rational mode), such a reliance upon these biases becomes significantly 
reduced (Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992).  
 Despite its often-theoretical application as a valid account of juror decision making, 
empirical attempts to directly examine the model’s utility within a juror context have been 
infrequent. Lieberman (2002) attempted to examine whether priming mock jurors to undertake 
experiential mode or rational mode information processing would affect the monetary figure 
awarded in a civil lawsuit whilst also manipulating extra-legal heuristic bias such as defendant 
attractiveness. The authors found less effortful processing (experiential mode participants) 
awarded significantly lower monetary awards when the defendant was attractive. Likewise, as part 
of their ongoing examination, Krauss, Lieberman, and Olson (2004) again attempted to induce 
experiential mode versus rational mode information processing in jurors. According to the authors, 
findings again revealed jurors that were utilising lower level experiential processing were 
significantly more likely to base their decisions on less reliable evidence than rational processing 
jurors and that higher level rational processing in jurors was significantly associated with decisions 
underpinned by more objective evidence.  
 Overall dual-process models offer somewhat of a detailed account of the different levels 
that processing jurors are likely to engage in during trial and what influence different levels of 
juror processing may have upon the interpretation of specific evidence and ultimate decisions 
formed. In fact, explanation surrounding the cognitive processes involved and circumstances under 
which heuristic biases are most likely to confound rational and impartial decision-making is felt 
by some to be the strongest feature of dual-process models in understanding juror decisions 
(Lieberman, 2002; Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Wevodau, Cramer, Clark, & Kehn, 2014). 
However, very few explorations have sought to empirically examine such a concept within legal 
decision-making broadly, and specifically, the juror-deliberation process. Where studies have 
attempted to do so, the extent to which jurors can be reliably considered to have been primed to 
one form of information processing over another, proves somewhat difficult to ascertain. Whilst 
such models clearly have value in understanding juror information processing, no dual-process 
model applied has provided a comprehensive account of juror decision-making in its totality. In 
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fact, despite each of the aforementioned models adequately accounting for many of the processes 
thought to underlie juror decisions, none have been so comprehensive and widely accepted as 
Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model. 
2.2.1.3 The Story Model 
 Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model (1986, 1988, 1992, 1993) attempts to provide a 
complete account of the individual decision-making process jurors undertake during trial. The 
model considers jurors to be actively engaged in a narrative construction process from the onset 
of trial, seeking a cause and effect explanation of the information available. Moreover, a 
combination of trial evidence and personal inferences made about the case are used to organise 
information, so that decisions relative to the range of verdicts available (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 
1) can be made (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). It is theorised that the combination of this 
information, alongside existing world views and prior attitudes, are then used to construct one or 
more possible interpretations of the event (also termed stories). Importantly, the impact of jurors’ 
personal inferences and biases are considered most likely to be incorporated within the narratives 
jurors construct, when key elements of the stories are not presented as evidence (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1988). Essentially, the authors suggest when hearing competing accounts of the same 
incident during trial, typically including one version put forward by the defendant, as well as an 
alternative account put forward by the complainant, individual jurors construct differing narrative 
interpretations of what they believe to be the truth. At the end of trial and before deliberation, the 
theory suggests jurors then select one of these stories or narrative interpretations as the dominant 
and accepted version of events (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Before this happens, however, 
competing stories are thought to undergo differing stages of processing, with governing principles 
therein used to further assess which story is to be accepted.  
2.2.1.3.1 Stages of Processing 
 The model posits there to be three phases to a jurors’ processing leading up to the formation 
of a verdict decision; story construction, verdict representation, and story classification (see Figure 
1.2 in Chapter 1 above). Each of these phases contains a number of sub stages or governing criteria 
that stories constructed must have, in order to be accepted as a viable account of events by the 
individual juror (Pennington & Hastie, 1993).  
 The story construction phase is considered to be the most important stage underpinning 
individual decision formation. Here, jurors are thought to draw primarily upon the evidence 
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presented during the trial, as well as prior knowledge held around what typically occurs in similar 
events to the case at hand (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). This prior knowledge is thought to be 
based upon factual information, as well as assumptions and attitudes relevant to the issues under 
scrutiny. From the combination of such information, competing stories are likely to be constructed 
concurrently as possible variants of what truly happened in the case. Ultimately, however, only 
one of the multiple stories constructed will be selected and this is thought to be based upon the 
individual juror’s assessment of each story, relative to a number of criteria which the authors term, 
certainty principles (Pennington & Hastie, 1992).  
 Moreover, the authors propose that competing stories presented during trial are assessed 
by jurors in terms of having adequate; (1) coverage of crucial pieces of evidence integrated within 
an account (i.e. good fit between evidence presented and a given version of events), (2) coherence 
regarding how (3) consistent (lacks internal contradictions), (4) complete (no aspects of the story 
are missing from the evidence available), and (5) plausible (the story is credible and could possibly 
have happened) a story appears to be, and the (6) uniqueness of the story, surrounding whether 
alternative equally credible and comprehensive explanations could emerge from the evidence 
available. Pennington and Hastie (1992, 1993) posit that only upon satisfying each of these 
elements within the story construction stage (see Figure 2.1), will any one story be accepted by an 
individual juror over other competing stories. This premise was of central importance and 
investigation within the current thesis.  
 Next, within the verdict representation phase, jurors are said to begin to identify with and 
understand the differing verdict categories available. More specifically, what is thought to occur 
during this stage of processing is that jurors follow directions given to them on the law and use 
prior knowledge surrounding what constitutes a crime, in their attempt to match the evidence (or 
their perception of it) to a relevant verdict option available, including for example, guilty of rape, 
guilty of sexual assault or not guilty (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Finally, within the story 
classification stage, jurors then simply determine which verdict from the range of options available 
best match the story or version of events they have accepted according to their perceived goodness 
of fit between the two (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). For example, if the story accepted strongly 
indicates guilt for the crime of rape and verdicts available (based upon legal instructions given by 
the judge) allow the defendant to be found guilty of such an offence, then the juror will decide a 
defendant is guilty. 
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2.2.1.3.2 Theoretical and Empirical Support  
 The Story Model is now widely considered to be the dominant explanation of individual 
juror decision-making, accepted not only as the most comprehensive account of juror decision 
formation (Devine, 2012; Groscup & Tallon, 2009), but thought to be the most empirically reliable 
based upon research support attained thus far (Ellison & Munro, 2014; Hastie, Penrod, & 
Pennington, 2013; Huntley & Costanzo, 2003; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Moreover, as the 
model derived directly out of research testing the construction stages proposed, empirical support 
for such a narrative construction of the evidence is not lacking.  
 Early attempts to examine whether jurors’ mental representation of the evidence adopted a 
story structure consistent with the processing stages set out in the Story Model have provided some 
degree of support. Pennington and Hastie (1986) showed mock jurors a videotaped re-enactment 
of a murder trial and subsequently interviewed participants after making a decision, probing them 
to describe the decision-making process they undertook. Findings described that jurors constructed 
evidence into a story structure format and drew more heavily upon evidence which supported the 
accepted version of events than other evidence presented. Moreover, the authors found evidence 
presented at trial, which did not directly fit with the story constructed, was less likely to be 
discussed by the jurors. Where important elements of a juror’s story were not presented as 
evidence, the researchers found mock jurors simply made inferences based upon personal 
experiences and assumptions, ensuring the accepted story was deemed coherent and complete. 
 Pennington and Hastie’s (1988) next study adopted an alternative approach in their attempt 
to examine jurors’ mental processing, presenting student sampled participants with a written 
summary of a case which they were required to render a verdict upon. After making a verdict 
decision, mock jurors undertook a memory recognition test of trial evidence. Results displayed 
memory of trial information was best when the information being recalled was consistent with a 
story matching the verdict decision participants had made. Memory was also found to be poorest 
for story inconsistent evidence, supporting an alternative verdict to the one chosen, which the 
authors concluded to be evidence of the story construction process undertaken. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, jurors rated story consistent trial evidence as more important than evidence which 
did not support the story underpinning their verdict decision. Importantly, the authors also found 
that the content of the stories jurors constructed differed based upon the verdicts that were returned. 
67 
 In a subsequent series of studies, Pennington and Hastie (1992) varied the delivery of 
testimony at trial, to examine the impact upon this would have upon the story construction jurors 
are thought to undertake. The authors varied the presentation of evidence from the traditional 
narrative format (whereby witnesses were asked questions about the entire event sequentially), to 
an item-by-item format (whereby witnesses were asked about discrete aspects of the case non-
sequentially). Results displayed presentation order not only differentially affected a juror’s 
memory of evidence, but led to important differences in the verdicts returned. The traditional 
narrative format was found to allow easier credibility assessments of witness testimony to be 
undertaken and free recall of the trial evidence was shown to have a story structure under these 
conditions (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Findings also displayed that when jurors were asked to 
make global judgements of the evidence - as is typical during criminal trials - rather than the 
atypical item-by-item evaluations of discrete pieces of evidence, jurors appeared to adopt certainty 
principle processing and assessment, as suggested takes place within the story construction phase 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Notably, this assertion is made based upon qualitative feedback 
provided by jurors who simply described what they were thinking. This thereby appears to suggest 
that information heard by jurors at trial, is organised into competing narrative representations.  
 Pennington and Hastie (1992, p. 202) conclude that “the ease of story construction 
mediates perceptions of evidence strength, judgements of confidence, and the impact of 
information about witness credibility”. Notably, all studies purportedly displayed jurors’ mental 
representations of the case were underpinned by causally connected sequences of events, in which 
selected trial testimony appeared to be constructed into story formats. Whilst Pennington and 
Hastie’s (1988) study displayed the same evidence would be considered stronger when presented 
in a story format, the greatest influence upon final decisions was found to be the strength of one 
story when compared to another, further displaying the importance that the ease with which stories 
can be constructed appears to have (Pennington & Hastie, 1988, 1993).  
 Contemporarily, Huntley and Costanzo’s (2003) and Ellison and Munro’s (2015) studies 
exploring mock juror’s decision making in sexual assault case re-enactments also reported finding 
that narrative constructions of evidence underpinned juror decisions. A conclusion drawn largely 
by assessment of jurors’ narrative explanation of the decision-making process undertaken. In their 
attempt to examine individual differences in juror decision making within hypothetical sexual 
harassment cases, Huntley and Costanzo (2003) found jurors who endorsed different stories, 
returned different verdicts overall. This led the authors to conclude that in sexual harassment cases 
at least, differential stories constructed did underlie individual juror decision-making. In a 
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qualitative study conducted by legal scholars Ellison and Munro (2015), the authors examined the 
impact that written judicial instructions may have upon juror decisions within English criminal 
trials. Whilst beyond the main scope of the research objectives, analysis of mock juror 
deliberations led the researchers to conclude that jurors appeared to exhibit a narrative construction 
of trial evidence, rather than any Bayesian or dual-process modelling of information. Overall, the 
degree of value ascribed from such studies, alongside similar support obtained by others (cf. 
Blume, Johnson, & Paavola, 2007), has led to the Story Model’s perceived dominance within the 
literature, continually drawn upon and widely considered to be the most comprehensive 
explanation of individual juror decision formation to date (Devine, 2012). 
2.2.1.3.3 Current Limitations 
 Despite the Story Model’s comprehensiveness in its attempt to explain the juror decision-
making process from start to finish, closer consideration of the explanation does, however, 
highlight certain gaps in current understanding. Firstly, as Groscup and Tallon (2009) accurately 
point out, in much the same way as other juror-level decision models, little is known about the 
interaction this individual juror processing has upon collective group jury deliberations thereafter. 
In fact, the Pennington and Hastie’s model makes no attempt to account for the transition of 
individual juror decision formation to the ultimate unanimous group decisions required within 
English trials. This is of arguable importance when considering many justice systems around the 
world, and specifically within Britain, disregard much juror-level research as being 
unrepresentative of jury-level decisions that are ultimately returned (cf. Darbyshire, 2011; 
Kapardis, 2014). The associated logic being that the group deliberation phase of decision-making, 
alongside the need for unanimous (and occasionally majority) juror agreement before any verdict 
can be returned, resolves any undesirable juror conduct (Kapardis, 2014). As such, there is a need 
to examine to what extent individual juror decisions remain stable and how they may interact with 
the group deliberation process overall.  
 Furthermore, very little research exists that tests the individual elements termed ‘certainty 
principles’ within the Story Model, despite being considered crucial to the acceptance of one 
version of events over another. Whilst several studies described above have sought to substantiate 
claims that jurors construct competing stories or versions of events during trial, no research to date 
has directly sought to test whether the certainty principles set out within the Story Model do in fact 
govern the acceptance of one story over another. Individual constructs comprised within the story 
construction phase have been tested in isolation within past research. For example, sparse studies 
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have sought to establish the importance of plausibility in judgements made of criminal narratives 
during trial (Canter, Grieve, Nicol, & Benneworth, 2003; Jackson, 1996), as well as narrative 
coherence and completeness upon mock juror assessments of guilt (Voss & Van Dyke, 2001; Yale, 
2013). However, to the author’s knowledge no research has attempted to measure the influence of 
the combination of such certainty principles upon juror decision-making, or specifically whether 
higher scores on such principles relative to either the complainant or defendants story, are in fact 
related to the acceptance of one version of events over another. Alternatively put, no empirical 
attempt to date has established whether the Story Model’s assertion is correct in that, a juror’s 
greater belief in a complainant or defendant’s story has any significant association or correlation 
with individual juror verdict decisions overall. In general, despite its apparent utility, there is a 
need to expand upon the Story Model further, taking account of the transition between individual 
to collective jury decision-making and specifically test the constructs thought to underlie decision 
formation.  
2.4 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF JURY RESEARCH 
 Methodological criticisms are intrinsically linked to jury research. Typically centring upon 
weak methodological designs, concerns surrounding the usefulness and ecological validity of 
research set to inform legal policy, are right to be cautious. This is particularly important when 
considering that such research informed policy has the potential to impact upon the liberty of those 
accused and access to justice within those victimised.  
 A common problem, partially the result of legislative restrictions closely governing the 
jury process, surround the realism of mock trial recreations. Moreover, as highlighted previously, 
mock trial simulation research is favoured over examination of archival materials and post-trial 
interviews due to the methodological control afforded within experimental designs. However, 
somewhat ironically, many mock trial simulations are often themselves confounded by the 
unrealistic settings and circumstances in which most studies take place. For example, it is common 
practice for mock trial simulations to take place in physical spaces which in no way resemble a 
courtroom, typically selected on the basis of the ease in which they can be obtained rather than 
with ecological validity in mind. Whilst this is symptomatic of much experimental research, by 
definition often conducted in controlled laboratory settings, broader problems with the samples 
adopted and general unrealistic mundane manner in the way the studies are conducted often results 
in mock trial research exhibiting limited external and ecological validity (McCabe, Krauss, & 
Lieberman, 2010). Notably, Diamond (1997) noted early on that six core features can reduce the 
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validity of conclusions drawn from jury research identifying: “inadequate sampling, inadequate 
trial simulations, lack of jury deliberation, inappropriate dependent variables, lack of corroborative 
field data, and the nature of decisions based on role play” (p. 562), to be common in a wealth of 
studies. Despite this, many studies today exhibit little improvement.  
 A common feature of recent studies is that case information and associated trial evidence 
is presented in a written vignette format, which in many cases is significantly shorter than one 
sheet of A4 paper that jurors are subsequently required to read before making judgements. As well 
as being highly unrepresentative of genuine jurors’ decision-making task, in that discrete pieces 
of evidence are assessed and verdict decisions made after only brief, simplified, and passive 
exposure to case information, several commentators have highlighted that such procedures likely 
lead to participant identification of the independent variables being investigated (Kerr & Bray, 
2005). The influence of which likely results in demand characteristics overriding any natural juror 
behaviour at play (Hosch, Culhane, Tubb, & Granillo, 2011). Worse still, due to the administrative 
and organisational challenges associated with bringing groups of participants together to simulate 
a collective jury panel, many studies simply opt for individual juror assessments of such scenarios. 
Along with being atypical of both the manner and volume of evidence which a decision maker 
would be exposed to during trial, such research relates merely to individual decision makers with 
no actual deliberative ‘jury’ element included (Diamond, 1997; Lieberman & Olsen, 2009). Of 
particular importance is the lack of gravity usually associated with participant decisions, in that, 
unlike a real trial, mock jurors are undoubtedly aware that the verdicts they return relate to non-
genuine cases and have no consequence upon the freedom of the defendant accused.  
 Almost all jury research is so far removed from a genuine trial scenario that findings 
obtained may not accurately represent the gamut of thoughts, emotions, and internal processes that 
underlie actual jury decision-making. This issue alone highlights the importance of representative 
jury research exploration. In fact, where jury decision-making research has made its way into the 
courtroom, such limitations have not been ignored. McCabe et al. (2010) draw attention to several 
US cases, whereby even pertinent jury research is dismissed in court due its perceived lack of 
realism. Perhaps the primary methodological concern which has plagued jury research and led to 
a general unwillingness among policy makers to adopt findings attained is utilisation of 
opportunistically sampled university students as participants. Whilst the reasons for using such 
samples are self-evident, the extent to which research findings result in an external validity crisis 
remains contested.  
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 Bornstein’s (1999) examination of jury research throughout the 1990s displayed that more 
than 70% of mock trial research used students as participants. Despite longstanding concerns 
surrounding generalisability and perceived differences between university students and more 
representative community sampled mock jurors, research has traditionally concluded any 
differences to be negligible (Eisenberg, Rachlinski, & Wells, 2002; Diamond, Saks, & Landsman, 
1998; Green & Bornstein, 2003). More recent explorations, however, have offered an alternative 
perspective, finding evidence that students and community participants differed in attitude 
measures and cognitive processing styles, which in turn influenced decisions surrounding 
culpability, leniency, and guilt (Keller & Weiner, 2011; McCabe et al., 2010). Overall, what is 
however apparent is the doubt that perceived externally unrepresentative studies and 
methodologies low in ecological validity have upon the legal systems interpretation of jury 
research. As such, the need for research that examines the relationship between juror 
characteristics and verdict decision-making within settings more realistic and representative of the 
procedures encountered within genuine criminal trials, is undoubtedly required. Efforts to utilise 
and compare such effects within alternative samples and whilst employing advanced analytical 
procedures previously untested within the domain of jury research, including person-centred 
analysis, will allow more reliable findings to be obtained and are arguably essential for the 
discipline of jury decision-making to advance and continue.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
ABSTRACT 
 Within previous chapters it has been highlighted that methodological limitations exist 
within much jury research conducted to date, often low in ecological validity and therefore limiting 
the practical application of findings to real world jury decisions. The present research has made a 
concerted effort to vastly improve upon such limitations and this formed a major part of the thesis 
objectives, ensuring that results obtained - relative to each specific aim - could be more readily 
applied to the English Criminal Justice System (CJS), than previous research has accomplished. 
Whilst weak methodological designs and poor ecological validity are not uncommon, limitations 
of previous jury research are often intrinsically linked to legislative restrictions, which govern 
juror conduct and restrict research access within countries where studies have been conducted. For 
example, in the United States (US) and Canada, varying legislation restricts jury behaviour and 
disclosure of deliberative conversations. Likewise, in England, jurors are prohibited from 
discussing almost all elements of their deliberations to individuals outside of the trial. In fact, strict 
legal rules mean English jurors commit a criminal offence if disclosing any details of statements 
made or opinions cast by other jurors within a genuine trial (Contempt of Court Act, 1981). 
Equally, researchers who attempt to ask jurors questions specific to any given trial decisions are 
subject to the same legal ramifications. Therefore, alongside studies that have employed overly 
simplistic research designs, such strict legislation has undoubtedly led to a pausation in reliable, 
ecologically valid, and representative research understanding surrounding how jurors make verdict 
decisions. This is particularly true in relation to English jury decision making, with very little 
representative research existing to date.  
 This chapter introduces, in detail, current jury procedures within England and Wales 
(hereafter referred to as England for ease), and specifically how the present research sought to 
replicate such procedures within successive experimental designs. Alongside description of the 
participants recruited and sampling procedures adopted within both experiments, which sought to 
closely replicate genuine juror recruitment procedures, the psycho-social measurement tools 
employed are discussed. Here the use of separate and distinct samples is explained and a detailed 
account is provided of both experimental procedures as they were employed. Importantly, due the 
degree of forward planning that occurred prior to experimentation, as well as during each mock 
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trial simulation, the procedures are explained sequentially and in depth. Finally, the ethical 
procedures adhered to and the statistical analysis conducted will be discussed, again in relation to 
both experiments conducted. 
3.1 ENGLISH JURY TRIAL PROCEDURES 
 Within England, criminal jury panels are comprised of twelve lay individuals, randomly 
drawn from the community in which they live. English citizens are asked to serve as jurors within 
criminal trials in circumstances where a person has pled not guilty to a crime that they are accused 
of committing and where the police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) deem there to be 
sufficient evidence suggesting otherwise. A detailed description of each of the stages that underpin 
English jury procedures is provided sequentially below. 
3.1.1 Jury Selection and Recruitment 
 To fulfil their duty to serve on a jury, individuals are selected from the local electoral 
register which stores lists of the names and addresses of everybody that is registered to vote in 
public elections (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Using this information, the Jury Central Summoning 
Bureau then randomly selects a specific number of these names based upon the number of cases 
listed for trial at each English Crown court within a given week. All individuals selected are then 
sent a letter informing them that they must attend their local court at a stipulated date and time. 
Before attending, prospective jurors must complete and return a jury summons form, which seeks 
to ensure that those selected are in fact eligible to serve as a juror (Her Majesties Courts and 
Tribunals Service [HMCTS], 2014). These questionnaires assess eligibility on the basis of age, 
British residency, criminal history, and mental health (see Table 3.1 below). Whether an individual 
currently works or has worked for the police or prison service in the last five years is also recorded, 
although nowadays such employment is unlikely to result in an excusal from serving (Judicial 
College, 2016).  
 It is a criminal offence to fail to disclose information that would render yourself ineligible 
to serve as a juror, and criminal records checks are conducted on a selection of those summoned 
to ensure jurors have answered honestly (Jury Central Summoning Bureau, Personal 
Communication, March 11th, 2015). Likewise, once summoned, it is a legal requirement to 
undertake jury duty at the time stipulated, with few reasons permitting a juror from being excused 
(HMCTS, 2014). However, due to prospective juror’s information being obtained from the 
electoral register, senior personnel within the English Jury Central Summoning Bureau outline that 
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outdated address details are common, resulting in many of those selected never actually receiving 
the summons to attend. As such, approximately three times the required number of jurors are 
summoned for a given period, ensuring that enough jurors are available for the trials taking place 
at the beginning of each week, (Jury Central Summoning Bureau, Personal Communication, 
March 11th, 2015). 
 
Table 3.1  
Summary of the English Jury Summons Inclusion & Exclusion Criteria  
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Aged between 18 and 75 on the date jury duty begins. 
Have lived in the UK for a period of at least 5 years, since the age of 13. 
Are not currently suffering from any diagnosed and severe mental illnesses 
Are not currently on bail, been convicted or served prison time for a criminal offence in the 
last 10 years.   
Adapted from the Judicial College, (2016) Crown Court Compendium guidelines. 
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3.1.2 Day of the Trial 
 Upon arriving at court, jurors are met by a jury officer and assembled within a separate 
room to the other people in the court building. Here, each juror is recorded as in attendance and 
seated. Once all jurors expected for the day’s trials are in attendance, or by a stipulated time 
(whichever arrives first), the jury officer briefly explains what will take place throughout their jury 
service (Open Justice, 2016). In unison, all jurors are subsequently asked to watch a short twelve-
minute step-by-step video, which explains, in detail, the role of the juror and what will occur during 
the trial (cf. Ministry of Justice, 2016). Jurors are then asked to simply remain within the jury 
assembly room until further notice. Over the course of the day and week ahead, jurors are selected 
for trial from the jury assembly area through a process of random computer generation. Upon the 
jury officer being notified that a trial is about to begin, fifteen names are automatically generated 
by computer and these individuals are subsequently asked to follow the court clerk into a 
courtroom (known as the jury in waiting) (Ministry of Justice, 2016). In the final stage of the 
process, the court clerk then reads aloud the names of twelve of the fifteen jurors in waiting, to be 
seated for trial. Again, this is conducted through a process of random selection whereby fifteen 
cards featuring the names of each of the prospective jurors are simply shuffled and the clerk reads 
the first twelve names aloud (Ministry of Justice, 2016).  
 The twelve jurors selected make their way into the jury box within the courtroom and are 
individually asked to take an oath or, as is increasingly popular nowadays, make an affirmation to 
faithfully try the defendant and return a verdict according to the evidence (cf. Ministry of Justice, 
2016). Whilst the presence of twelve jurors is said to be based more on tradition than logic (Auld 
Report, 2001), criminal trials can continue with as few as nine jurors if individuals are discharged 
before the trial is complete. This is often as a result of unforeseen circumstances, most commonly, 
serious illness or important family matters (Juries Act 1974, sec 16 (1)). The remaining three 
individuals not selected for the trial are asked to return to the jury assembly room to await selection 
for another case. 
3.1.3 Onset of the Trial 
 At the onset of the trial, once all jurors have been sworn in, the charges against the 
defendant are read aloud in open court by the clerk. The jury has the opportunity to highlight at 
this point whether there are any reasons why they should not be formally seated as a juror in the 
case. Primarily, this refers to knowing any of the individuals involved in the case (Ministry of 
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Justice, 2016). However, in practice this happens infrequently within the United Kingdom (UK) 
(Kapardis, 2009). The trial then begins and the judge starts by providing the jury with some basic 
instructions surrounding the difference in roles of the judge and jury, as well as procedural 
information surrounding how the different stages of the trial will progress. The judge also explains 
in detail the legal restrictions (and ramifications) imposed upon jurors during their service, such 
as not to discuss the case with any persons outside of the court and not even with other jurors, until 
all evidence has been completed (Judicial College, 2016).  
 Legal directions are also now routinely given surrounding use of social media, explaining 
that nothing related to the case must be shared in such arenas, at present or at any point in the 
future (Judicial College, 2016). The judge then typically gives the jury a final direction to make 
use of the pens and paper in front of them, should they wish to take notes. For a summary of the 
instructions that an English judge must give to jurors pre-trial, as determined by the Judicial 
College (2016), see table 3.2 below.  
 
Table 3.2 
Summary of the instructions a trial judge provides to jurors’ pre-trial. 
Key Pre-Trial Jury Instructions 
The need to try the case only on the evidence heard and remain faithful to their oath or 
affirmation. 
The prohibition on internet searches for matters related to the trial. 
The importance of not discussing any aspect of the case with anyone outside their own jury 
panel or allowing anyone to talk to them about such via any form of communication, 
including Facebook or Twitter. 
The importance of taking no account of any media reports about the case. 
The need to bring any concerns, including concerns about the conduct of other jurors, to the 
attention of the judge at the time, and not to wait until the case is concluded. 
Adapted from the Crown Court Compendium guidelines (Judicial College, 2016). 
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 As the defendant has pled not guilty to the offences they are accused of (necessary for the 
case to be heard before a jury), the prosecution begins by presenting their case against the 
defendant. The prosecuting lawyer starts by delivering an opening speech to the jurors, outlining 
the key pieces of evidence against the defendant and provides jurors with an overview of what the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) argue happened in case. The prosecution then begins to call 
their witnesses during what is known as evidence-in-chief, whereby the lawyers ask witnesses 
questions surrounding what they know about the case. Following this, the defence lawyers then 
have an opportunity to ask each prosecution witness questions of their own, known as cross-
examination. This is typically the point during which defence barristers aim to display gaps, 
inconsistencies, or deception within witness testimony. Lastly, following such questioning the 
prosecution is again permitted to ask each witness further questions should they wish to do so, 
termed re-examination, after which time the witnesses are dismissed (Ministry of Justice, 2016). 
This re-examination is typically used by prosecution lawyers to clarify to the court any ambiguous 
or contradictory statements made by witnesses during cross-examination. After all prosecution 
witnesses have been questioned, the defence lawyers then begin to present their case to the jury. 
Following an identical pattern, the defence case is outlined to the jury, defence witnesses are called 
and questioned before being cross-examined by the prosecution lawyers and re-examined by 
defence lawyers. Finally, once all evidence has been presented to the jury, the prosecution and 
defence lawyers deliver their closing speeches, summing up their respective (and typically 
contrasting) arguments or narratives in the case (MOJ, 2016).   
 In what equates to the final stage of the trial, the sitting judge then provides the jury with 
his or her own summary of the case. Unlike the lawyers, this speech is governed by stricter legal 
guidelines, which a judge must follow when instructing jurors in a case. The main objective of the 
judge’s summary is to outline relevant points of law and present an unbiased summary of the 
evidence such that jurors are best able to reach a verdict decision (Judicial College, 2016). This 
often requires the trial judge to follow a prescribed set of guidelines relevant to the type of case at 
hand. For example, in a rape trial, specific and somewhat standardised instructions must be 
provided surrounding the law of consent, as well as particular interpretations of the facts that the 
jury should agree upon in order to decide upon a particular verdict.  
 It is important to note that these important and complex legal questions are explained to 
the jury at length, in an attempt to ensure that verdicts reached conform with the law around the 
specific offence type. The judge also summarises specific facts of the case and gives directions 
relating directly to key pieces of evidence that the jury should choose to focus upon (MOJ, 2016). 
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Nowadays, it is also increasingly common for judges to provide jurors with a document known as 
a ‘route to verdict’, where key legal instructions provided by the judge in their summary of the 
case, is handed to jurors in print format prior to deliberation (Judicial College, 2016). This serves 
as an attempt to simplify the legal instructions jurors should follow during their decision-making 
process, in particular providing guidance surrounding how jurors may satisfy the need to be 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, a criteria necessary (in principle) in order to convict a defendant at 
trial (Judicial College, 2016).   
3.1.4 Jury Deliberation 
 Before deliberation, the judge explains to the jury that the decisions they make must be 
based solely on the evidence that was presented during the trial and that no outside influence or 
bias should influence their decisions in the case. Directions specific to the ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ requirement will again be explained, before the jury is asked to proceed to the jury room 
where they are instructed to deliberate until a verdict is reached (Judicial College, 2016). Jurors 
are then led to the deliberation room by the court usher where, for the first time during their jury 
service within a particular trial, they are permitted to discuss the case as a collective. The first 
stage of deliberations, however, is to nominate a jury foreperson between themselves (MOJ, 2016). 
Within England, juries must endeavour to reach a unanimous verdict, whereby all twelve members 
of the jury panel are in agreement. Where jurors are unable to do so, at the judge’s discretion, a 
majority verdict of ten jurors to two (10:2) may be accepted (Judicial College, 2016). The legal 
requirement underlying the acceptance of majority decisions is that a minimum time of two hours 
deliberating must have passed and jurors receive an amended direction from the judge outlining 
that a majority verdict will now be accepted (known as The Watson Direction) (Judicial College, 
2016). Deliberations take place in private and at no point is anybody, other than the jurors present, 
permitted to know anything that was discussed or took place during deliberations, with the 
exception of the ultimate verdict decision returned or where juror misconduct is reported to the 
judge.  
 A court usher is stationed outside of the jury room throughout the duration of deliberations, 
who manages any questions jurors may have for the judge. At the point upon which a verdict has 
been reached, the jury foreperson will notify the court usher, who notifies the judge, and the court 
is then reconvened (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Once all personnel are in attendance, the court clerk 
will ask the jury foreperson to stand and deliver the collective verdict. After the verdict has been 
delivered the role of the jury is complete and they are then thanked and provided with a final 
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warning that they must not discuss the case with anybody thereafter, before being dismissed from 
court by the judge (Judicial College, 2016).  
3.1.5 Ecological Validity of Study Procedures  
 Due to legislative restrictions which surround the jury trial process, attaining high 
ecological validity has traditionally proved extremely difficult within previous jury research. 
Experiments have typically made use of unrepresentative opportunity samples, selected more on 
the ease in which participants are able to be recruited, than the degree to which they represent a 
mock juror. Additionally, participant eligibility to serve as a juror within a genuine criminal trial 
has either not been assessed or simply assumed based upon the age of those who partook. More 
importantly, however, most experimental jury research is often so far removed from a criminal 
trial procedure that the requirement bestowed upon participants to make a verdict selection, is 
typically the only factor which links the study to jury decision making at all. Despite this, ensuring 
high ecological validity based on the methodological procedures employed has important 
implications for giving strength to any findings obtained and claims that can be asserted. 
Moreover, the implications of jury research have consequences not only for legal policy but 
directly upon the lives of those accused and genuine victims bringing their case to trial. With this 
in mind, the upmost care was taken within the present research to ensure that the methodological 
procedures employed obtained a high degree of ecological validity, for the most part unrivalled 
within any existing mock jury research, particularly within England.  
 Within the current research, Experiment 1, (discussed in more depth below) attempted to 
improve upon traditional mock jury student sample research by (1) assessing participant eligibility 
to serve a genuine juror, (2) conducting jury panel explorations rather than individual juror 
decision making tasks, and (3) doing so within the context of a genuine criminal trial simulation. 
The simulated trial was filmed within an actual English courtroom, which was subsequently 
observed by live groups of deliberating participants. A large sample was also considered 
paramount for reliably testing effects within a student sample. Extending upon such a 
methodological approach further, Experiment 2 attempted to conduct what may perhaps be 
considered the most ecologically valid and realistic mock jury trial research ever conducted within 
the UK. Notably, jurors were selected in an identical manner to real jury selection and observed a 
live re-enactment of genuine criminal case, simulated by genuine lawyers and professional actors 
over the course of an entire day. The purpose of doing so was to allow subsequent results obtained 
to be more readily applicable and indicative of genuine jury decision-making occurrences. In turn, 
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the findings are likely to have greater practical utility to the jury decision making process, allowing 
direct implications for this form of justice to be asserted. 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 1 – STUDENT SAMPLE MOCK TRIALS 
 Working in consultation with an expert panel of criminal justice practitioners, including 
lawyers and specialist sexual offence detectives from two separate British police forces, the first 
study was devised. Adopting an experimental, independent-subjects and repeated-measures 
design, participants were recruited to take part in a mock jury trial scenario, whereby panels of 
student mock jurors observed a short rape trial re-enactment. The scenario depicted an 
‘acquaintance’ style rape case, which included important components that both past research and 
expert consultation suggests are present in many contested rape cases, namely; voluntary 
intoxication, lack of independent witnesses, and some form of prior acquaintanceship with the 
defendant accused. In line with the overarching aims of the thesis, the study sought to examine 
whether mock juror psychological constructs and attitudes have an influence upon verdict 
outcomes. Essentially, the present experiment sought to directly investigate the relationship 
between individual juror characteristics and the verdict decisions participants make within rape 
trials.  
3.2.1 Sample 
 A self-selecting opportunity sample of 352 participants distributed across 30 mock jury 
trials, were recruited from the University of Huddersfield, UK. The University of Huddersfield is 
located in the North of England and, with a student population in excess of 20,000, is the 5th largest 
of 12 universities within the Yorkshire region (Yorkshire Universities, 2017). The university has 
students enrolled from more than 130 countries within seven separate schools and was recently 
ranked 68th out of 154 UK universities in terms of its research output and national impact (Research 
Excellence Framework, 2014). Full demographic information of the university’s student 
population is displayed within Table 3.3 below. The present study sample consisted primarily of 
undergraduate and postgraduate university students, as well as a small number of non-student 
members of the general population, recruited through their involvement in some form with the 
university (i.e. staff, volunteers, and visiting practitioners). As a result of significant missing 
information, as well as the non-attendance of a total of eight participants from mock trials that 
went ahead (see procedure below for details of mock trials that were cancelled), the data from 
three mock jury panels (panels 1, 3 & 4) were removed prior to analysis. The remaining sample, 
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therefore, was 324 participants distributed across 27 separate mock jury trials, each comprising of 
12 jurors.  
 Participants ranged in age from 18 to 70 years old (M = 24.86, SD = 9.34), and comprised 
of 210 females (64.8%) and 114 males (35.2%). Additionally, the majority of the sample - 213 
participants - reported their ethnicity as Caucasian (65.7%), 58 reported themselves as of South 
East Asian descent (17.9%) and 53 as Black Afro-Caribbean (16.4%). In total, 301 participants 
were university students (93.5%), with the remaining twenty-one being non-student university 
affiliates (6.5%). Finally, in line with most participants being undergraduate students, most of the 
sample reported their highest qualification to date to be a college obtained qualification (73.1%), 
and a total of 48 participants stated that they were the parent to at least one child (14.8%). The 
overall demographic profile of study participants was therefore similar to the general student 
population at the University of Huddersfield (see Table 3.3 and 3.4). In particular, age, gender 
distribution, ethnicity, and level of study were extremely similar and therefore highly 
representative of the university’s student population as a whole.  
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Table 3.3  
University of Huddersfield student population demographic profile (enrolled 2014/1) 
Variable N (%) 
Population  20,742 (100%) 
Age 
   20 and below 
   20 to 29 
   30 and above 
 
 7,934 (38.0%) 
 8,155 (40.0%) 
 4,653 (22.0%) 
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
 8,835 (43.0%) 
11,907 (57.0%) 
Level of Study 
   Undergraduate 
   Postgraduate 
 
15,456 (75.0%) 
 5,286 (25.0%) 
Ethnicity 
   Caucasian  
   BME 
   Chinese 
   Other 
 
13,593 (66.0%) 
 4,976 (24.0%) 
 1,302 (6.0%) 
    871 (4.0%) 
Current Area of Study 
   Human and Health 
   Business 
   Educational Studies 
   Arts and Design 
   Computer Engineering 
   Music and humanities 
   Applied Sciences 
 
4,854 (23.0%) 
4,616 (22.0%) 
2.626 (13.0%) 
2,353 (11.0%) 
2,350 (11.0%) 
2,155 (10.0%) 
1,788 (9.0%) 
Note: Data derived from University of Huddersfield internal marketing records relating to the academic 
year 2014/15. For publicly available information please refer to The Complete University Guide (2017). 
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Table 3.4 
Complete demographic profile of the student sample utilised within Experiment 1. 
Variable N (%) Mean (SD) Range 
Age (continuous) 324 (100%) 24.86 (9.41) 18-70 
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
114 (35.2%) 
210 (64.8%) 
 
 
 
Ethnicity  
   Caucasian 
   South East Asian 
   Black Afro-Caribbean  
 
213 (65.7%) 
58 (17.9%) 
53 (16.4%) 
  
Highest Qualification 
   Secondary School or less 
   College / Vocational 
   University Degree  
   Higher Degree (MD/PhD/MSc) 
 
9 (2.8%) 
237 (73.2%) 
50 (15.4%) 
28 (8.6%) 
 
 
 
 
Current Area of Study 
   Human Health Sciences 
   Business 
   Arts 
   Science 
   None (Finished/Yet to Start) 
 
235 (72.5%) 
 28 (8.6%) 
 15 (4.6%) 
 25 (7.7%) 
 21 (6.5%) 
 
 
 
Currently Employed (PT/FT) 
   Yes 
   No 
 
135 (41.7%) 
189 (58.3%) 
 
 
 
Parent of Child/Children 
   Yes 
   No 
 
 48 (14.8%) 
276 (85.2%) 
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3.2.2 Measures 
 A number of established psychological and attitudinal measures were adopted within the 
present study. Additionally, a demographics questionnaire was completed by participant’s pre-
trial, and a juror verdict decision questionnaire completed post-trial. Full descriptions of each 
questionnaire and measure are detailed below. 
Demographics Questionnaire – A self-report demographic questionnaire was developed 
to gather information surrounding participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, and educational 
qualifications. Questions were also asked about family background (i.e. ‘Do you have any 
children?’, ‘What gender are your children?’), as well as previous victimisation (i.e. ‘Have you 
ever been a victim of crime?’, ‘Have you ever been a victim of a sexual crime?’). The 
demographics questionnaire was comprised of 14 items in total. 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA; Gerger, Kley, Bohner, 
& Siebler, 2007). This is a self-report inventory devised to more subtly measure attitudes held 
towards rape and sexual aggression, than more overt rape myth acceptance inventories which 
preceded the development of this measure (e.g. Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale; Payne, 
Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999). The inventory is comprised of thirty items, all of which are 
positively scored and unidimensional (e.g. “Alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a 
woman”, “When a single woman invites a single man to her flat she signals that she is not averse 
to having sex”, “Women often accuse their husbands of marital rape just to retaliate for a failed 
relationship”). Responses are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 “completely 
disagree” to 7 “completely agree”, and overall scores are measured from 30 up to 210, with higher 
scores indicating greater acceptance of myths about sexual aggression. Within a series of previous 
studies, exploratory factor analysis demonstrated the scale to consist of a single factor (Gerger et 
al., 2007; Hantzi, Lampridis, Tsantila, & Bohner, 2015). Additionally, validation of the inventory 
within a Spanish and Greek context also displayed high internal consistency and moderate internal 
validity of the scale (Megias, Romero-Sánchez, Durán, Moya, & Bohner, 2011; Hantzi et al., 
2015). However, some researchers have outlined that further studies are required in order to 
confirm the scale’s internal and predictive validity (Debowska et al., 2014). Internal-consistency 
estimates of reliability within the current sample were examined for the reported unidimensional 
factor using Cronbach’s alpha. Reliability was inferred with a value of .92 for the full scale, which 
was consistent with the figures reported by Gerger et al. (2007).  
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Psychopathic Personality Traits Scale (PPTS; Boduszek, Debowska, Dhingra, & DeLisi, 
2016). The scale was designed as a brief self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits, to 
be used within diverse populations for research purposes. Specifically, the scale was developed in 
response to a lack of existing inventories, which measure psychopathic personality broadly within 
both forensic and non-forensic populations, irrespective of respondents’ criminal history, cultural 
background, age or gender (Boduszek, et al., 2016). All scale items measure respondents’ self-
reported knowledge/skills and attitudes/beliefs, rather than behavioural characteristics and, as 
such, was deemed the most appropriate measure of psychopathic personality traits within the 
present non-offender sample. The inventory is comprised of twenty items (six of which are reverse 
scored) divided over four factors; 
(1) Affective Responsiveness (AR), five items, (for example, “I don’t care if I upset someone 
to get what I want”, “What other people feel doesn’t concern me”, “Seeing people cry 
doesn’t really upset me”). 
(2) Cognitive Responsiveness (CR), five items, (for example, “I am good at predicting how 
someone will feel”, “I’m quick to spot when someone is feeling awkward or 
uncomfortable”, “I find it difficult to understand what other people feel”). 
(3) Interpersonal Manipulation (IPM), five items, (for example, “I know how to make another 
person feel guilty”, “I know how to pay someone compliments to get something out of 
them”, “I sometimes provoke people on purpose to see their reaction”). 
(4) Egocentricity (EGO), five items, (for example, “I tend to focus on my own thoughts and 
ideas rather than on what others might be thinking”, “I believe in the motto: “I’ll scratch 
your back, if you scratch mine”, “It’s natural for human behaviour to be motivated by self-
interest”). 
 Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” 
to 5 “strongly agree”, with possible scores therefore ranging between 20 and 100. Higher scores 
thereby indicate higher elevated levels of psychopathic personality traits. Confirmatory factor 
analysis, along with confirmatory bifactor analysis, corroborated the four-factor model of the 
PPTS. Additionally, use of composite reliability further indicated the measure had good internal 
reliability (Boduszek, et al., 2016). Internal reliability estimates for the current sample were 
examined for all four factors in the model with use of composite reliability. All values proved to 
be above Diamantopoulos and Siguaw’s (2000) stipulated acceptable limit of .60 (Affective 
Responsiveness = .86, Cognitive Responsiveness = .76, Interpersonal Manipulation = .84 & 
Egocentricity = .69) displaying adequate to good internal reliability. 
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The scale was designed as a self-
report measure of an individual’s self-esteem. Defined as a set of positive or negative thoughts and 
feelings held in relation to perceived self-worth (Rosenberg, 1965), the inventory is considered to 
be one of the most widely used instruments in the history of psychology (Mash, Scalas, & 
Nagengast, 2010). The scale is comprised of ten items (five of which are reverse scored) and 
treated as a unidimensional construct (“On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”, “At times, I 
think I am no good at all”, “I certainly feel useless at times”). Responses are measured on a four-
point Likert scale ranging from, 1 “strongly disagree” to 4 “strongly agree”, with possible scores 
therefore ranging between 10 and 40. Higher scores reflect more positive evaluations of the self, 
thus indicating greater self-esteem. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, as well as 
principal-components analysis have supported both a one-factor unidimensional solution (Schmitt 
& Allik, 2005; Shevlin, Bunting, & Lewis, 1995) and a two-factor solution of positive and negative 
self-esteem (Boduszek, Hyland, Dhingra, & Mallett, 2013; Boduszek, Shevlin, Mallett, Hyland, 
& O’Kane, 2012). However, recent studies among general non-specific populations utilising large 
samples, reported that the two hypothesised factors (positive and negative self-esteem) are better 
conceptualised as ‘grouping factors’, rather than representing distinct latent constructs. This 
supports the bifactor model of the RSES as a unidimensional construct (Hyland, Boduszek, 
Dhingra, Shevlin, & Egan, 2014; McKay, Boduszek, & Harvey, 2014). Treating the RSES 
inventory as unidimensional within the present study, internal consistency estimates of reliability 
were examined using Cronbach’s alpha. Reliability was displayed with a value of .86 for the full 
scale and thereby above the minimum acceptable level of above .70 (DeVellis, 2003). 
Juror Decision Scale (JDS; Willmott & Boduszek, under review). This scale was 
developed within the present study and was designed as a self-reported measure of individual juror 
verdict decision-making, which sought to incorporate specific theoretical principles set out in 
Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model. Moreover, after hearing competing evidence during 
trial the model theorises there to be three processing phases underpinning a jurors’ formation of a 
verdict decision, termed story construction, verdict representation, and story classification (see Fig 
1.2 in Chapter 1), with the story construction phase considered to be most important upon 
individual decision formation. Here, the model suggests competing versions of events (i.e. the 
complainant versus defendant stories), are independently and implicitly assessed by individual 
jurors according to a number of prescribed certainty principles. To accept one of these given stories 
and subsequently make a verdict decision upon it, it is suggested that jurors review; (1) the 
coverage of crucial evidence offered in an account, (2) the existence of story coherence regarding 
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how (3) consistent, (4) complete and (5) plausible each version is deemed to be, alongside being 
(6) unique, in that alternative equally credible explanations do not emerge from the evidence 
available. However, despite outlining how the certainty principle process is thought to underlie 
decision formation, no empirical attempt to test such concepts through the development of an 
associated scale has yet occurred. In an attempt to firstly develop a scale, which allows testing of 
such a premise to be undertaken and secondly, empirically examine the existence of such an 
apparent mode of processing within the context of the present study samples, the Juror Decision 
Scale (JDS; Willmott & Boduszek, under review) was devised.  
 Item generation for the JDS relied directly upon the Story Model’s theoretical 
conceptualisation of the certainty principles. As such, seven items pertaining to the extent to which 
a juror felt a complainant’s story had coverage, coherence, consistency, completeness, plausibility, 
uniqueness, and overall believability were devised. An identical seven items pertaining 
specifically to the defendant’s story were also included in the scale, all of which were measured 
on a five-point Likert scale. In accordance with the story model assertions, these complainant 
versus defendant certainty principle items were hypothesised to constitute two separate dimensions 
within the scale, which, in line with the Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) theory, should be highest 
for the individual whose story is matched to a verdict decision. Taking into account theoretical 
discussion surrounding the role of juror confidence in jurors’ story assessments/verdict 
classifications (Pennington & Hastie, 1993), two global items pertaining to decision confidence 
were also included in the scale, hypothesised to comprise a separate dimension within the scale. 
Thereby, in total, the scale developed comprised of a total of sixteen items distributed across three 
hypothesised dimensions. Overall, where the Story Model is accurate, higher scores would be 
expected to be found on the complainant believability sub-scale for jurors who returned a guilty 
verdict, and higher on the defendant believability sub-scale where jurors retuned a not guilty 
verdict.  
 Therefore, all JDS scale items measure respondents’ self-reported assessments of how 
believable they determine a complainant and defendant to be, having heard all evidence in a 
particular jury trial (or mock trial for research purposes), as well as their self-reported confidence 
relating to the individual verdict decision made in a given case. The measure is comprised of 
sixteen items all of which are positively scored and divided over three factors;  
(1) Complainant Believability (COMP), seven items, (for example, “How complete was the 
complainant’s story, in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported by the 
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evidence?”, “How coherent was the complainant’s story, meaning that the different stages 
described as happening were logically connected?”). 
(2) Defendant Believability (DEF), seven items, (for example, “How complete was the 
defendant’s story, in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported by the 
evidence?”, “How coherent was the defendant’s story, meaning that the different stages 
described as happening were logically connected?”). 
(3) Confidence in Decision (CON), two items, (for example, “Thinking about your individual 
verdict decision of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, how confident are you that you made the correct 
decision?”, “Finally, taking everything into consideration, how confident are you overall 
that you reached the correct verdict decision in this case?”). 
 Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from, 1 “not at all” to 5 
“extremely”, with possible total scores ranging from 16 to 80. Higher scores on the Complainant 
Believability and Defendant Believability sub-scales indicates greater belief in the account given 
by each respective individual, with lower scores indicating a lower respondent belief in the account 
given. Higher scores on the Confident in Decision subscale indicates a greater respondent 
confidence that the individual verdict decision they had made was accurate according to the 
evidence heard. For the CFA, which examined the proposed three factor model of the JDS, refer 
to Chapter 4 Results, sub-section section 4.3. 
3.2.3 Procedure  
 The current study sought to improve upon methodological limitations that exist within 
much jury research to date, typically utilising short vignette trial scenarios, whereby individual 
jurors - rather than a collective jury panel - are asked to make verdict decisions. Accordingly, 
efforts were made within the present experiment to design and implement mock trials that 
improved upon the ecological validity therein. In order to do so, study procedures were broken 
down into different stages and, where possible, reflect the sequential stages undertaken within 
genuine criminal jury trial procedures. For clarity, each of these stages is discussed in detail below. 
3.2.3.1 Pre-trial Procedures 
 Before the mock trial simulations took place, a number of pre-trial procedural steps and 
plans were undertaken. This included careful selection of the case to be used within the mock trial 
simulation, after consultation with a panel of experts had occurred. Also, preparation of the case 
in terms of the experimental objectives, as well as legal admissibility, development of the case into 
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a format that could be repeatedly shown to different panels of participants, and, finally, the 
recruitment of mock jurors as closely in alignment with genuine trial recruitment procedures as 
possible. 
3.2.3.1.1 Case Selection 
 Before selecting or devising a scenario to be used within the rape trial simulation, 
consultation with an expert panel of Criminal Justice System (CJS) practitioners was undertaken. 
Here, panel members included a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyer, an experienced 
criminal barrister, and three senior detectives within specialist sexual offences units from two 
differing police forces in the North of England. In an attempt to enhance the future practical 
applications of the study findings, discussions focused upon what panel members felt the central 
and commonly contested components to be within rape cases, as well as what features typically 
lead to uncertainty surrounding the likely verdict that would be returned during trial.  
 Subsequent to group discussions, all expert panel members collectively agreed and 
identified the following three features as typically present within contested rape cases, namely: 
voluntary intoxication where the complainant had willingly consumed alcohol prior to the alleged 
rape (often with the alleged perpetrator themselves), a lack of independent witnesses that were 
able to corroborate either parties account of the event, and some level of previous acquaintanceship 
between the alleged victim and perpetrator. Acquaintanceship was collectively described as 
equating to having met on the day of the incident, through to knowing one another for several 
years. Examination of the scientific literature further displayed the apparent importance of such 
features upon jury decisions, highlighted as being present within a large majority of rape cases and 
considered central to the difficulty of the decision-making task that jurors must undertake within 
rape trials (Lovett & Horvath, 2009). Accordingly, it was decided that these three components 
would form the basic core features required to be present within any case selected for development 
into a mock trial simulation. Furthermore, to improve the ecological validity within the present 
study, it was decided that the case scenario adopted would be based on a genuine rape case that 
had previously been heard before a jury. Selecting cases that had previously been to trial ensured 
that the legal threshold had been met with regards to the evidence available, and such evidence 
had therefore been deemed significant enough to warrant a criminal trial. This was a direct attempt 
to avoid potential criticism surrounding the realistic nature of scenario used.  
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 A systematic trawl was then conducted of legal case databases, LexisNexis and the British 
and Irish Legal Information Institute (BILII). These databases store genuine information and 
transcripts of cases that have previously gone to trial within the UK. The basic search criteria 
adopted within these databases was that the transcript, (1) related to a criminal rape trial that had 
taken place within England since 2003 (due to changes in sexual offence legislation during that 
year – see Stevenson, Davies, & Gunn, 2004). This search generated in excess of 2000 trial 
transcripts, varying in length, depth and legal purpose. Therefore, to further narrow the search, 
additional inclusion and exclusion criteria was adopted at this stage (see table 3.5 below) and a 
qualitative review was then conducted of the available case transcripts. 
 In line with the research objectives, transcripts were further required to include (2) 
voluntary intoxication, previous acquaintanceship, and a general lack of independent witnesses, as 
highlighted as common within many contested rape cases. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
gendered nature of most rape cases that progress to trial in the UK (Burrowes, 2013; Lovett & 
Horvath, 2009), only cases with (3) one alleged male perpetrator and one alleged female victim 
were included, (4) where the sexual offence of rape was recorded (excluding cases with additional 
offences of grievous bodily harm, robbery or domestic violence). Transcripts were also required 
to include (5) enough detail surrounding the alleged rape, specifically, the events preceding and 
following the rape incident, as well as the competing accounts of the complainant and defendant. 
These competing accounts were required to be (6) largely evidentially balanced or ambiguous, 
meaning that roughly equal information corroborated and contradicted both parties’ accounts of 
what happened.  
 Notably, legal scholars highlight that due to the general lack of independent evidence, 
alleged rapes committed by an individual in some way acquainted with the complainant are 
typically ambiguous and evidentially neutral (Lovett & Horvath, 2009). This pertains to the fact 
that testimony generally hinges on one person’s account versus that of the other party and that 
sexual interactions tend to take place in private, limiting the possible independent evidential 
opportunities. As such, the need for a representative scenario that included a level of ambiguity 
and sufficient lack of corroborative evidence, such that participant decisions would not be 
necessarily swayed one way or another was stipulated. Additionally, this would ensure that verdict 
decisions would be more closely attributable to the personal attitudes, biases, and psychological 
factors implicit within jurors making decisions. Cases which met all of the stipulated criteria were 
then selected on a first-come first-selected basis, until a total fifteen cases were shortlisted. These 
transcripts were then further scrutinised on the basis of including, (7) key information surrounding 
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the legal arguments put forward by the prosecution and defence, as well as the legal instructions 
provided by the judge. The purpose of this was to permit subsequent detailed re-enactment within 
the later mock trial experiment. For a complete summary of the case selection criteria, see Table 
3.5 below. 
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Table 3.5 
Case Selection Criteria adopted within Experiment 1 mock trial simulations 
 
Rape Case Selection Criteria 
A criminal rape trial that had taken place in England & Wales since 2003. 
Includes elements of voluntary intoxication, previous acquaintanceship, and a lack of 
independent witnesses. 
Involved only one alleged male perpetrator and one alleged female victim. 
Only the offence of Rape was alleged. 
Sufficient detail surrounding the incident and competing versions of events from parties 
involved were present. 
Cases were overall evidentially balanced in terms of corroboration and contradiction (or 
lack thereof) of both parties’ account of what happened.  
Important legal information surrounding arguments put forward by the prosecution, 
defense, and judge were present (and sufficiently detailed). 
 
 Of the fifteen cases shortlisted, just two met all of the above criteria, deemed necessary for 
realistic and legally admissible mock trial recreation within the present study. Therefore, following 
further consultation with lawyers from the expert CJS panel, and upon agreement surrounding 
which case best matched the inclusion criteria from the detail available, one case was selected to 
represent the ‘acquaintance rape’ case within the present study. To review the anonymised 
adaptation of this genuine transcript developed by the present author, please refer to Appendix I. 
3.2.3.1.2 Case Preparation  
 Having selected the case that formed the basis of the experiment, the genuine trial transcript 
was subsequently reduced in length to allow a shorter mock trial scenario to be devised. A clear 
narrative was constructed relative to the case, whereby a summary including; the undisputed facts, 
the complaint’s version of events, the defendant’s version of events, a condensed version of both 
the prosecution and defence questioning of both parties, and a summary of the judge’s instructions 
in the case (see Appendix I).  
 Moreover, firstly pre-trial instructions provided by the judge were drafted. Making use of 
the same guidelines issued to genuine trial judges when constructing pre-trial instructions (cf. 
Judicial Studies Board, 2010), a script of all essential instructions was constructed and developed 
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from the genuine transcript. Likewise, as the case scenario had been selected on the basis of 
including important factors and legal questions surrounding; voluntary intoxication, previous 
acquaintanceship, and a lack of independent witnesses, legal instructions typically provided by 
judges at the close of the trial relating to these factors (termed ‘judge’s summary’), were also 
drafted from the initial transcript and crown court compendium guidelines (cf. Judicial Studies 
Board, 2010). In order to ensure that the judge’s instructions were accurately summarised from the 
original trial transcript, as well as being in accordance with the English law of evidence, lawyers 
from the expert CJS panel were again consulted. Separately, lawyers reviewed the summarised 
pre-trial and summary judge’s instructions. After recommending slight amendments to the use of 
language in places, both were in agreement that all instructions conformed with genuine trial 
instructions typically given.  
 Next, a brief ambiguous medical report was developed, which constituted the sole medical 
evidence in the case. Following discussions conducted with police officers from the expert CJS 
panel (and later confirmed upon review of the scientific literature), it was noted that it is not 
uncommon for victims to display very few physical signs of having been raped, particularly when 
the perpetrator was in some way acquainted with the victim (Saunders, 2012). Moreover, even 
where damage is sustained within the genitals of a female victim, it is often difficult to distinguish 
whether this was the result of vigorous consensual intercourse or non-consensual rape. Therefore, 
consistent with the evidence that is typically present within such contested rape cases, jurors across 
the mock trials were presented with the same evidentially neutral and ambiguous medical 
statement (see Appendix I), adapted from past research which used ambiguous medical evidence 
in a similar way (cf. Ellison & Munro, 2015). The purpose of using such evidentially neutral 
medical evidence was that whilst clearly neither indicative of rape nor consensual sexual 
intercourse, it is possible that jurors may interpret and draw upon such information as supporting 
underlying preconceptions or biases they hold. Finally, a short summary script was developed of 
the remaining undisputed facts in the case, the complaint and defendant testimony, alongside 
condensed versions of the questions both parties were asked by the prosecution and defence 
lawyers while giving their evidence.  
 Overall, the trial scenario was purposefully chosen and structured to include a level of 
ambiguity and sufficient lack of corroborative evidence, such that participant decisions would not 
be necessarily swayed one way or another solely upon the evidence displayed (or lack thereof it). 
Attempting to balance the evidence both supporting and contracting each party (complainant and 
defendant) was a methodological control, which thereby ensured that jurors were not evidentially 
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predisposed to one version of events over another, simply on the basis of the case chosen. Simply 
put, the evidence theoretically allowed jurors to believe either party’s version of events, as both 
were equally plausible and had an equal amount of internal contradictions, which, it is argued, 
would permit underlying biases to more readily emerge. After the case had been summarised into 
a complete rape trial scenario, the ‘script’ was once more reviewed for legal admissibility and to 
ensure that no important elements present in trial transcripts were missing. Here, lawyers from the 
expert CJS panel agreed that the summarised scenario would be considered legally representative 
of the main issues present within the case. 
3.2.3.1.3 Trial Video Development  
 The next stage of the study involved developing the scenario into a videotaped, mock trial 
simulation. As the current experiment aimed to improve upon the poor ecological validity present 
within much jury research to date, it was decided that instead of asking individual mock jurors to 
simply read written rape trial scenarios, participants would instead collectively observe a video 
recorded re-enactment of the rape trial. As a large experimental sample size was sought, a pre-
recorded videotaped mock trial was deemed to be the most feasible means by which all jurors 
would be exposed to identical mock trial content. 
 Having recruited a local filmmaker who agreed to assist in the recording of the mock trials, 
a talent agency within the West Yorkshire region of the UK was contacted to recruit two actors for 
the role of the complainant (alleged victim) and defendant (alleged perpetrator). Having described 
what the role would involve, both actors were demographically matched in terms of age, ethnicity, 
and similar regional accents, factors which previous research found could influence attitudes 
towards witness credibility in itself (Ryan, Hewstone, & Giles, 1984). These criteria were adopted 
as a means of reducing the influence of extraneous variables within the study. A further female 
actress was also recruited to take on the role of the court clerk within trials. Her role was to present 
the undisputed facts of each case, as well as a summary of the questioning that occurred during 
examination and cross-examination. Finally, an experienced criminal barrister was recruited to 
take on the role of the judge and present jurors with the pre-trial instructions and summary 
instructions discussed above, at the close of the trial.  
 Following recruitment, the actors were provided with a script detailing the content of the 
testimony or instructions they would be required to deliver within the case two weeks prior to 
filming. In an attempt to further strengthen the ecological validity of the study, a request was made 
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to a Crown Court within the North of England for permission to record the trial simulation videos 
within a genuine courtroom and subsequently this request was granted by the court manager (see 
Appendix II). Accordingly, within the realistic setting desired, the actors were subsequently filmed 
re-enacting the trial scenario within the courtroom (see Picture 3.1 below). Again, videos were 
constructed to mirror genuine trial procedures, in that a brief overview of the juror’s role was set 
out at the onset by the court clerk, followed by standardised pre-trial instructions given by the 
judge. The agreed facts of the case that were not in dispute by either party were then detailed, 
alongside a description of the circumstances (for example, date, time, location), during which the 
alleged offence is said to have taken place. Following this, the court clerk was filmed providing a 
summary of the prosecution case, before the complainant actress was recorded giving her 
testimony of what happened during the night in question. Immediately after this, a summary of the 
questions asked during examination-in-chief and later cross-examination were outlined for mock 
jurors. Repeating the same process, the clerk then provided a summary of the defence case, the 
questioning that occurred during examination and cross-examination, as well as the defendant 
actor being recorded presenting his testimony of what happened during the night in question. 
Finally, the experienced trial barrister, acting out the role of the judge, was filmed sitting in the 
judge’s seat within the genuine Crown Court, providing a summary of the facts (in respect of each 
differing case) before concluding with the final standardised legal instructions. Over the following 
two weeks, the mock trial recording was edited into a short twenty-five-minute video with the 
assistance of Final Cut Pro X professional editing software. The completed trial video was once 
more shown to lawyers on the expert CJS panel. Both agreed that within the constraints of 
reductions in total trial time, the video was an accurate summary of the case in question, and in 
accordance with the UK law of evidence. The full mock trial video used can be accessed on 
YouTube via the following URL (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkF3NftVgZA). 
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Picture 3.1: Mock trial judge filmed delivering juror instructions within genuine English Crown 
Court. 
 
3.2.3.1.4 Mock Jury Selection and Recruitment  
 Just over half of all participants (n = 180) were recruited through an online research 
participation system termed SONA, available to psychology based undergraduate students where 
the experiment had been advertised. The remaining 144 participants were recruited through 
advertising posters distributed throughout the university campus (see Appendix III), where 
interested individuals were asked to contact the researcher by email to volunteer to take part. In 
accordance with English jury eligibility criteria (see Table 3.1 above), all participants were 
subjected to pre-trial screening assessments prior to inclusion in the study. Specifically, students 
recruited through the SONA system were notified that prior to registering to take part, they must 
ensure that they first met the stipulated age, citizenship, mental health, and lack of criminal history 
inclusion criteria. They were told that registering to participate constituted a declaration of such. 
All other participants, recruited through requests made to the principle researcher, were manually 
asked via email correspondence with the experimenter to confirm that they met such eligibility 
criteria. Upon declaring that they did, participants were registered a place on an upcoming jury 
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panel by the experimenter. It is noteworthy that many prospective participants who responded to 
advertisement posters were declined participation due to failing to meet all inclusion criteria. Most 
frequently, international students who had not been residents of the UK for a period of at least five 
years since the age of 13 were declined from participating.  
 By way of further ensuring that participants were, by definition, jury eligible, on the day 
of experimentation all participants were also asked to complete a screening questionnaire. Utilising 
questions adapted from the genuine English Jury Summons Form (HMCTS, 2014), participants 
answered questions prior to the onset of the trial and upon subsequent review of the self-reported 
responses, it was observed that all of those in attendance met all jury eligibility criteria. In an 
attempt to simulate the randomisation of mock jurors into respective trials, participants who 
contacted the researcher volunteering to take part were simply randomly booked a place onto 
different mock trials listed for experimentation over the coming weeks. In total, twenty-seven 
mock trial simulations took place over a period of three months and, therefore, randomly assigning 
participants to differing experimental trials was implemented with relative ease. Where 
participants were unable to take part in a given trial on a stipulated date and time, they were simply 
randomly reallocated a place on an alternative trial date. It is important to highlight, as psychology 
students were able to self-select a place on a given trial (from the range of trial dates listed as 
available on the SONA system), they were encouraged to book sessions in isolation rather than 
with members of their friend groups.  
 When replicating genuine jury panel recruitment as closely as possible within the confines 
of utilising a student sample, it was desirable that jurors were not known to one another prior to 
the day of experimentation. Accordingly, the researchers conducted a manual review of students 
registered to take part on each differing trial date and, where participants were known to have 
opted for the same session as their peers, they were reallocated to different trials to preserve the 
genuine trial conditions as far as possible. Despite the researcher’s best efforts to discourage and 
prevent students from partaking alongside their peers, as participants were drawn from the same 
undergraduate courses in which many were enrolled, it was not entirely possible to eradicate such 
possible confounding effects from taking place. However, as mock jury panels were not simply 
comprised of undergraduate psychology students, a general mixture of participants from varied 
disciplines and backgrounds were present across the twenty-seven trials. As an incentive, 
undergraduate psychology students received three course credits for taking part, which equated to 
3% of the total grade received on one course module. All other participants (n = 144) gave up their 
time voluntarily and received no recompense for taking part.  
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 Finally, all participants registered to attend were provided with details of the date, time, 
and location of the mock trial experiment two weeks prior to attending. Automatic email reminders 
were sent one week, as well as two days, prior to experimentation, notifying participants of the 
importance of all twelve jurors being present for each mock trial. As a precautionary measure, 
fourteen jurors were permitted to register for each trial listed on the SONA research participation 
platform. This system of overbooking and email reminders was introduced after the first three 
mock trial experiments (trial 1, 3 & 4) had to be withdrawn from the dataset due to several 
participants failing to arrive for the study. Accordingly, for the vast majority of mock trials exactly 
twelve participants arrived and therefore trials went ahead as planned. On four occasions, less than 
the required twelve participants arrived for the experiment and therefore the mock trials had to be 
cancelled and participants reassigned to an alternative date. On several occasions, all thirteen or 
fourteen of the jurors enrolled, arrived to take part. In these instances, two psychology students 
were simply asked to volunteer to come back to take part on an alternate day. These students were 
selected on a first come first served basis. Accordingly, all twenty-seven mock trials went ahead 
with the required twelve jurors present. 
3.2.3.2 Mock Trial Procedure  
 Adopting a cross-sectional and experimental design, participants were recruited to take part 
in one of the twenty-seven replications of the same mock jury trial simulations, whereby they first 
completed a number of psychometric assessments pre-trial, before their verdict decisions were 
repeatedly measured at two time-points, post-trial. Experimentation took place within a realistic 
mock courtroom located within the law school at the University of Huddersfield (see Picture 3.2).  
3.2.3.2.1 Arrival on the Day 
 Upon arrival, participants selected were asked to sit in the jury box and await further 
instruction. Once all twelve participants were in attendance and seated, each individual was 
provided with a study booklet, including an information sheet, consent form, and a number of 
questionnaires (see Appendix IV). For a review of the questionnaires included, refer to the 
measures section above. Firstly, participants were thanked for attending and asked to carefully 
read the information sheet on the first page of the booklet in front of them. The information sheet 
provided an overview of what the study would involve and specifically outlined that participants 
would shortly be asked to watch a video recorded recreation of a genuine rape trial, before 
deliberating as a group to reach a verdict in the case. Having read the information sheet, 
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participants were informed that if they no longer wished to take part, they could leave the study 
without any justification being required. However, in practice no participations chose to do so (full 
ethical procedures described in the ethical considerations section below). Participants were 
subsequently asked to read and complete the consent form before experimentation begin. Once 
consent forms had been signed and dated, the experimenter collected all completed copies. At this 
stage participants were given the opportunity to ask any general questions before experimentation 
began. 
 Next, participants were asked to begin to complete the questions in the booklet in front of 
them. Before doing so however, all participants were issued with a unique juror identification 
number. This number related to the jury panel that they were assigned to (ranging from 1 to 27) 
and their randomly allocated juror number (ranging from 1 to 12). For example, juror number 12 
on the 27th jury trial panel was assigned the following reference number; J27-12. Jurors were asked 
to write their unique juror number on the first page of their study booklet and informed that, from 
this point onwards, this unique reference number would be used in place of their real names. The 
purpose of this was to encourage jurors to be honest in their responses to questions asked within 
the study booklet. It was explained to participants that as the experimenter had no list 
corresponding unique juror reference numbers with participant names, there would be no way that 
individuals could be linked back to the answers given. A notable exception was where jurors who 
made a record of their unique reference number requested that their data to be removed prior to 
analysis. However, in practice no such request was ever made. 
 Over the course of the next twenty to thirty-five minutes (varying between the twenty-
seven trials), participants answered the questions within their respective study booklets. This took 
place in silence as jurors had been asked not to confer with other participants. Once all jurors had 
completed the questionnaires, the experimenter collected the booklets from participants. Following 
this, jurors were informed that they would shortly be played the trial video. In an attempt to ensure 
that participants were actively paying attention to the video and approached the decision-making 
task in a similar way to that of a real jury, the experimenter provided some further instructions. 
Participants were informed that whilst the video was not filmed during an actual criminal trial and 
instead was a re-enactment, the content therein related to that of a genuine rape allegation that had 
previously gone to trial (note: under the Criminal Justice Act 1925, filming with UK courtrooms 
is not permitted). Moreover, participants were informed that all of the testimony they would hear 
was drawn from evidence presented within the real case, and therefore the decisions they made 
would have important implications for understanding that case.  
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Picture 3.2: University of Huddersfield Mock Courtroom 
 
 Finally, participants were asked to take their role as a juror seriously throughout the 
duration of the trial, and that from this point onwards they should consider themselves a juror in a 
criminal trial rather than a participant in an experiment. Paper and pencils were provided for 
participants, so that they could take notes should they choose to, as is typical procedure within 
genuine English jury trials. 
3.2.3.2.2 Onset of Trial Videos 
 On a large screen within the courtroom participants were then shown the mock trial video. 
Each video was around twenty-five minutes in length and, as previously outlined, this involved 
the court clerk outlining the different stages of the trial, to familiarise jurors with what to expect. 
Next, the judge, speaking directly to mock jurors within the video, provided specific instructions 
surrounding the difference in roles between the judge and jury, as well as the legal guidelines that 
they were required to follow throughout the course of their jury service. Subsequently, jurors were 
presented with the undisputed facts in the case surrounding the dates, times, and location of the 
alleged incident, as well as circumstances leading up to the day in question which both parties 
agree happened.  
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 Following the agreed facts, jurors were then presented with the complainant’s version of 
events. Using the pseudonym Sarah Adams, the alleged victim described the details of what she 
states happened before, during and after the rape is said to have occurred. The overarching 
narrative of the complainant’s account between the three cases is largely the same. Specifically, 
she stated that whilst there was some conversation had with the accused, a person who is known 
to her, she did not agree to have sexual intercourse with him and that, despite her indicating that 
she didn’t want to have sex, he continued regardless. Immediately following this testimony, mock 
jurors were presented with a summary of the prosecution case. At this point, it was outlined why 
the prosecution propose the defendant’s actions equate to rape, under English law. A summary of 
the questions the complainant was asked by defence lawyers during cross-examination were then 
detailed, with specific questions asked and responses given, presented to mock jurors. Again, the 
essence of the defence lawyer’s case here was quite simply that the complainant was lying; she 
did want to have sex and she did consent to the intercourse that occurred. Therefore, the allegations 
of rape made are unfounded and untrue (see Appendix I).  
 Next, jurors were shown the defendant’s version of events. Again, through use of a 
pseudonym, the alleged perpetrator presented mock jurors with details of what he claimed 
happened before, during, and after the alleged rape is said to have occurred. The essence of the 
defendant’s testimony was simply that, on the night in question, he was with the complainant, they 
had chatted and voluntarily consumed alcohol together until a point where both parties had made 
sexual advances towards one another. This, he stated, culminated in consensual sexual intercourse 
taking place. Following this testimony, mock jurors were presented with a summary of the defence 
case, explaining why they state the defendant’s actions should be considered to be lawful. A 
summary of the questions the defendant was asked by prosecution lawyers during cross-
examination were then presented, with specific questions asked and the responses given outlined 
to mock jurors. Again, the essence of the prosecution lawyer’s case presented was that the 
defendant was lying, he knew that Sarah Adams did not want to have sex, she made this clear to 
him, yet he continued regardless, which therefore constitutes rape (see Appendix I). The legal 
point was presented that according to the law, it is not for the complainant to display her lack of 
consent but the defendant to ascertain that he either had consent or had a reasonable belief that he 
had consent. The prosecution argued that he had neither. 
 Following the testimony described above, jurors were next presented with the medical 
evidence in the case. As previously discussed, this was purposely evidentially neutral and included 
the statement of the medical practitioner who was said to have examined the alleged victim. The 
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premise of this evidence was that, whilst a degree of force was evident around the vaginal area of 
the complainant, this was neither consistent nor inconsistent with a rape having taken place. The 
full statement of the medical evidence was presented to participants by way of the typewritten 
report being displayed on screen whilst concurrently read aloud by the court clerk within the video. 
Finally, the trial video concluded with the judge presenting mock jurors with a summary of the 
evidence in the case. Split into two segments, jurors were firstly given a summary of the evidence 
specific to the acquaintance rape case facts (i.e. the important details pertaining to that particular 
case) and secondly, general legal directions given in all rape trials.  
 Within the judge’s legal directions, mock jurors were given a detailed explanation of the 
law around rape, what constitutes consent, and therefore the pertinent legal questions that jurors 
should seek to answer when reaching their verdict. Specific instructions were also given regarding 
deliberations. Here, participants were informed that before deciding upon the trial outcome they 
should be sure of the verdict chosen, beyond a reasonable doubt. Participants were also informed 
that all jurors should be unanimously in agreement. For a full description of the judge’s summary 
instructions, refer to the transcript upon which the video was based (Appendix I). In total, the mock 
trial videotaped aspect of the simulations was twenty-five minutes in length. Whilst this is 
undoubtedly significantly shorter than a genuine rape trial would typically last, summaries of the 
important legal aspects of each case, along with the cutting out of repeated and unnecessary 
information, alongside the stops and starts that commonly exist within real trials, allowed for each 
case to be condensed into a timeframe appropriate for experimentation to occur.  
3.2.3.3 Post-Trial Procedure 
 Once the trial video had concluded and mock jurors had heard all testimony and evidence 
in the case, participants were asked to remain in their seats prior to deliberation. At this stage, the 
experimenter reminded participants that whilst the evidence they had been shown was presented 
through the medium of a videotaped simulation, the testimonials and facts of the case related to 
that of a genuine rape trial. Accordingly, participants were asked to take their decision-making 
task seriously throughout the remainder of the study.  
3.2.3.3.1 Individual Verdict Decision 1 
 Whilst still sitting within the jury box, each participant was then given the first of two 
verdict decision forms and asked to write their unique juror reference number within the top left 
corner. Participants were told not to discuss the case with other jurors until they were in the 
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deliberation room and then asked to complete the first verdict decision form. Here, participants 
were asked to select whether they felt the defendant to be guilty or not guilty, whether they felt 
guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and specific questions surrounding the extent to 
which they believed the testimony of the complainant and defendant, comprised within the Juror 
Decision Scale (JDS - Willmott & Boduszek, under review) (refer to Verdict Decision Form 1, 
within the study booklet – Appendix I). Participants were reminded prior to providing their verdict 
decisions that all responses were confidential and anonymous, viewed only by the researchers, in 
order to minimise the effects of social desirability upon responses given. Notably, the responses 
recorded at this stage allowed the experimenter to determine how each juror had voted as an 
individual, having heard all the evidence in the case and prior to group deliberation influence. 
Once complete, all verdict decision forms were collected in so that participants would not be able 
to directly compare their initial decisions made with post deliberation decisions. 
3.2.3.3.2 Group Deliberation 
 The experimenter next provided mock jurors with brief standardised instructions 
surrounding the deliberation phase of the study (see Appendix V). In accordance with genuine trial 
deliberation procedures, participants were reconvened within a separate jury deliberation room 
where they were asked to collectively discuss the case in an attempt to reach a verdict. They were 
informed that whilst they should attempt to reach a unanimous verdict, if - after a period of one 
hour - they had not been able to do so, the experimenter would contact them and notify them that 
a majority decision of ten jurors to two would now be accepted. Finally, participants were told to 
vote a jury foreperson and the experimenter then left the room. It was decided that participants 
would be more likely to openly discuss their views on the case if the experimenter was not present 
and, as such, deliberations were conducted in private.  
 During deliberations, where participants agreed upon a unanimous verdict within the 
allotted one-hour time frame, they were reconvened within the mock courtroom to return their 
verdict. Where participants were not unanimous after one-hour deliberating, an extra thirty-
minutes was provided in an attempt to reach a majority verdict. After this additional time period, 
jurors reconvened in the courtroom regardless, and asked to return either a majority verdict or 
‘unable to decide’ no verdict given. In all instances, the jury foreperson was asked to stand and 
return the verdict of the jury. This was recorded by the experimenter along with whether this was 
a unanimous, majority, or an ‘unable to decide’ verdict. 
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3.2.3.3.3 Individual Verdict Decision 2 
 In the final stage of the study, mock jurors sat within the courtroom were asked to change 
seats so that they were not sitting directly next to a fellow mock juror. Participants were each given 
a second copy of the JDS (Verdict Decision form 2 – see Appendix IV), identical to the form 
completed pre-deliberation. Again, jurors were asked to write their unique juror reference number 
in the top left corner and complete the form. Importantly, before doing so, jurors were given 
specific standardised instructions outlining that the verdict decisions they were being asked to 
make related to them as an individual and may therefore not necessarily be the same as the 
collective verdict that had just been returned.  
 Participants were informed that none of their fellow jurors would, at any point, see the 
verdict choices they made or any other answers given on this sheet. This was an attempt to 
encourage honesty in responses, examine whether any disparity existed between collective verdicts 
returned, and what individual jurors truly felt the verdict should be. Once completed, the 
experimenter collected in all answer sheets, which had been folded in half to conceal responses. 
Participants were then informed that the mock trial was now over and were given a debrief sheet 
to take away with them prior to leaving. Participants were thanked for taking part and importantly 
asked not to reveal any of the evidence presented, facts of the case, or decisions cast to anybody 
they knew to be taking part in the study at a later date. In total, each mock trial experiment lasted 
between 120 and 180 minutes from arrival to debriefing.  
3.2.4 Ethical Considerations 
 Prior to the onset of experimentation, the present research was subject to the scrutiny of 
the University of Huddersfield’s School of Human and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel 
(SREP). A detailed application, adhering to all relevant ethical guidelines outlined within the 
British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Code of Practice for Human Research (BPS, 2014), was 
submitted on 24th November 2015 and was subsequently approved by the SREP panel 21st 
December 2015 (see Appendix VI). Moreover, prior to the onset of the study a detailed information 
sheet and itemised consent form were given to participants to ensure that they were aware of the 
nature of the study prior to taking part (see Appendix IV).  Specifically, as participants were to be 
exposed to details of an alleged sexual crime, prior warning of the type of case they would be 
asked to hear, and subsequently discuss among other participants, was make clear from the onset. 
Due to the high prevalence of sexual victimisation within the UK, it was felt important that all 
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participants were able to make an informed decision around participation in the study, thereby 
reducing the possibility of causing undue harm or upset to those taking part.  
 The information sheet (and debrief) also provided the contact details of free and impartial 
support services available to participants, regardless of participation in the study. These included 
local support services, as well as specialist national support charities, including the Samaritans and 
Victim Support. Participants were also encouraged to have a brief look through questions within 
their study booklet before signing the consent forms, further ensuring they were fully satisfied and 
informed of what they were being asked to partake in. Prior to the onset of experimentation, 
participants were also explicitly informed of their right to take a break or fully withdraw from the 
study at any point, without the need to provide a reason. Due to the potentially emotive content 
heard within the mock trials, participants were informed that should they feel upset or distressed 
in any way they were free to leave the room or experiment for as long as they needed. Care was 
taken in the selection and presentation of rape trial scenarios to ensure that no overly distressing, 
violent or graphic content was included to further ensure participant wellbeing.  
 Alongside the individual’s right to withdraw, all participants were also informed of the 
right to withdraw their data from the study up until a stipulated date (typically three months after 
the date of experimentation). This date and the guidelines for requesting data be removed were 
provided within the information sheet, which participants were able to take away with them. The 
primary researcher’s contact details and those of the main project supervisor were also provided, 
should any participants have wished to obtain other information or have any further queries in the 
future. Participants were afforded full anonymity throughout the research, with their names 
replaced with unique juror participant numbers upon arrival on the day and within all subsequent 
use of their data. The anonymised data of all participants was afforded an additional level of 
security, with electronic data files stored on a password protected hard drive and paper responses 
within a locked filling cabinet. Notably, some small degree of deception was required by way of 
ensuring participants’ active engagement in the experiments. In an attempt to replicate the 
circumstances under which actual jurors make decisions during genuine trials, mock jurors were 
encouraged on several occasions to take their decision-making task seriously, as the case they were 
making decisions about was genuine and that, as the researchers were working directly with the 
criminal justice system, their decisions would have important implications for understanding the 
case. Importantly, however, whilst the case were indeed genuine, small elements of each case had 
been amended and abbreviated in line with the experimental objectives (described in the procedure 
above) and were therefore not a perfect representation of the genuine case. Also, whilst criminal 
106 
justice practitioners assisted with the research by way of an expert panel of consultants, the 
research was not conducted directly in partnership with any UK courts or the criminal justice 
system, despite some participants having perhaps inferred this to have been the case.  
 After experimentation was complete, participants were fully debriefed of this and of the 
exact aims of the research, notifying them that their decisions would be used to inform only the 
researcher’s objectives broadly and not any court’s decision surrounding a particular rape case. A 
full debrief was given verbally by the researcher at the end of the experiment, allowing participants 
the opportunity to ask any questions they had, alongside a debrief sheet, which participants were 
encouraged to read prior to leaving and take with them after experimentation was complete.  
3.3 EXPERIMENT 2 – COMMUNITY SAMPLE MOCK TRIALS 
 Developing upon the first study, and again working in consultation with an expert panel of 
criminal justice system (CJS) practitioners, including five Crown Court barristers and an active 
Crown Court judge, the second study was devised. Adopting an experimental design, participants 
were recruited to take part in one of nine separate mock trials, whereby panels of community 
sampled mock jurors observed a live re-enactment of the same acquaintance rape case. Each mock 
trial was identical in terms of the case and evidence presented (explained in further detail below) 
in an attempt to examine whether mock juror psychological and attitudinal constructs were related 
to individual juror verdict decisions. Essentially, in line with the overarching objectives of the 
thesis, the present study sought to investigate whether psychological constructs have any direct 
and discernible relationship with juror verdict decisions and, secondly, whether such a 
relationship, if found, remains consistent post-deliberation. Undoubtedly, the existence of such a 
relationship, which remains stable irrespective of deliberation, would provide direct evidence that 
juror characteristics do in fact influence verdict outcome within rape cases. 
3.3.1 Sample 
 A systematic random sample of 108 participants, comprised within nine mock jury trials, 
were recruited from the general population within Huddersfield, UK. Huddersfield is a market 
town within the county of West Yorkshire and metropolitan borough of Kirklees, located within 
the North of England. Based upon the 2011 Office for National Statistics (ONS) census data and 
annual demographic estimates, Huddersfield has a population of approximately 140,000 people 
(ONS, 2015), making it the 11th largest town in Great Britain (The Telegraph, 2011). Of this 
population, electoral polls suggest around 96,000 live within the parliamentary constituency of 
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Huddersfield, where approximately 75,400 are aged 18 and above, meaning that such individuals 
are eligible to vote in government elections and, in principle, eligible for jury service (Electoral 
Calculus, 2015).  
 With a long history of textile manufacturing, Huddersfield has an ethnically diverse 
population. Individuals with South East Asian Pakistani heritage (12.8%) are represented at a rate 
above the national average (2.1%), as is Muslim religiosity within the town (15.0%), compared to 
nationally (5.0%). Christianity (49.7%) is also slightly under-represented when compared to the 
national average (59.3%). Gender composition and age distribution are, however, comparable to 
the national average, and the average household income is £32,123, compared to the £39,472 
England average (ONS, 2015). To review complete demographic information of the population 
residing in Huddersfield, see Table 3.6 below.  
 The present study made use of a community sample drawn from members of the general 
population from within Huddersfield town. Specifically, the sample was recruited through access 
granted to an amended version of the local electoral register, a database storing the name and 
address details of all residents who have registered to vote in government elections within the 
parliamentary constituency of Huddersfield. Due to a small number of participants registering to 
take part but failing to attend on the day (n = 8), the final experimental sample comprised of 100 
participants distributed across nine separate mock jury trials. Participants ranged in age from 18 
to 70 years old (M = 45.50, SD = 15.75), and where demographic information was given, this 
equated to 48 females and 46 males. Additionally, the majority of the sample reported their 
ethnicity to be Caucasian (67%), followed by South East Asian (15%), and Black Afro-Caribbean 
(9.0%). The vast majority of participants were either married (42%) or single (30%), with 
remaining participants reporting that they had a partner (8%) or were divorced (12%). In terms of 
educational attainment, 41% of participants had a university degree, 34% of participants had a 
college or vocational qualification, and 23% reported having only secondary school qualifications 
or no qualifications at all. Finally, as participants were drawn from the general population, a large 
majority reported that they were employed (70%) and were the parent to at least one child (59%).  
 From the data available, the demographic profile of the present sample, compared with that 
of the local population, displayed a high degree of similarity (see Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 below). 
Specifically, gender and ethnic group distributions were almost identically represented in the 
present study, as well as age distributions, whereby participant mean age and the standard 
deviation were reflective of the most prevalent age categorisations in existence within the town. 
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The main disparity between population and sample was observed in the qualifications participants 
possessed, with many reporting greater educational attainment overall than typically found within 
the town. Nonetheless, the present sample was deemed to be a good representation of the 
population of Huddersfield. 
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Table 3.6 
Demographic profile of the population of Huddersfield town, West Yorkshire.  
Variable         N (%) 
Population   140,056 (100%) 
Age 
   15 and below 
   16 to 29 
   30 to 44 
   45 to 64 
   65 and above 
 
 27,553 (19.7%) 
 30,377 (21.7%) 
 27,376 (19.5%) 
 32,947 (23.5%) 
 21,735 (15.5%) 
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
69,205 (49.4%) 
70,793 (50.6%) 
Ethnicity 
   Caucasian  
   South East Asian 
   Black Afro-Caribbean  
   Other 
 
96,767 (71.7%) 
22,258 (16.5%) 
 10,618 (7.9%) 
  5,338 (3.9%) 
Highest Qualification 
   Secondary School or Less 
   College / Vocational 
   University Degree  
   Higher Degree (MD/PhD/MSc) 
 
 N/A (53.6%) 
 N/A (17.4%) 
 N/A (23.9%) 
  N/A (5.1%) 
Religion 
   Christian 
   Muslim 
   Sikh 
   Other 
   No Religion 
   Undisclosed 
 
67,119 (49.7%) 
20,256 (15.0%) 
  2,597 (1.9%) 
  1,792 (1.4%) 
34,041 (25.2%) 
 9,183 (6.8%) 
 
Note: N/A is used where total figure data was not available within official documentation/reports. Data 
was sourced from ONS (2015) and Kirklees Observatory (2015). 
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Table 3.7  
Demographic profile of complete community sample within Experiment 2. 
Variable     N (%) Mean (SD) Range 
Age (continuous) 100 (100%) 45.50 (15.75) 18-70 
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
46 (46.0%) 
48 (48.0%) 
 
 
 
Ethnicity  
   Caucasian 
   South East Asian 
   Black Afro-Caribbean  
   Other 
 
 67 (67.0%) 
 15 (15.0%) 
  9 (9.0%) 
  2 (2.0%) 
  
Highest Qualification 
   Secondary School or less 
   College / Vocational  
   University Degree  
   Higher Degree (MD/PhD/MSc) 
 
 23 (23.0%) 
 34 (34.0%) 
 41 (41.0%) 
   1 (1.0%) 
 
 
 
 
Marital Status 
   Single 
   Partner 
   Married 
   Divorced 
 
 30 (30.0%) 
   8 (8.0%) 
 42 (42.0%) 
 12 (12.0%) 
  
Currently Employed (PT/FT) 
   Employed 
   Retired 
   Unemployed 
 
 70 (70.0%) 
 15 (15.0%) 
 15 (15.0%) 
 
 
 
Parent of Child/Children 
   Yes 
   No 
 
 59 (59.0%) 
 40 (40.0%) 
  
Note: The difference in frequencies and total numbers in categories reflect missing values. 
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3.3.2 Measures 
 A number of established psychological and attitudinal measures were adopted within the 
present study. Likewise, a demographics questionnaire was completed by participant’s pre-trial 
and a juror verdict decision questionnaire completed post-trial, made up in part by the JDS items. 
Whilst a description of each measure is outlined below, refer to the measures section above 
(Section 3.2.2) for a more comprehensive review of the scales that were also used with Experiment 
1. A detailed review is provided below of newly implemented measures. 
Demographics Questionnaire. A self-report demographic questionnaire was developed to 
gather information surrounding participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, marital status, 
educational qualifications, as well as questions surrounding family background and previous 
victimisation experiences. The demographics questionnaire was comprised of fourteen items in 
total. 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA; Gerger, Kley, Bohner, 
& Siebler, 2007). This is a self-report inventory, devised to more subtly measure attitudes held 
towards rape and sexual aggression, than more overt rape myth acceptance inventories which 
preceded the development of this measure (for example, Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale; 
Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999). The inventory is comprised of thirty items, all of which are 
positively scored and unidimensional (i.e. “Alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a 
woman”), and responses are measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “completely 
disagree” to 7 “completely agree”. Overall scores are measured from 30 up to 210, with higher 
scores indicating greater acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression.  
Psychopathic Personality Traits Scale (PPTS; Boduszek, Debowska, Dhingra, & DeLisi, 
2016). This scale was designed as a brief self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits, to 
be used within diverse populations for research purposes. All scale items measure respondents’ 
self-reported knowledge/skills and attitudes/beliefs, rather than behavioural characteristics. The 
inventory is comprised of twenty items (six of which are reverse scored) divided over four factors 
(Affective Responsiveness, Cognitive Responsiveness, Interpersonal Manipulation, 
Egocentricity), with responses measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “strongly 
disagree” to 5 “strongly agree” (see Section 3.2.2 above). Scores therefore range between 20 and 
100, with higher scores indicating elevated levels of psychopathic personality traits. 
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Juror Decision Scale (JDS; Willmott & Boduszek, under review). This scale was 
developed within the present study and was designed as a self-reported measure of individual juror 
verdict decision-making. All JDS scale items measure respondents’ self-reported assessments of 
how believable they determine a complainant and defendant to be, as well as their self-reported 
confidence relating to the individual verdict decision made in a given case. The measure is 
comprised of sixteen items, all of which are positively scored and divided over three factors 
(Complainant Believability, Defendant Believability, Confidence in Decision) with responses 
measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 5 “extremely” (see Section 
3.2.2 above). Scores therefore range between 16 and 80, where higher scores on the Complainant 
Believability and Defendant Believability sub-scales indicate greater belief in the account given 
by each respective individual, and lower scores indicating a lower respondent belief in the account 
given. Higher scores on the Confident in Decision subscale indicate a greater respondent 
confidence that the individual verdict decision they had made was accurate according to the 
evidence heard. For the CFA, which examined the proposed three-factor model of the JDS, refer 
to Chapter 4 Results, sub-section Section 4.3. 
3.3.3 Procedure 
 In an attempt to replicate - as closely as possible - a genuine jury trial and thereby create a 
similar contextual environment to that in which actual jurors make their decisions, a concerted 
effort to match the English jury procedures was undertaken within the present experiment. In order 
to do so, study procedures were divided into different stages and, where possible, directly reflect 
the sequential stages undertaken within genuine criminal jury trial procedures (as described in 
Section 3.1 above). For clarity, each of these stages are discussed in turn below.  
3.3.3.1 Pre-trial Procedures 
 Before the mock trial simulations took place, a number of pre-trial procedural steps and 
plans were undertaken. This included: carefully selecting the case to be used during mock trials; 
preparation of this case in terms of the experimental objectives and legal admissibility; developing 
the case into a format that could be re-enacted live;, and, finally, the recruitment of mock jurors in 
line with genuine criminal trial recruitment procedures. 
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3.3.3.1.1 Case Selection 
 Due to the methodological complexities and time-consuming nature of re-enacting a 
criminal trial before a live panel of community recruited participants, it was decided that just one 
type of rape case would be developed into a full mock trial simulation within the present 
experiment. Furthermore, for reasons of consistency, and upon considering the significant 
preparatory work had already been conducted within the previous study (described in Section 3.2.3 
above), it was decided that this same case would form the basis of the live rape trial simulations. 
In line with the objectives of the present study, which focused upon examining whether a 
relationship exists between juror characteristics and the voting decisions individuals make during 
contested rape trials, the need to select a case considered most likely to inform understanding of 
poor convictions rates and the effect of bias therein was paramount. As such, following further 
consultation with members of the newly compiled expert panel of CJS practitioners, all senior 
police officers and legal personnel agreed that as acquaintance rape trials are typically evidentially 
ambiguous, with a lack of independent witnesses and largely equate to one person’s account 
against another’s, jurors’ decisions were felt to be most unpredictable and least understood here.  
3.3.3.1.2 Case Preparation  
 Following the selection of the acquaintance rape case scenario as the basis of the live mock 
trial simulations, further preparation and development of the case was required. As alluded to 
above, this scenario previously underwent extensive preparation during Experiment 1, in terms of 
ensuring an accurate but condensed summary of all evidence was included, alongside members of 
the expert CJS panel agreeing upon the legal admissibility of all summarised evidence (see Section 
3.2.3 above). However, in accordance with devising a more realistic simulation of the case, greater 
coverage and discussion surrounding each aspect of the evidence was necessary. Having 
conducted observational ‘sit-ins’ during several rape cases which took place at Nottingham, 
Manchester and Leeds Crown Courts during early 2016, a detailed step-by-step plan of each 
procedural aspect of the jury trial had been drafted. Additionally, working in close consultation 
with a crown court barrister from the expert CJS panel, with extensive experience in both 
prosecuting and defending rape cases at trial, a more detailed narrative of the acquaintance rape 
case adopted within the present study was then developed.  
 Firstly, all pre-trial and closing summary instructions provided by the judge (to the jury) 
were drafted into a script and reviewed, in terms of accurately representing important aspects 
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within the present case. Once the researcher and barrister were in agreement, a further measure of 
ensuring ecological validity of these instructions was implemented, recruiting the services of a 
sitting Crown Court judge based within the north of England. The purpose of the experiment and 
specific details of the selected case were explained to the judge and a hardcopy of the scripted 
judge’s instructions were provided. As all instructions were developed from the same guidance 
handbook provided to English judges (cf. Judicial Studies Board, 2010), no major issues were 
anticipated. Consequently, after agreeing to review the scripted instructions, the judge stated that 
he considered all content therein to be in accordance with the UK law of evidence and conformed 
with language that would typically be used when speaking to jurors during trial. Notably, stylistic 
recommendations were made in terms of the order of presenting specific directions and these were 
amended accordingly.  
 Next, based upon the original trial transcript and materials developed for use within 
Experiment 1, a summarised script of the complainant’s testimony, defendant’s testimony, and the 
key areas of questioning that would take place during examination and cross-examination of the 
witnesses was constructed. This constituted a more detailed ‘version of events’ than had been used 
within the previous videotaped mock trial study, as this was to constitute a major piece of the trial 
evidence that mock jurors were going to be exposed to and which real jurors are exposed to, within 
such contested rape cases. A script of the key issues that prosecution and defence barristers were 
to focus upon within their closing speeches were also drafted and agreed upon by the researcher 
and consultant barrister. Subsequent to the construction of these elements of the trial, four different 
experienced barristers were sent the drafted materials. After being fully informed of the purpose 
and objectives of the research, the lawyers were asked to review the documentation and provide 
comments surrounding the legal admissibility of such evidence, as well as whether they felt an 
equal match of evidence supporting and contracting both parties’ accounts had been achieved. All 
lawyers provided comments surrounding these elements and, again, in direct consultation with the 
lead consultant barrister, these changes were implemented where appropriate.  
 From start to finish, the pre-trial preparation of the mock trial took approximately eight 
weeks to complete. This included preparing and finalising the content of all testimony 
(complainant scripted account, defendant scripted account, medical evidence, core prosecution 
barrister narrative, core defence barrister narrative, judge’s instructions), as well as continued 
consultation before reaching agreement between all expert CJS panel members. 
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3.3.3.1.3 Mock Trial Development 
 As the present study sought to vastly improve upon the ecological validity of much 
previous jury research, the next stage of the study involved developing the case materials into a 
live mock trial simulation, which closely replicated a genuine trial process. Firstly, it was decided 
that genuine criminal justice practitioners would be used to take on the roles of lawyers (barristers), 
judges and legal personnel within the trial rather than making use of actors. This was felt to be 
more akin to an authentic presentative and representation of the evidence, than a non-legally 
trained actor required to memorise a fully scripted case would be able to deliver. The four criminal 
barristers, who had previously consulted on the case materials as part of the expert panel of CJS 
practitioners, were approached and asked to take on the role of prosecution and defence barristers 
over the course of the nine mock trial simulations. All barristers agreed to do so and, working on 
a voluntary basis, they were asked to begin reading over the case materials relative to the respective 
role they had been given (i.e. prosecuting or defending). The lawyers were provided with the full 
trial documentation and, in close consultation with the researcher and lead consultant barrister, 
conducted further preparatory work around how the evidence should be presented during mock 
trials, as well as their examination/cross-examination of witnesses.  
 Importantly, the barristers were not asked to memorise scripted questioning of witnesses, 
in the interest of maintaining an authentic presentation of the evidence during trial and preserving 
the ecological validity of the study. However, they were instructed not to detract from the core line 
of questioning agreed during consultation meetings or central components the scenario (i.e. 
voluntary intoxication, previous acquaintanceship, lack of independent corroboration of witness 
accounts). Essentially, barristers were given the freedom to prepare an unscripted delivery of the 
prosecution/ defence case to jurors, consistent with how they would typically argue a case during 
trial. However, they were directed to do so within the strict parameters and objectives of the 
research. For example, overly flamboyant arguments were prevented and a standardised time 
frame of twenty minutes was put in place in which barristers were to question (examine/cross-
examine) all witnesses. This was an active attempt to minimise extraneous variables and 
confounding effects that may have resulted from differences in the lawyers’ abilities to 
convincingly argue a case, within loose scripted arguments agreed upon.  
 Moreover, prior to the day of trial, each barrister was also asked to provide a summary of 
the argument that they were going to make during trial and the specific questions they were going 
to ask. This was subsequently reviewed by the researcher and lead consultant barrister, ensuring 
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that both the prosecution and defence cases were presented to the jury as equally as possible. For 
example, an equal amount of questioning was put to the complainant, which either supported or 
refuted her version of events, as was also put to the defendant during his testimony. Whilst this 
may appear to somewhat detract from the authentic delivery of opposing arguments during trial, 
this was a further attempt to ensure that both the complainant and defendant were both presented 
to the jury as equally plausible. The scenario was purposefully structured to include a level of 
ambiguity and sufficient lack of corroborative evidence, such that participant decisions could not 
be necessarily swayed one way or another solely upon one side of the evidence, and therefore 
verdict decisions would be more closely attributable to personal attitudes, biases, and psychosocial 
factors implicit within them. 
 Next, due to the extensive involvement and consultation provided throughout the 
development of the mock trial, as well as his extensive experience prosecuting and defending 
similar rape cases, the lead consultant criminal barrister (Nigel Booth) was recruited to take on the 
role of the judge during mock trial simulations. The role of the judge was to present jurors with 
pre-trial instructions, alongside summary instructions at the close of the trial. Having previously 
obtained a sitting Crown Court judge’s approval that the instructions were in accordance with UK 
law, these scripted instructions were simply memorised and prepared by the acting judge for 
presentation to jurors on the day of trial. Additionally, three junior lawyers, with experience of 
being present within genuine trials and assisting more senior lawyers within criminal cases, were 
also recruited to take on the role of the court clerk and ushers during mock trials. 
 Finally, a talent agency within the West Yorkshire region of the UK was again contacted 
to recruit two actors for the role of the complainant (alleged victim) and defendant (alleged 
perpetrator). Having described what the role would involve, both actors were demographically 
matched in terms of their age (21 years old), Caucasian ethnicity and similar regional Greater 
Manchester accents. These are factors which have previously been found to influence attitudes 
towards witness credibility (Ryan, Hewstone, & Giles, 1984) and were therefore deemed necessary 
to control within the present study to reduce the influence of such extraneous variables. Notably, 
the same actors and legal personnel were utilised across all nine mock trial simulations in the 
interest of consistency and again to prevent extraneous variables from preventing direct 
comparison between each mock trial experiment. An exception to this was the defence barristers, 
who, as a result of availability, had to be rotated between different mock trials. However, 
discussions were held between the differing barristers in an attempt to maintain consistency in the 
presentation of evidence between different mock trials. A non-speaking actor was also recruited 
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to play the role of the security guard to escort the defendant into court and sit with him throughout 
the duration of the trial, for authenticity of observations made by jurors. 
 Following recruitment of all those who were going to be re-enacting the rape trial, the 
actors were provided with a script detailing the content of their testimony/instructions for each 
respective case, two weeks prior to the first experimental day. Again, whilst they were not asked 
to memorise a verbatim script of the testimony, they were asked to retain all details of the alleged 
rape and their characters account of what happened. They were also provided with a number of 
different questions they would be asked by barristers during examination and cross-examination. 
Here they were asked to prepare answers in line with the version of events given by their character, 
drawn from the scripts they had been provided with. Two weeks prior to the first day of 
experimentation, a practice run was held within a mock courtroom at the University of 
Huddersfield. Over the course of one full day, trial rehearsals took place several times, with all 
actors and legal personnel present. In the interest of reducing the chance of mistakes being made 
on the day, the researcher explained the specific objectives of the research and all parties had the 
opportunity to discuss any queries that they had. Barristers also prepared the actors at length 
around the questions they would be asked during their testimony, to prevent confounding or 
irrelevant information being exposed to mock jurors on the day of experimentation. For visual 
representation of mock trial rehearsals and to display the developmental process undertaken, 
please refer to the Pictures 3.3 and 3.4 below.  
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Picture 3.3: Mock courtroom trial rehearsals with genuine barristers and actors in position 
 
Picture 3.4: Mock trial rehearsals and development of scripts with genuine barristers and actors  
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3.3.3.1.4 Mock jury Selection and Recruitment 
 All participants within the present study (n = 100) were recruited through a process which 
closely replicated genuine jury recruitment procedures within England. Firstly, the local electoral 
office was contacted to gain access to the details of all registered voters within the Huddersfield 
parliamentary constituency. Whilst the complete electoral register was unavailable to the general 
public, an open version of the electoral register was accessible for a nominal fee. The open register 
is identical to the complete electoral register and contained the details of all registered voters within 
the Huddersfield parliamentary area, except those who had requested their details be removed. 
Accordingly, the open register was purchased and the name and address details of a total of 35,492 
registered voters from the Huddersfield area were obtained.  
 As the open electoral register was provided as a Microsoft Excel database file and ordered 
to replicate the random selection of participants for the study, a random case generator formula 
was applied to automatically select the details of a predefined number of individuals. In line with 
genuine Jury Summoning Bureau procedures described in Section 3.1 above, three times the 
amount of participants required for mock trials were invited to partake. In total 108 participants 
were needed for the nine mock trials planned and, therefore, the details of 324 individuals were 
randomly generated from the database, before being sent a letter of invitation to take part in the 
study.  
 Letters of invitation provided prospective participants with detailed information about the 
mock trials. This included what the mock trial research would involve, why the research was being 
conducted, how they had personally come to be selected, and informed all those invited that 
participation was voluntary, in that, unlike a genuine jury summons, they were not compelled to 
take part. A detailed information sheet and timetable of the mock trial day were also included (see 
invitation letter in Appendix VII). Invites were devised in part using the genuine jury summons 
form (see HMCTS, 2014), ensuring those approached could be assessed in terms of eligibility. 
Therefore, jury eligibility criteria was also set out within invitations, and prospective participants 
were informed that in order to be eligible to take part, they must meet all of criteria listed. Notably, 
whilst determining the eligibility of participants was reliant on self-disclosure, this was not felt to 
be a major issue posed to the authenticity of the study, as genuine jury recruitment procedures 
typically only conduct eligibility checks on a small proportion of all jurors selected for trial (Jury 
Central Summoning Bureau, Personal Communication, March 11th, 2015).  
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 All individuals declaring that they met such criteria and who wished to partake on the date 
and time stipulated within the invitation, were then instructed to register their attendance online 
via a webpage URL listed or by directly contacting the researcher on the details provided. To 
effectively manage participant registration and cancellation of attendance, each mock trial 
experiment was listed on the Eventbrite event management website and accessible via the unique 
web links provided. Upon visiting the webpage, prospective participants were provided with 
further information about the study they had been invited to, alongside how to register their 
attendance. Individuals who directly contacted the researcher by phone or email to secure a place 
were simply asked to confirm that they met the inclusion criteria stipulated on their letter of invite, 
before manually being registered a place on the Eventbrite page. Notably, registration for the study 
occurred on a first-come first-served basis, ensuring that no more than the required number of 
mock jurors were able to register their attendance. In total, nine mock trials occurred over three 
differing experimental days (requiring thirty six jurors present on each day), and on all occasions, 
within seven days of invitation letters being dispensed for a given trial, all mock juror places had 
been fully booked. Importantly, the randomised nature of how participants were recruited for the 
experiment ensured that the composition of mock jurors on to each respective mock trial occurred 
through a process of random assignment. As it was desirable for participants to not be known to 
one another prior to the trial, and in a further attempt to replicate genuine trial conditions, random 
selection of participants from a sample of in excess of 35,000 members of the community 
naturalistically permitted such. 
 Attempting to ensure that all of those registered to attend arrived on the day of 
experimentation, automatic email reminders were sent one week, as well as two days, prior to the 
day of mock trial. Despite this, across the nine differing mock trials, a total of eight participants 
failed to attend on the day. Importantly, adhering to UK law surrounding juror numbers, although 
a trial typically begins with twelve jurors, where jurors are discharged, the trial can continue with 
as few as nine jurors (Judicial College, 2016). Notably, all mock jury panels within the present 
study met the criteria and as such went ahead as planned. Specifically, on four occasions exactly 
twelve jurors arrived, on two occasions eleven jurors attended and on three occasions ten jurors 
attended for the mock trial. All participants received a £10 high street voucher as a token gesture 
for partaking in the study. Finally, by way of further ensuring that all participants recruited and 
selected within the study could be defined as jury eligible, on the day of experimentation all 
participants were also asked to complete a screening questionnaire. Again, utilising questions 
adapted from the genuine English Jury Summons Form (HMCTS, 2014), participants answered 
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questions prior to the onset of the trial, which, upon subsequent review, displayed that all of those 
in attendance could be considered jury eligible according to UK procedures. 
3.3.3.2 Mock Trial Procedure 
 Adopting an experimental design, participants were recruited to take on the role of a juror 
within a mock jury trial which took place over the course of one full day. For methodological 
reasons, the same acquaintance rape case was re-enacted on three separate occasions, to three 
concurrent jury panels each day. Therefore, in total, over the three experimental days, nine separate 
mock jury panels presided over the same case and deliberated separately before returning their 
verdict. In accordance with English jury trial procedures and the differing experimental stages, the 
mock trial procedure is described sequentially and in detail below. Notably, a summary of the 
different procedural stages are described below. 
3.3.3.2.1 Arrival on the Day 
 Experimentation took place within a large lecture theatre, located on campus at the 
University of Huddersfield. The room was purposely selected on the basis of accurately resembling 
the layout of a genuine courtroom. Upon arrival, participants were greeted by the court ushers, 
who, after taking their names, led them to a separate room designed to resemble a jury assembly 
area, where they were seated and asked to await further instruction once all jurors had arrived. As 
each mock trial was re-enacted to three separate panels of mock jurors concurrently, a total of 
thirty-six participants were due to attend each experimental day. Once all participants had arrived, 
or by the latest stipulated arrival time (whichever came first), the jury ushers escorted all jurors 
into the mock courtroom. Here, the researcher then welcomed all participants and gave a brief 
overview of the day’s timetable, as well as what the mock trial experiment would involve. Next, 
each individual was provided with a study booklet, including an information sheet, a consent form, 
and a number of questionnaires (see Appendix VIII). Please note for a detailed review of the 
questionnaires included, refer to the Measures section above.  
 Firstly, participants were thanked for attending and asked to carefully read the information 
sheet on the first page of the booklet in front of them. The information sheet provided an overview 
of what the study would involve and specifically outlined that participants would shortly be asked 
to watch a live re-enactment of a rape trial, before deliberating as a group to reach a verdict in the 
case. Having read the information sheet, participants were informed that if they no longer wished 
to take part, they could leave the study without any justification being required. However, in 
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practice, no participations chose to do so (full ethical procedures described in the Ethical 
Considerations section below). Subsequently, participants were asked to read and complete the 
consent form before experimentation begin. Once consent forms had been signed and dated, the 
experimenter collected in all completed copies. At this stage, participants were given the 
opportunity to ask any clarification questions before experimentation began. 
 Next, participants were required to complete the questions in the booklet in front of them. 
However, before doing so, all participants were issued with a unique juror identification number 
that they were asked to use throughout the entirety of their participation. This number related to 
the jury panel that they were assigned to (ranging from 1 to 9) and their randomly allocated juror 
number (ranging from 1 to 12). For example, juror number six on the first jury trial panel was 
assigned the following reference number: J1-6. Notably, as highlighted above, all jurors had been 
randomly selected to take part in the study from the open electoral role. However, to ensure further 
randomisation of the jury selections in accordance with genuine jury selection procedures (outlined 
in Section 3.1. above), participants were assigned to each differing jury panel and given an 
individual juror number relative to that jury panel, through a process of randomly reading names 
from the list of attendees on the day. After each name was read, the participants were informed of 
their juror number and asked to sit with their fellow panel of jurors within a particular area in the 
mock courtroom.  
 After all participants had been allocated to their respective panels, jurors were asked to 
write their unique juror number on the first page of their study booklet and informed that, from 
this point onwards, this unique reference number would be used in place of their real names. The 
purpose of this was to encourage jurors to be honest in the responses given to questions within the 
study booklet. Informing jurors of this, it was explained that as the experimenter had no list 
corresponding unique juror reference numbers with participant names, there would be no way that 
individuals could be linked back to the answers given. A notable exception being where jurors 
who made a record of their unique reference number requested that their data to be removed prior 
to analysis. However, in practice no such requests were made. 
 Over the course of the next twenty to thirty-five minutes (varying between the nine trials), 
participants answered the questions within their study booklets. This took place in silence, as jurors 
had been asked not to confer with other participants and think carefully when responding to the 
questions. Once all jurors had completed the questionnaires, the experimenter collected the 
booklets from participants. Next, jurors were played a twelve-minute pre-trial video developed by 
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the Ministry of Justice, which is shown to all jurors before hearing evidence in a genuine trial. The 
video provides an overview of different people within the courtroom, their respective roles, and 
what the role of the jury consists of during trial (Ministry of Justice, 2016).   
 After watching the video, mock jurors were informed that the live trial re-enactment would 
now begin. In an attempt to ensure that participants approached the trial and their subsequent 
decision-making task in a similar way to that of a real jury, the experimenter provided some 
standardised final instructions. Participants were informed that whilst the mock trial they were 
about to observe was clearly a simulation and therefore not an actual criminal trial taking place 
within a courtroom, the content therein related to a genuine rape allegation, where a real 
complainant and real defendant gave evidence in court. Moreover, participants were informed that 
the whole of the testimony they would hear was drawn from evidence presented within the actual 
criminal case and, therefore, the decisions they made would have important implications for 
understanding that case. Finally, participants were asked to take their role as a juror seriously 
throughout the duration of the trial and that, from this point onwards, they should consider 
themselves a juror in a genuine criminal trial rather than a participant in an experiment. Paper and 
pencils were provided for jurors to take notes should they choose to, as is the typical procedure 
within English jury trials. 
3.3.3.2.2 Onset of the Trial 
 At the onset of the trial, with mock jurors seated within their respective jury panels, 
participants were provided with a folder containing evidence and information they would later be 
directed to read, namely written accounts of the witness statements and the route to verdict 
document described above. Firstly, the court clerk, barristers and defendant, accompanied by a 
security officer, entered the courtroom. In line with tradition, the court clerk then asked all those 
present to stand as the judge also entered. The judge firstly introduced himself to the jury and 
informed participants that they must all stand when approached by the usher and swear an 
affirmation to, ‘faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence’. This 
was purposely included as a method of ensuring jurors were both engaged with the trial and to 
simulate the degree of seriousness assigned to their role, in much the same way as a real juror 
would having taken such an oath.  
 After all jurors were sworn in, the court usher then read the indictment to the jury, outlining 
the exact charge against the defendant and informing them that, after hearing all evidence in the 
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case, it would be their duty to determine whether or not the defendant should be found guilty or 
not guilty of rape. Speaking directly to mock jurors, the judge then began his opening remarks. 
Here, jurors were provided with specific instructions surrounding the difference in roles between 
the judge and jury, as well as the legal guidelines that they must follow throughout the course of 
their jury service. Specifically, the judge also informed jurors that a key part of their role would 
be to decide whether the complainant gave consent to sexual intercourse and, if not, whether the 
defendant knew this. Next, jurors were presented with the prosecution case. Prosecution barristers 
began their opening speech by outlining the undisputed facts in the case surrounding the dates, 
times, and location of the alleged incident, as well as circumstances leading up to the day in 
question which both parties agree happened. Jurors were then introduced to the prosecution 
narrative of the case and, outlining the complainant’s version of events, why they argue that the 
defendant should be found guilty of rape.  
 The prosecution barrister then called the complainant (pseudonym Sarah Adams), to give 
her evidence and a court usher left the courtroom to collect the complainant actress who was 
waiting outside. Having been brought into the witness box, the judge first asked the complainant 
to make an affirmation to the court that the evidence given would be truthful. The prosecution 
questioning then began (termed examination-in-chief), and the complainant described in detail 
what she stated had happened before, during and after the alleged rape is said to have occurred. 
The overarching narrative of the complainant’s account was that, whilst she had voluntarily spent 
the night drinking alcohol with the accused, along with their other friends, she at no time agreed 
to have sexual intercourse with him and that, despite her indicating this with her body language, 
he went on regardless (see Appendix I).  
 Next, the defence barrister began their questioning of the complainant (termed cross-
examination). The essence of the defence questioning and the overarching case presented to the 
jury was quite simply that the complainant was lying, she did want to have sex with the defendant, 
and she therefore did consent to the intercourse that occurred. During their cross-examination, the 
defence barrister argued that the allegation of rape was therefore unfounded and untrue. 
Importantly, the complainant stated that this was incorrect and maintained that she had in fact been 
raped by the defendant. Notably, the mock trial was purposely designed to ensure that, whilst being 
somewhat lambasted during cross-examination, the actress playing the complainant maintained 
her composure and gave a relatively consistent and plausible account of what happened.  
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 Finally, the prosecution barrister then read all other witness statements to the jurors. 
Specifically; testimony from the mother of alleged victim who stated that, after the incident, her 
daughter had reported the rape to her by telephone; a police officer who interviewed the defendant, 
along with a summary of the initial account given after his arrest; and importantly, the statement 
of the medical examiner who examined the alleged victim (refer to Appendix I). The medical 
evidence was purposely evidentially neutral, reporting that, whilst a degree of force was evident 
around the vaginal area of the complainant, this was neither consistent nor inconsistent with a rape 
having taken place. Next, the prosecution barrister began presenting their case to the court. The 
defendant, who was sitting with a security officer within the court, was then escorted to the witness 
box. After being asked by the judge to make an affirmation to the court that the evidence given 
would be a truthful account of events, the defendant began giving his testimony. During 
examination-in-chief, the defence presented mock jurors with details of what the defendant 
claimed to have happened before, during and after the alleged rape was said to have occurred. 
Through use of the pseudonym Jake Walker, the defendant stated that on the night in question he 
was with the complainant, they had chatted and voluntarily consumed alcohol together throughout 
the evening until a point where both parties had made sexual advances towards one another. This 
he stated, culminated in consensual sexual intercourse taking place. The essence of the defence 
case was therefore that the defendant’s actions should be considered to be lawful by the jury and 
did not constitute rape. 
 Mock jurors then observed the prosecution barrister’s cross-examination of the defendant. 
Again, the essence of the prosecution questioning was that the defendant was lying, he knew that 
Sarah Adams did not want to have sex, she made this clear to him, yet he continued regardless, 
which therefore constituted rape. Notably, again, the mock trial was purposely designed to ensure 
that, whilst being lambasted during cross-examination, the actor playing the defendant maintained 
his composure and gave a relatively consistent account of what happened. The last evidential stage 
of the trial involved the both lawyers delivering their closing speeches to participants. Here, the 
defence argued that the jury should find the defendant not guilty and, respectively, the prosecution 
argued they should find him to be guilty. Finally, the trial concluded with the judge presenting 
mock jurors with a summary of the evidence in the case. Mock jurors were given a summary of 
the evidence, highlighting the important details that they may wish to consider when deciding a 
verdict.  
 Additionally, mock jurors were given a detailed explanation of the law around rape, what 
constitutes consent, and therefore the central legal questions that jurors should seek to answer in 
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their own minds before reaching their verdict. Specific instructions were also given in regard to 
the deliberations. Participants were informed that before returning a verdict, all jurors should be 
unanimously in agreement and they should be sure of this verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, the court usher asked all those present to stand, after which the judge, legal personnel and 
defendant left the courtroom 
 In total, the delivery of evidence within each trial occurred over a period of approximately 
three hours and thirty minutes. Whilst this is somewhat shorter than a genuine trial would typically 
last, summaries of the important legal aspects of each case along with the removal of repeated and 
unnecessary information, allowed the trial to be condensed into such a timeframe. In particular, 
the common stops and starts that typically exist within genuine jury trials were removed, which 
itself reduced the length of trial simulations. Legal challenges, where the jury are required to leave 
the courtroom whilst advocates and the judge discuss matters, were also deemed to be unnecessary 
due to the depth of pre-trial planning and consultation between parties.  
3.3.3.3 Post-trial Procedure 
 Once the trial had concluded, mock jurors were asked to remain in their seats prior to 
deliberation. At this stage, the experimenter reminded participants that whilst the evidence they 
had been shown was presented through the medium of a re-enacted simulation, the testimonials 
and facts of the case related to that of a genuine rape trial. Accordingly, participants were asked to 
take their role as a juror and decision-maker in the trial seriously throughout the remainder of the 
study.  
3.3.3.3.1 Individual Verdict Decision 1 
 Whilst still sitting within the jury box, each participant was given the first of two verdict 
decision forms and asked to write their unique juror reference number within the top left corner. 
Participants were told not to discuss the case with other jurors until they were in the deliberation 
room and then asked to complete the first verdict decision form. Here, participants were asked to 
select whether they felt the defendant to be guilty or not guilty, whether they felt guilt had been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and specific questions surrounding the extent to which they 
believed the testimony of the complainant and defendant with questions comprised within the JDS 
(see Verdict Decision form 1 within the study booklet - Appendix VIII). Participants were 
reminded that prior to recording their verdict decisions, all responses were confidential and 
anonymous and would be viewed only by the researchers, in order to minimise the effects of social 
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desirability upon verdict decisions made. Notably, the responses recorded at this stage allowed the 
experimenter to determine how each juror had voted as an individual, having heard all the evidence 
in the case and prior to group deliberation influence. Once complete, all ‘Verdict Decision 1’ forms 
were collected in, so that participants would not be able to directly compare the initial decisions 
made post deliberation. 
3.3.3.3.3 Group Deliberation 
 Next, mock jurors were led to their respective deliberation rooms by the jury ushers, one 
panel at a time. In accordance with genuine trial deliberation instructions, participants were 
reconvened within a deliberation room separate from the courtroom and not permitted to discuss 
the case with any person until all jurors were present. Detailed instructions surrounding 
deliberations had already been provided by the judge, and so the experimenter simply reminded 
participants that they were asked to collectively discuss the case in an attempt to reach a verdict. 
Jurors were informed that whilst they should attempt to reach a unanimous verdict, if they were 
not able to do so after a given period of time, the court would provide further instructions to them 
on the possibility of accepting a majority verdict.  
 For methodological reasons, a two-hour curfew was placed on deliberations and, therefore, 
it was decided in consultation with the expert panel of CJS personnel that after sixty-minutes had 
passed without a verdict being returned, jurors would be informed that a majority verdict of ten 
jurors to two would be accepted. Jurors were not made aware of this before deliberations began, 
in accordance with genuine English deliberation procedures. Finally, participants were told to vote 
a jury foreperson and the experimenter then left the room and the usher stationed outside the 
deliberation room, to ensure no jurors came into contact with any individuals outside of their 
fellow jurors. Notably, all deliberations were conducted in private in the interest of maintaining 
ecological validity and reducing social desirability in opinions cast, had the experimenter been 
present. In practice, just over half of the jury panels reached a unanimous verdict (n = 5) with 
deliberation times ranging from 35 - 90 minutes. The remaining majority verdicts (n = 4) took 
between 60 – 95 minutes to be reached. Once jury panels notified the usher stationed outside their 
deliberation room that they had agreed upon a verdict, they were reconvened within the mock 
courtroom to deliver their verdict to the judge. In all instances, the jury foreperson was told to 
stand and asked to return the verdict of the jury. This was then recorded by the experimenter along 
with whether this was a unanimous or majority verdict. 
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3.2.3.3.3 Individual Verdict Decision 2 
 In the final stage of the study, after returning their collective verdict, mock jurors were 
asked to spread out throughout the courtroom and change seats so that they were not sitting 
immediately next to a fellow mock juror. Participants were each given a second copy of the JDS 
question items (Verdict Decision form 2 – see Appendix VIII), identical to the form completed 
pre-deliberation. Again, jurors were asked to write their unique juror reference number in the top 
left corner and complete the form. Importantly, before doing so jurors were given specific 
standardised instructions, outlining that the verdict decisions they were being asked to make on 
this occasion related to them as an individual and therefore may not necessarily be the same as the 
collective verdict that had just been returned. Participants were informed that none of their fellow 
jurors would see their verdict choices at any point, nor any other answers given on this sheet. This 
was an attempt to examine whether any differences existed between collective verdicts returned 
and what individual jurors truly believed the verdict to be. Participants were again encouraged to 
be honest in their responses. Additionally, participants were reminded that even the experimenter 
would be unable to link the answers given to any individual, as a result of the unique juror 
identification numbers used in place of names.  
 Once completed, the experimenter collected in answer sheets, which had been folded in 
half to conceal responses. Participants were then informed that the mock trial was now over and 
were given a debrief sheet to take away with them, prior to leaving. Participants were thanked for 
taking part and informed that their decisions would not have any bearing on the actual case. They 
told that their decision-making would be used to inform theoretical understanding only. On 
average, each mock trial experiment was around seven hours long from arrival to completion.  
3.3.4 Ethical Considerations 
 Before experimentation began, the present research had been subjected to the scrutiny of 
the University of Huddersfield’s School of Human and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel 
(SREP). A detailed application, adhering to all applicable ethical guidelines outlined within the 
BPS (2014) Code of Practice for Human Research, was submitted (24th November 2015) and 
subsequently approved (21st December 2015) by the university’s SREP (see Appendix VI). Prior 
to the onset of the study, certain ethical considerations were made and steps taken by the researcher 
to ensure that any risk of harm posed to participants was kept to a minimum. Specifically, as large 
numbers of invitations to take part were sent out to prospective participants, many of whom would 
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not go on to participate, it was decided that initial invitations would not outline that the mock trials 
related to a sexual crime. Whilst seemingly in contradiction to ethical guidelines surrounding 
informed consent, experiences of sexual victimisation are notably high within England. As such, 
inclusion of such detail within letters randomly distributed to the personal addresses of members 
of the community, whose personal circumstances were not known to the researcher, was felt to be 
an inappropriate risk which had the possibility of causing unnecessary harm or distress to 
recipients of the invitations.  
 Instead, prospective participants were notified of the sexual nature of the mock trial 
experiments at the earliest opportunity on the online Eventbrite webpage, prior to registering to 
partake in the study. On the day of experimentation, a detailed information sheet and itemised 
consent form were given to participants prior to exposure to the mock trial evidence. This ensured 
that all participants were fully aware of the nature the study before it began (see Appendix VIII).  
Moreover, as participants would hear details of an alleged sexual crime, prior warning of the type 
of case that they would be asked to observe, and subsequently discuss among their fellow 
participants, was made clear from the onset. The information sheet (and debrief) also provided the 
contact details of free and impartial support services available to participants, regardless of 
participation in the study, including the Samaritans and Victim Support. Participants were also 
encouraged to review the questions within their study booklet before signing their consent forms, 
further ensuring they were fully informed of what they were being asked to partake in. 
 Pre-trial, it was explicitly explained to participants of their right to withdraw from the study 
or take a break at any point throughout the day, without the need to provide a reason. Due to the 
potentially emotive content heard within the case, participants were informed that should they feel 
upset or distressed in any way, they were free to leave the room or experiment for as long as they 
needed. Care was taken to ensure that barristers and actors did not present evidence from the 
scenario in an overly distressing or graphic manner, to further ensure participant wellbeing. 
Alongside the individual’s right to withdraw, all participants were also informed of the right to 
withdraw their data from the study up until a stipulated date (one month after experimentation). 
This date and the guidelines for requesting data be removed were provided within the information 
sheet, which participants were encouraged to take with them at the end of the experiment. The 
primary researcher’s contact details and those of the main project supervisor were also provided, 
should any participants wish to obtain other information or have any further queries in the future.  
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 Adopting the same procedure utilised within the initial student sample study, participants 
were afforded full anonymity throughout the research, with their names replaced with unique juror 
participant numbers from the onset and within all subsequent use of their data. Likewise, 
anonymised data of all participants was given an additional level of security, in that electronic data 
files were stored on a password protected hard drive and paper responses within a locked filling 
cabinet. All electronic data and paper responses will be stored for a period of five years, in 
accordance with University of Huddersfield procedures. Notably, in a similar manner to that 
explained in relation to Experiment 1, within live mock trial simulations, some small degree of 
deception was required to ensure participants’ active engagement in the study. Whilst the live 
presentation of the case was clearly much more engaging than previous videotaped mock trials, in 
an attempt to replicate the circumstances under which actual jurors make decisions, mock jurors 
were encouraged on several occasions to take their decision-making task seriously. Specifically, 
they were reminded that the case they were making decisions about was a genuine case and that 
their decisions would have important implications for understanding the case. However, as 
previously mentioned, certain elements of the rape case had been amended and abbreviated in line 
with the experimental objectives, and therefore the case was not a perfect representation of the 
original trial.  
 Additionally, whilst criminal justice practitioners assisted the research by way of providing 
consultancy during the development phase of the mock trials, the research was not directly 
conducted in partnership with any UK court. As such, immediately after experimentation was 
complete, participants were fully debriefed in regard to this and the exact aims of the research were 
set out. Specifically, mock jurors were notified that their decisions would only be used to inform 
the research objectives broadly and not any court’s decision related to a specific case. A full debrief 
was verbally given by the researcher and barristers at the end of the experiment, allowing 
participants the opportunity to ask any clarification questions they had and discuss any aspect of 
the case or experiment they wished to. Finally, a printed copy of the debrief sheet was also 
provided, which participants were encouraged to read prior to leaving and take with them after 
experimentation had concluded.
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Chapter 4: Results 
ABSTRACT 
 Within the present chapter the results relative to each aim of the thesis are reported and 
interpreted in line with convention. According with the four main aims of the research these results 
are reported in consecutive sub-chapters. Findings are presented relative to the relationship 
between psychopathic personality traits and juror decisions within both the student and community 
independent samples whereby latent variable modelling techniques were employed. Likewise, 
regression model associations which sought to examine whether any predictive relationship 
existed between rape myth acceptance, personal victimisation, and juror demographics are 
presented. Within sub-chapter 4.3 results of the confirmatory factorial exploration of the newly 
devised and validated Juror Decision Scale are displayed and interpreted in terms of the scales 
reported construct validity and dimensionality. Finally, the association between all variables tested 
within four separate path models are presented, reporting the correlations displayed between 
psychopathic personality traits, rape supportive attitudes, witness credibility assessments, decision 
confidence, and ultimate verdict decisions juror made, both pre- and post-deliberation, across both 
independent samples.  
4.1 THE ROLE OF PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY TRAITS UPON JURY DECISION 
MAKING – A LATENT PROFILE ANALYSIS 
4.1.1 Current Study 
 The overarching aim of the thesis was to investigate the relationship between a jurors’ 
psychological make-up and the verdict decisions made during criminal trials. Despite a plethora 
of past research arguing against the existence of such a relationship, finding only weak and 
inconsistent evidence that factors, such as personality traits, may be associated with verdict 
decisions, the present study sought to again explore this relationship within the context of a rape 
trial. Adopting a methodological approach, which vastly improves upon previous simulated jury 
trial procedures - high in ecological validity, alongside advanced analytical procedures, never 
previously tested within the domain of jury research, the influence that psychological constructs 
may have upon juror decisions was directly tested. Therefore, the main objective of the analysis 
in this sub-chapter, was to examine the relationship between psychopathic personality traits (i.e. 
affective responsiveness, cognitive responsiveness, interpersonal manipulation, and egocentricity) 
upon mock juror verdict decisions. Further, in accordance with the experimental design adopted, 
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the relationship between psychopathic personality traits and juror decisions was tested at two time-
points; individual juror verdict decision pre-deliberation and post-deliberation, within both 
respective samples (Experiment 1 – opportunistically selected student sample; Experiment 2 – 
randomly selected community sample) from a person-centred rather than variable centred 
approach.
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4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics, including means (M), standard deviations (SD), and the observed 
range of scores (minimum and maximum scores) across the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale 
(PPTS) four dimensions for all Experiment 1 and 2 participants, are presented in Table 4.1 below. 
Descriptive results reveal that combined mean scores for all participants, across both data sets, 
displayed moderate levels of psychopathic personality traits. Additionally, verdict outcome 
frequencies between experiments and within respective experiments, relative to pre- and post-
deliberation individual juror decisions, are displayed in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.1  
Descriptive Statistics of the PPTS four sub-scales for Experiment 1 (n = 324) and Experiment 2 
(n = 100) participants. 
Study Scale M SD Observed 
Min 
Observed 
Max 
Experiment 1 AR  10.59 3.55 5.00 22.00 
 CR 10.56 2.95 5.00 19.00 
 EGO 13.10 3.12 5.00 22.00 
 IPM 13.23 3.97 5.00 25.00 
      
Experiment 2 AR  11.28 3.28 5.00 21.00 
 CR 11.54 2.66 5.00 17.00 
 EGO 13.15 3.26 6.00 23.00 
 IPM 12.30 3.26 5.00 23.00 
 
Note: PPTS = Psychopathic Personality Traits Scale; AR = Affective Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive 
Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity. 
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 The verdict decision frequencies displayed in Table 4.2 show that within Experiment 1, the 
initial verdict decisions that participants gave pre-deliberation were comparably similar however, 
the majority of participants returned a not guilty verdict (n = 179, 55.2%), and just under half of 
all participants selected a guilty verdict (n = 145, 44.8%). After deliberation (VD2), the number 
of participants returning a not guilty verdict decision increased (n = 191, 59.0%), whilst guilty 
verdict decisions decreased (n = 133, 41.0%). This voting preference was reflected in the collective 
verdicts returned, with 22 of the 27 separate jury panels returning a not guilty verdict in the case. 
Comparably, five jury panels returned a collective guilty verdict in relation to the same case. A 
McNemar's Chi-square test for association was carried out to help determine if there were any 
significant change between pre-deliberation (VD1) and post-deliberation (VD2) individual juror 
verdict decisions, within Experiment 1. Results displayed there was no significant change overall 
in verdict decisions jurors made between pre-deliberation and post-deliberation, 2 (1, N = 324) = 
2.16, p = .142.  
 Within Experiment 2, verdict decision frequencies shown within Table 4.2 display that the 
vast majority of participants returned a not guilty verdict pre-deliberation (n = 78, 78.0%), with 
around a fifth of participants selecting a guilty verdict (n = 22, 22.0%). After deliberation (VD2), 
the number of participants returning a not guilty verdict decision increased (n = 85, 85.0%), whilst 
guilty verdict decisions decreased (n = 15, 15.0%). Again, this voting preference was reflected in 
the collective verdicts returned, with all nine separate jury panels returning a not guilty verdict in 
the case. Notably within Experiment 2, when participants were asked what verdict they would 
have returned had they been a one-person jury, the number of participants who said guilty was 
greater than the frequency observed pre-deliberation and not guilty verdicts at the lowest number 
observed throughout all decision time points. 
 A McNemar’s Chi-square test for association was carried out to help determine any 
significant change occurred between pre-deliberation (VD1) and post-deliberation (VD2) 
individual juror verdict decisions, within Experiment 2. Results displayed there was no significant 
change overall in verdict decisions jurors made between pre-deliberation and post-deliberation, 2 
(1, N = 100) = 2.77, p = .092.
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Table 4.2 
Verdict Decision frequencies within experiment 1 (n =324) and experiment 2 (n = 100). 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 
Scale 
Guilty 
N (%) 
Not Guilty 
N (%) 
Guilty 
N (%) 
Not Guilty 
N (%) 
VD1 145 (44.8%) 179 (55.2%) 
191 (59.0%) 
193 (59.3%) 
264 (71.5%) 
22 (22.0%) 78 (78.0%) 
85 (85.0%) 
76 (76.0%) 
100 (100.0%) 
VD2 133 (41.0%) 15 (15.0%) 
OPV 131 (40.4%) 24 (24.0%) 
Collective  
Verdict 
60 (18.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
Note: VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-deliberation); VD2 = Individual 
Verdict decision 2 (that participants made post-deliberation); OPV = One Person Jury Verdict decision (that 
participants said they would have given if they were a one-person jury). Collective Verdict = the final 
verdict decision given by the combined vote of the jury panel members. 
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4.1.3 Experiment 1 - Latent Profiling Analysis 
 Latent profiling analysis (LPA) was used to identify homogeneous groups (hereby known 
as latent classes) within student sample mock juror participants present within Experiment 1, using 
the four dimensions of the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale (PPTS). A two-stage procedure 
was carried out in Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015).  
 Firstly, the LPA was carried out to establish the number of different psychopathy classes 
within the data, and ascertain whether different classes that emerged differed qualitatively or 
quantitatively. The LPA stage of the model used total psychopathy scores for each of the four 
psychopathic personality trait dimensions of the PPTS measure (Affective Responsiveness, 
Cognitive Responsiveness, Interpersonal Manipulation, and Egocentricity). Secondly, using 
logistic regression, the association between latent classes of these personality traits and the verdict 
decisions mock jurors made (guilty/not guilty) were assessed. Notably, this process was repeated 
separately at both verdict decision time points within the experiment (for example, individual 
verdict decision 1 pre-deliberation, and individual verdict decision 2 post-deliberation).  
 Within the first LPA stage of the procedure, four alternate models were assessed (a 1-class 
model through to a 4-class model) using robust maximum likelihood estimation (Yuan & Bentler, 
2000). The relative fit of the models was compared using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; 
Akaike, 1987), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978), as well as the sample 
size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SSA-BIC; Sclove, 1987). The model, which exhibits 
the lowest value here (between alternative class solutions tested), is considered the best solution 
available. Strong simulation evidence exists, which suggests that the BIC value should be treated 
as the best information criterion statistic for reliably identifying the accurate number of latent 
classes within the data (cf. Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthen, 2007). The Lo-Mendall-Rubin 
adjusted likelihood ratio test (LRT; Lo, Mednall, & Rubin, 2001) was also used to compare models 
with increasing numbers of latent classes. Additionally, entropy values were calculated, which 
indicate the ability of a given model to correctly classify subjects, whereby higher values indicate 
better model classification (Ramaswamy, DeSarbo, Reibstein, & Robinson, 1993). Finally, 
attaining a non-significant value (p > .05), relative to any latent class in the model indicates that 
the previous model tested (with one less class), is the class solution that should be accepted. 
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4.1.3.1 Model Fit Statistics of the PPTS 
 The fit statistics for the LPA of psychopathy (as measured with the PPTS sub-scales 
described above) are presented in Table 4.3. The lowest BIC value is observed for the 3-class 
solution and the LRT test displays that there is no significant improvement in fit for the 4-class 
solution. Accordingly, the model fit statistics taken together indicate that the 3-class solution is 
considered the best model fit for Experiment 1 (student sample).  
 Figure 4.1 displays the latent profile plot for the 3-class solution (means and standard 
deviations of psychopathic personality trait sub-scales are displayed in Table 4.4). Class 1 (45.8% 
of student mock jurors) is the largest group. This group is characterised by generally low mean 
scores on all four psychopathic personality traits and, as such, is classified as the “low psychopathy 
group”. Class 2 (38.4% of student mock jurors) is characterised by relatively low mean scores on 
affective and cognitive responsiveness, and moderate mean scores on interpersonal manipulation 
and egocentricity. This group is therefore classified as the “moderate interpersonal 
manipulation/egocentricity group”. Class 3 (15.8% of student mock jurors) is the smallest group 
and characterised by relatively high mean scores on affective responsiveness, interpersonal 
manipulation, and egocentricity alongside low mean scores on cognitive responsiveness. This 
group was classified as the “high psychopathy group” within the present dataset.    
 The association between psychopathic personality trait class membership and juror 
decisions within Experiment 1 was examined using logistic regression at both verdict decision 
time points. For both verdict decisions made (pre-deliberation – VD1; post-deliberation – VD2), 
the “low psychopathy group” (class 1) was a reference category to which all other classes were 
compared against. Results displayed that whilst some differences exist between student jurors’ 
psychopathy group classifications (class 3 with class 1, and class 2 with class 1), there was no 
statistical significant differences detected between psychopathy groups in relation to verdict 
decisions made pre-deliberation (VD1) or post-deliberation (VD2) (see Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.3  
Fit Indices for the Experiment 1 Latent Profile Analysis of the Four Psychopathic Personality 
Trait Factors. 
Note: AIC = Akaike information criterion, BIC = Bayesian information criterion, SSA-BIC = sample size 
adjusted BIC, LRT = Lo-Mendell-Rubin’s adjusted likelihood ratio test.   
 
Table 4.4  
Means (Standard Deviations) for the 3-class Solution of the Psychopathy Personality Traits Scale 
sub-scales (PPTS) (Student Sample; n =324). 
Item AR CR IPM EGO 
Class 1 8.10 (1.99) 9.19 (2.58) 11.21 (3.46) 11.17 (2.48) 
Class 2 11.10 (1.99) 11.13 (2.58) 14.43 (3.46) 14.13 (2.48) 
Class 3 16.56 (1.99) 13.15 (2.58) 16.16 (3.46) 16.09 (2.48) 
Note: AR = Affective Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal 
Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity.
Model AIC BIC SSA-BIC LRT p Entropy 
1 class 6843.14 6873.38 6848.01 N/A N/A N/A 
2 classes 6638.45 6687.61 6646.37 207.50 .001 0.786 
3 classes 6606.01 6674.05 6616.96 41.03 .049 0.689 
4 classes 6589.48 6676.44 6603.48 25.64 .731 0.694 
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Figure 4.1: Latent profile analysis plot of psychopathic traits. Dashed line - Class 1 = “low 
psychopathy group” (reference group; 45.8% of cases); Dotted line - Class 2 = “moderate 
interpersonal manipulation/egocentricity group” (38.4% of cases); Solid line - Class 3 = “high 
psychopathy group” (15.8% of cases); Affective = Affective Responsiveness; Cognitive = 
Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation: Egocentricity = Egocentricity. 
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Table 4.5  
Logistic Regression Results - Associations between the 3 Latent Classes of the PPTS and Verdict 
Decisions (n = 324). 
 
Variable 
Class 2 with Class 1 
OR (95% CI) 
Cohen’s d Class 3 with Class 1 
OR (95% CI) 
Cohen’s d 
VD1 0.74 (0.37/1.52) 0.17 1.08 (0.50/2.33) 0.04 
VD2 1.19 (0.57/2.46) 0.10 0.61 (0.28/1.30) 0.27 
Note: Class 1 (reference group) = “low psychopathy group”; Dotted line - Class 2 = “moderate interpersonal 
manipulation/ egocentricity group”; Solid line - Class 3 = “high psychopathy group”; OR = Odds Ratio, 
95% CI = Confidence Interval. Cohen (1977) suggested that d = 0.2 be considered a small effect size, 0.5 
represents a medium effect size, and 0.8 denotes a large effect size. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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4.1.4 Experiment 2 - Latent Profiling Analysis 
 Within Experiment 2, latent profiling analysis (LPA) was again used to identify 
homogeneous groups or latent classes within community sampled mock juror participants, using 
the four dimensions of the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale (PPTS). An identical two-stage 
procedure was carried out in Mplus 7.4 as was conducted in Experiment 1 (Muthen & Muthen, 
2015) (refer to section 4.1.3 above for a full review of LPA procedures). 
4.1.4.1 Model Fit Statistics of the PPTS 
 The fit statistics for the LPA of psychopathy (as measured with the four PPTS sub-scales 
described above) are presented in Table 4.6. The lowest BIC value is observed for the 3-class 
solution and the LRT test displayed no significant improvement in fit for the 4-class solution. 
Taken together the model fit statistics thereby indicate the 3-class solution to represent the best 
model fit for the Experiment 2 community sampled juror data.  
 Figure 4.2 below displays the latent profile plot for the 3-class solution (means and 
standard deviations of personality trait sub-scales are displayed in Table 4.7). Class 1 (38.0% of 
mock jurors) is characterised by generally low mean scores on all four psychopathic personality 
traits and as such is classified as the “low psychopathy group”. Class 2 (55.0% of mock jurors) is 
the largest group and is characterised by relatively low mean scores on affective and cognitive 
responsiveness, and moderate mean scores on interpersonal manipulation and egocentricity. This 
group is therefore classified as the “moderate psychopathy group”. Class 3 (7.0% of mock jurors) 
is the smallest group and is characterised by relatively high mean scores on affective 
responsiveness and very high scores on interpersonal manipulation and egocentricity. Relatively 
low mean scores are displayed on cognitive responsiveness. Taken together this group was 
classified as the “high psychopathy group”.   
 The association between psychopathic personality traits class membership and juror 
decisions within Experiment 2 were subsequently examined using logistic regression at both 
verdict decision time points (see Table 4.8). For both verdict decisions made (pre-deliberation 
VD1; post-deliberation VD2), the “low psychopathy group” (class 1) was a reference category to 
which all other classes were compared against.  
 In relation to verdict decision 1, results suggest that community sampled jurors with high 
scores on affective responsiveness, interpersonal manipulation, and egocentricity (class 3) are 
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significantly less likely to return a guilty verdict (OR = 0.06, 95% CI = 0.02/0.26, p < 0.001, d = 
1.55) in comparison to mock jurors scoring low in all psychopathy personality traits (class 1). For 
verdict decision 2 post-deliberation, results again suggest that jurors from the “high psychopathy 
personality group” (class 3) are significantly less likely to return a guilty verdict (OR = 0.08, 95% 
CI = 0.01/0.56, p < 0.001, d = 1.39) in comparison to mock jurors from the “low psychopathy 
personality group” (class 1). Utilisation of Cohen’s d effect size estimator also indicates that the 
association at both verdict decision time points was very large (Cohen, 1977). 
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Table 4.6  
Fit Indices for Experiment 2 Latent Profile Analysis of the Four Psychopathic Personality Traits 
Factors. 
Note: AIC = Akaike information criterion, BIC = Bayesian information criterion, SSABIC = sample size 
adjusted BIC, LRT = Lo-Mendell-Rubin’s adjusted likelihood ratio test.   
 
 
Table 4.7 
Means (Standard Deviations) for the 3-class Solution of the Psychopathy Personality Traits Scale 
dimensions (PPTS) (Community Sample, n =100). 
Item AR CR IPM Ego 
Class 1 9.10 (2.57) 10.51 (2.51) 9.47 (2.84) 10.94 (1.90) 
Class 2 12.15 (2.57) 12.02 (2.51) 13.42 (2.84) 13.92 (1.90) 
Class 3 17.91 (2.57) 13.44 (2.51) 20.93 (2.84) 21.35 (1.90) 
Note: AR = Affective Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal 
Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity.
Model AIC BIC SSABIC LRT p Entropy 
1 class 2066.35 2087.11 2061.84 N/A N/A N/A 
2 classes  2030.51 2064.25 2023.19 43.93 0.001 0.85 
3 classes 2011.70 2058.42 2001.57 27.60 0.034 0.75 
4 classes 2005.32 2065.01 1992.37 15.70 0.158 0.88 
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Figure 4.2: Latent profile analysis plot of psychopathic traits (community sample). Dashed line - 
Class 1 = “low psychopathy group” (reference group; 38.0% of cases); Dotted line - Class 2 = 
“moderate psychopathy group” (55.0% of cases); Solid line - Class 3 = “high psychopathy group” 
(7.0% of cases); Affective = Affective Responsiveness; Cognitive = Cognitive Responsiveness; 
IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation: Egocentricity = Egocentricity. 
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Table 4.8 
Logistic Regression Results - Associations between the 3 Latent Classes of the PPTS and Verdict 
Decisions (n = 100). 
 
Variable 
Class 2 with Class 1 
OR (95% CI) 
Cohen’s d Class 3 with Class 1 
OR (95% CI) 
Cohen’s d 
VD1 0.28 (0.07/1.21) 0.07 0.06*** (0.02/0.26) 1.55 
VD2 0.86 (0.13/5.75) 0.08 0.08*** (0.01/0.56) 1.39 
Note: Class 1 = “low psychopathy group”; Dotted line - Class 2 = “moderate psychopathy group”; Solid 
line - Class 3 = “high psychopathy group”; OR = Odds Ratio, 95% CI = Confidence Interval. Cohen (1977) 
suggested that d = 0.2 be considered a small effect size, 0.5 represents a medium effect size, and 0.8 denotes 
a large effect size. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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4.2 THE ROLE OF RAPE ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL VICTIMISATION UPON 
JURY DECISION MAKING 
4.2.1 Current Study 
 The overarching aim of the thesis was to investigate the relationship between juror 
psychological make-up (traits, attitudes and experiences) with the verdict decisions made during 
trial. As the present study sought to explicitly explore this relationship within the context of a rape 
trial and with the existence of a wealth of literature which has suggested the importance that rape 
supportive attitudes may have upon juror impartiality, a direct examination of the influence of rape 
attitudes upon juror decision making was tested. Therefore, the main objective of this sub-chapter 
was to examine the relationship between rape supportive sexually aggressive attitudes, participant 
demographics, and personal victimisation experiences, upon mock juror verdict decisions. Further, 
in accordance with the experimental design utilised, the relationship between the aforementioned 
factors and verdict decisions were tested at the individual juror (not collective jury panel) level, 
both pre-deliberation and post-deliberation, in both respective samples (Experiment 1 – student 
sample; Experiment 2 – community sample). 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics – Experiment 1 
 Descriptive statistics for all continuous variables are presented in Table 4.9 and descriptive 
statistics for all categorical variables are presented in Table 4.10. The mean age of participants 
within the Experiment 1 student sample was 24.86 years (SD = 9.34), whilst the mean participant 
score on the AMMSA was 93.70 (SD = 25.74). The sample was predominately female (64.8%), 
and of the 114 participants who reported they had previously been a victim of crime, 24 stated this 
was a sexual crime, equating to 7.4% of the total sample. Notably, 20.1% of the sample stated that 
a close friend or family member had reportedly been the victim of serious sexual offence such as 
rape. Additionally, Table 4.11 contains independent samples t-test results for AMMSA between 
gender and ethnic groups. 
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Table 4.9 
Descriptive Statistics of age and the AMMSA scale for experiment 1 participants (n = 324). 
Scale M SD Observed Min Observed Max 
Age 24.86 9.34 18 70 
AMMSA  93.70 25.74 37 161 
Note: AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score. 
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Table 4.10 
Frequency of endorsements for gender and victimisation categorical variables (n = 324). 
Variable Frequency (%)   
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
114 (35.2%) 
210 (64.8%) 
Victim of crime 
   Yes  
   No  
 
114 (35.2%) 
210 (64.8%) 
Victim of serious crime 
   Yes  
   No 
 
  30 (9.3%) 
294 (90.7%) 
Victim of sexual crime 
   Yes  
   No 
 
  24 (7.4%) 
300 (92.6%) 
Friends/family that have been 
victim of serious sexual crime 
   Yes 
   No 
 
 
 67 (20.1%) 
256 (79.9%) 
  
 
 Independent sample t-test results for sexually aggressive attitudes suggest that male (M = 
99.23) and female (M = 90.68) participant scores on the AMMSA differed significantly (t (321) = 
2.884, p < .01, d = .33). The degree of difference in mean scores was shown to be small and, 
overall, men scored higher in such sexually aggressive attitudes. Results also suggest a difference 
in sexually aggressive attitudes between ethnic groups, with Caucasian respondents (M = 89.93) 
scoring significantly lower on the AMMSA (t (321) = -3.701, p < .001, d = .41) than Black and 
Asian minority ethnic respondents (M = 100.88). 
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Table 4.11  
Descriptive Statistics and group differences in AMMSA scale scores between gender; males (n = 
114) and females (n = 210), and ethnicity; Caucasian (n =213) and Black Asian Minority Ethnic 
(BAME) (n = 111) participants. 
Scale Group M SD t Cohen’s d 
AMMSA Males 99.23 26.67 2.884** .33 
 Females 90.68 24.77   
 Caucasian 89.93 25.41 -3.701*** .41 
 BAME 100.88 24.94   
Note: AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score. Cohen (1977) 
suggested that d = 0.2 be considered a small effect size, 0.5 represents a medium effect size, and 0.8 
denotes a large effect size. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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4.2.3 Binary Logistic Regression – Experiment 1 
 Direct binary logistic regression was conducted to establish the impact of age, gender, 
personal victimisation (criminal victimisation generally, serious victimisation, and sexual 
victimisation), having close friends/relatives that have reportedly been a victim of a sexual crime, 
as well as attitudes held towards sexual aggression (measured with the AMMSA scale), on the 
verdict decision preferences of mock jurors in a rape trial. Notably, this was measured at the 
individual juror level and at two time-points, pre-deliberation (VD1) and post-deliberation (VD2). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted and displayed no violation of the assumptions of 
multicollinearity occurred at either time point. 
 Firstly, a test of the complete model relating to the verdict decision made pre-deliberation 
(VD1), was undertaken. Containing all predictor variables against a constant only model, the 
complete model was statistically significant (χ2 (7, N = 324) = 40.97, p < .001), indicating that the 
model was able to distinguish between mock jurors who reported a guilty verdict preference, with 
those who reported a not guilty verdict preference. The model as a whole explained between 12% 
(Cox & Snell R Square) and 16% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance in verdict decisions made 
pre-deliberation, and correctly classified 65% of cases. 
 As displayed in Table 4.12 below, only two variables made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model (victim of a sex crime and sexual aggression attitudes [AMMSA]). 
AMMSA was a significant predictor of verdict preference (OR = .98, p < .001, d = .01), found to 
be negatively related to guilty verdicts. This indicated that mock jurors with higher scores on the 
AMMSA, were more likely to vote not guilty than those who scored low in sexually aggressive 
attitudes, when controlling for all other factors in the model. Additionally, the largest effect was 
found for previous sexual victimisation, which was positively related with verdict decisions (OR 
= 4.17, p < .05, d = .80), when controlling for all other factors in the model. This indicates that 
mock jurors with personal experience of such victimisation, were 4.17 times more likely to return 
a guilty verdict than participants without such experiences, at the pre-deliberation stage of the trial.  
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Table 4.12 
Logistic regression model of the demographic, victimisation, and attitudinal predictors of 
individual juror verdict decision 1 (VD1) and verdict decision 2 (VD2) (n = 324).  
Variables B SE OR (95% CI) 
VD1    
Age -0.01 0.01 1.00 (.97/1.02) 
Gender 0.13 0.26 1.14 (.69/1.89) 
Victim of crime -0.27 0.30 0.76 (.42/1.38) 
Victim of serious crime 0.45 0.60 1.57 (.48/5.13) 
Victim of sexual crime 1.43 0.72 4.17* (1.02/16.99) 
Friends/fam victim of sex crime 0.04 0.30 1.04 (.58/1.88) 
AMMSA -0.02 0.01 0.98*** (.97/.99) 
    
VD2    
Age -0.01 0.01 0.99 (.96/1.02) 
Gender -0.09 0.26 0.92 (.55/1.54) 
Victim of crime 0.27 0.30 1.31 (.73/2.35) 
Victim of serious crime 0.72 0.59 2.05 (.65/6.48) 
Victim of sexual crime 0.66 0.65 1.94 (.54/6.97) 
Friends/fam victim of sex crime -0.05 0.30 0.95 (.53/1.73) 
AMMSA -0.02 0.01 0.98*** (.97/.99) 
Note: Dependent variables: VD1 = Individual Juror Verdict decision pre-deliberation (guilty/not guilty), 
VD2 = Individual Juror Verdict decision post-deliberation (guilty/not guilty). AMMSA = Acceptance of 
Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score, OR = odds ratio. SE = standard error. 95% CI = 
confidence interval. ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001. 
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 A further test of the complete model relating to the verdict decision made post-deliberation 
(verdict decision 2), was also undertaken. Containing all predictor variables against a constant only 
model, the complete model was statistically significant (χ2 (7, N = 324) = 38.17, p < .001), 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between mock jurors who reported a guilty verdict 
preference, with those who reported a not guilty verdict preference. The model as a whole 
explained between 11% (Cox & Snell R Square) and 15% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance 
in verdict decisions made post-deliberation, and again correctly classified 65% of cases. 
 As displayed in Table 4.12, only one variable made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model relating to the Verdict Decision 2. Again, the AMMSA was a consistent 
predictor of verdict preference (OR = .98, p < .001), found to be negatively related to guilty 
verdicts. It also indicated that mock jurors with lower scores on the AMMSA were more likely to 
vote guilty than those who scored higher in sexually aggressive attitudes, when controlling for all 
other factors in the model.  
4.2.4 Descriptive Statistics – Experiment 2 
 Descriptive statistics for all continuous variables are presented in Table 4.13 and 
descriptive statistics for all categorical variables are presented in Table 4.14. The mean age of 
participants within Experiment 2 community sample was 45.00 years (SD = 15.75), whilst the 
mean participant score on the AMMSA was 97.62 (SD = 29.92). The sample was evenly 
distributed by gender where this was reported, with females making up 48% and males 46% of 
participants (please note missing values account for the remaining 8% of participants who failed 
to disclose their gender). In total, 41% of mock jurors reported they had previously been a victim 
of crime, with 7% of the total sample stating this was a sexual crime. Notably, 15% of the sample 
also stated that a close friend or family member had reportedly been the victim of serious sexual 
offence, such as rape.  
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Table 4.13 
Descriptive Statistics of age and the AMMSA scale for all experiment 2 participants (n = 100). 
Scale M SD Observed Min Observed Max 
Age 45.00 15.75 18 70 
AMMSA  97.62 29.92 37 177 
Note: AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score. 
 
Table 4.14 
Frequency of endorsements for gender and victimisation categorical variables (n = 100). 
Variable Frequency (%) 
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
46 (46.0%) 
48 (48.0%) 
Victim of crime 
   Yes  
   No  
 
41 (41.0%) 
58 (58.0%) 
Victim of serious crime 
   Yes  
   No 
 
7 (7.0%) 
91 (91.0%) 
Victim of sexual crime 
   Yes  
   No 
 
7 (7.0%) 
91 (91.0%) 
Friends/family that have been 
victim of a sexual crime 
   Yes 
   No 
 
 
15 (15.0%) 
83 (83.0%) 
  
Note: The difference between sample size and frequencies/ total numbers in categories, reflect missing 
values. 
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Table 4.15 contains independent sample t-test results for sexually aggressive attitudes between 
gender groups, ethnic groups, and level of education categories within community sampled 
participants. Results suggest that male (M = 104.09) and female (M = 92.25) participant scores on 
the AMMSA differed significantly (t (91) = 2.00, p < .05, d = .42). The degree of difference in 
mean scores was shown to be small, with men scoring higher in sexually aggressive attitudes 
overall. Results further suggest a difference in sexually aggressive attitudes between differing 
ethnic groups, with Caucasian respondents (M = 93.52) scoring significantly lower on the 
AMMSA (t (91) = -1.915, p < .05, d = .40) than Black and Asian minority ethnic respondents (M 
= 105.92). The degree of difference in mean scores was again shown to be small. In relation to 
educational attainment, results also suggest that participants with less than a university degree 
qualification (M = 103.93) scored significantly higher on the AMMSA (t (91) = 2.512, p < .05, d 
= .51) than those who had a university degree qualification and above (M = 89.05). The degree of 
difference observed in mean scores here was displayed to be moderate. 
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Table 4.15 
Descriptive Statistics and group differences in AMMSA scale scores between gender; males (n = 
49) and females (n = 51), ethnicity; Caucasian (n =67) and Black Asian Minority Ethnic (BAME) 
(n = 24), and level of education; less than university educated (n = 57) and university educated 
and above (n = 43) participants. 
Scale Group M SD t Cohen’s d 
AMMSA Males 104.09 29.34 2.00* .42 
 Females 92.25 28.04   
 Caucasian 93.52 28.86 -1.92* .40 
 BAME 105.92 25.71   
 Less than Uni degree 103.93 28.28 2.51* .51 
 Uni degree & above 89.05 30.27   
Note: AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score. Cohen (1977) 
suggested that d = 0.2 be considered a small effect size, 0.5 represents a medium effect size, and 0.8 denotes 
a large effect size. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Differences between total sample size and frequencies 
in categories reflect missing values. 
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4.2.5 Binary Logistic Regression – Experiment 2 
 Direct binary logistic regression was conducted to establish the impact of age, gender, 
personal victimisation (criminal victimisation generally, serious victimisation, and sexual 
victimisation), having close friends/relatives that have reportedly been a victim of a sexual crime, 
as well as attitudes held towards sexual aggression (AMMSA), on the verdict decision preferences 
of mock jurors within a rape trial. Notably, again, this was measured at the individual juror level 
and at two time-points, pre-deliberation (VD1) and post-deliberation (VD2). Preliminary analyses 
were conducted and displayed no violation of the assumptions of multicollinearity occurring at 
either time point. 
 A test of the complete model relating to the verdict decision made pre-deliberation (VD1) 
within the community sample was undertaken. Containing all predictor variables against a constant 
only model, the complete model was statistically significant (χ2 (7, N = 100) = 17.15, p < .05), 
indicating that the model was able distinguish between mock jurors, who reported a guilty verdict 
preference, with those who reported a not guilty verdict preference. The model as a whole 
explained between 17% (Cox & Snell R Square) and 26% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance 
in verdict decisions made pre-deliberation, and correctly classified 80% of cases. 
 As displayed in Table 4.16, only two variables made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model (gender and AMMSA). AMMSA was a significant predictor of verdict 
preference (OR = .96, p < .01, d = .02), found to be negatively related to guilty verdicts. This 
indicated that mock jurors, with lower scores on the AMMSA, were more likely to vote guilty than 
those who scored higher in sexually aggressive attitudes, when controlling for all other factors in 
the model. Additionally, gender was strongly related with verdict decisions (OR = .28, p < .05, d 
= .70), when controlling for all other factors in the model. Based on gender group classifications, 
this indicated that female mock jurors were more likely to return a guilty verdict than their male 
counterparts, at the pre-deliberation stage of the trial.  
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Table 4.16 
Logistic regression model of the demographic, victimisation and, attitudinal predictors of 
individual juror verdict decision 1 (VD1) and verdict decision 2 (VD2) (n = 100).  
Variables B SE OR (95% CI) 
VD1    
Age -0.02 0.02 0.99 (.95/1.02) 
Gender -1.26 0.63 0.28* (.08/.98) 
Victim of crime 0.35 0.61 1.42 (.43/4.67) 
Victim of serious crime -1.96 1.52 0.14 (.01/2.78) 
Victim of sexual crime -1.19 1.27 0.30 (.03/3.66) 
Friends/fam victim of sex crime 0.78 0.88 2.18 (.39/12.15) 
AMMSA -0.04 0.01 0.96** (.94/.99) 
    
VD2    
Age -0.03 0.02 0.98 (.94/1.02) 
Gender -0.30 0.66 0.74 (.20/2.70) 
Victim of crime 0.29 0.65 1.33 (.37/4.78) 
Victim of serious crime -0.21 1.47 0.81 (.05/14.41) 
Victim of sexual crime 0.52 1.08 1.68 (.20/13.97) 
Friends/fam victim of sex crime -1.59 1.23 0.21 (.02/2.30) 
AMMSA -0.02 0.01 0.98* (.95/.99) 
 
Note: Dependent variables: VD1 = Individual Juror Verdict decision pre-deliberation (guilty/not guilty), 
VD2 = Individual Juror Verdict decision post-deliberation (guilty/not guilty). AMMSA = Acceptance of 
Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score, OR = odds ratio. SE = standard error. 95% CI = 
confidence interval. ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.  
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 Finally, a test of the complete model relating to verdict decisions made post-deliberation 
(VD2), was undertaken. Containing all predictor variables against a constant only model, the 
complete model was not statistically significant (χ2 (7, N = 100) = 7.15, p >.05), indicating that the 
model was not sufficiently able distinguish between mock jurors who reported a guilty verdict 
preference, against those who reported a not guilty verdict preference. Despite this, examination 
of the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test displayed the model fit could not be considered 
poor χ2 (8, N = 100) = 2.90, p =.94). Examination of the Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R 
Square values displayed the model as a whole explained between 8% and 13% respectively, of the 
variance in verdict decisions made post-deliberation and again correctly classified 85% of cases.  
 As displayed in Table 4.16, only one variable made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model relating to the verdict decision two time-point. AMMSA was a consistent 
predictor of verdict preference (OR = .98, p < .05, d = .01), found to be negatively related to guilty 
verdicts. Again, this indicated that mock jurors with lower scores on the AMMSA, were more 
likely to vote guilty than those who scored higher in sexually aggressive attitudes, when 
controlling for all other factors in the model. 
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4.3 DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCT VALIDITY AND DIMENSIONALITY OF THE 
JUROR DECISION SCALE (JDS) 
4.3.1 Current Study  
 Whilst Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model provides a detailed conceptualisation 
of the decision-making processors, thought to underlie a jurors’ decision to vote guilty or not guilty 
and remains the dominate explanation of jury decision making. To date, a lack of empirical 
research exists, which has sought to verify important features of the theory. In particular, one 
central aspect of the model termed the certainty principles (for a detailed explanation refer to 
chapter 2) has, to the author’s knowledge, never been empirically tested or verified. Therefore, the 
aim of the current study and analytical sub-chapter was to develop and validate a measure of 
individual juror decision making relative to criminal trials, directly integrating theoretical features 
of the Story Model of jury decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) into an empirically 
testable scale. Accordingly, the factorial structure and construct validity of the scale developed, 
termed the Juror Decision Scale (JDS) was tested using confirmatory factor analysis. Please note, 
for a detailed description of the JDS scale development, refer to Chapter 3 Experiment 1 measures 
section. 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive statistics of Experiment 1 data for the three JDS factors (Complainant 
Believability, Defendant Believability, and Confidence in Decision) at both verdict decision time 
points (VD1 = pre-deliberation; VD2 = post-deliberation), are presented in Table 4.17 below. 
Descriptive statistics including means (M), standard deviations (SD), median (Mdn), and the 
observed range of scores on the AMMSA and Self-Esteem scales are also presented in Table 4.17. 
Statistics reveal consistent moderate mean scores on the three JDS sub-scales across both time 
points.  
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Table 4.17 
Descriptive Statistics for the JDS factors pre-deliberation (verdict decision 1 – VD1) and post-
deliberation (verdict decision 2 – VD2), rape attitudes (AMMSA), and self-esteem (SES). 
Variables M SD Mdn Observed 
Min. 
Observed 
Max. 
JDS VD1 (total score) 52.11 5.80 51.00 35 74 
Confidence in Decision 7.09 1.44 7.00 2 10 
Complainant Believability  22.32 4.72 22.00 10 33 
Defendant Believability 22.71 4.29 23.00 8 35 
AMMSA 93.70 25.74 91.00 37 161 
SES 20.76 4.51 21.00 10 37 
      
JDS VD2 (total score) 51.87 6.22 51.00 34 78 
Confidence in Decision 7.57 1.60 8.00 2 10 
Compliant Believability 21.27 5.12 21.00 7 35 
Defendant Believability 23.03 4.83 23.00 10 35 
Note: JDS = Juror Decision Scale; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-
deliberation); VD2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (that participants made post-deliberation); AMMSA = 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score; SES = Self-Esteem. 
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4.3.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Procedure 
 To examine the dimensionality and construct validity of the JDS, traditional confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) techniques and confirmatory bifactor analysis procedures (cf. Reise, Moore, 
& Haviland, 2010) were undertaken at both verdict decision time points (VD1 – pre-deliberation 
& VD2 – post-deliberation). Three alternative models of the JDS were specified and assessed using 
Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) with Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) estimation. The 
CFA was used to determine factor loadings and identify the best factorial structure. 
 At both verdict decision time points, Model 1 is a one-factor solution, where all 16 JDS 
items load onto a single latent factor. Model 2 is a correlated three-factor solution, where items 
load on the complainant believability factor (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), defendant believability 
factor (items 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15), and confidence in decision factor (items 1 and 2). Model 
3 (see Figure 4.3 below) is a bifactor conceptualisation with one general factor (all items) of juror 
decision making, alongside three subordinate factors, as described in Model 2.  
 The overall fit of each model and the relative fit between the three differing models were 
assessed using a range of goodness-of-fit indices. The Chi-square statistic (χ2), Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI; Cronbach, 1990), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), Root-Mean-
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) with the associated 90% confidence 
interval (90% CI), Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) were reported for all CFA models. For CFI and TLI, values above 
or approaching .95 are indicative of good model fit and above .90 acceptable model fit (Bentler, 
1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Likewise, for RMSEA and SRMR, values less than .05 suggest good 
model fit and below .08 acceptable model fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). For BIC values 
comparing alternate models, the lowest value is indicative of the best fitting model (Nylund, 
Asparouhov, & Muthen, 2007). 
 Finally, due to criticisms surrounding Cronbach’s alpha coefficient indicators of internal 
consistency (cf. Raykov, 1997; 1998), composite reliability was used within the present analysis 
to assess internal reliability of the JDS factors, with values above .60 typically considered 
acceptable (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). 
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Figure 4.3: Bifactor solution of the JDS; G = general factor of JDM (items 1-16); COMP = 
Complainant Believability (items 2-8); DEF = Defendant Believability (items 9-15); CON = 
Decision Confidence (items 1 & 16). 
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4.3.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results 
 Table 4.18 displays the fit indices for the three alternative models of the JDS at both verdict 
decision time points (VD1, VD2). At both time points, the one-factor model and correlated three-
factor model were rejected, based upon exhibiting CFI and TLI values considerably below the .95 
approximate level of acceptance (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Furthermore, the RMSEA 
and SRMR values were also considerably above the .05 level of acceptance for the one-factor and 
correlated three-factor models. Taken together the combination of fit statistics suggest the bifactor 
model of the JDS provides the best fit to the data, at both verdict decision time points; VD1 (CFI 
= .94, TLI = .92, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .07 [90%CI = .05/.08], BIC = 11119.99), VD2 CFI = 
.96, TLI = .94, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .07 [90%CI = .05/.08], BIC = 10700.38). Notably, the 
BIC statistic, for the bifactor model at both verdict decision time points, was lower than that 
displayed for all alternative models, an important indication that it represents the best fitting model 
(cf. Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthen, 2007). 
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Table 4.18 
Fit Indices for Three Alternative Models of the JDS, during stage VD1 (pre-deliberation) and stage VD2 (post-deliberation). 
Stage Models χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA 90% CI SRMR BIC 
VD1 1. One-factor 1149.72* 104 .49 .41 .16 .17/.19 .16 12034.38 
 2. Correlated 3 factors 813.79* 101 .90 .89 .10 .08/.12 .07 11201.76 
 3. Bifactor 204.42* 85 .94 .92 .07 .05/.08 .04 11119.99 
VD2 1. One-factor 1606.68* 104 .52 .45 .21 .20/.22 .17 11980.06 
 2. Correlated 3 factors 353.86* 101 .90 .89 .09 .08/.10 .07 10785.36 
 3. Bifactor 199.60* 85 .96 .94 .07 .05/.08 .04 10700.38 
Note. JDS = Juror Decision Scale; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; CI = Confidence Interval; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria; χ2 = chi square goodness 
of fit statistic. * Indicates χ2 are statistically significant (p < .05).
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 The appropriateness of the bifactor model of the JDS is also determined by examining 
factor loadings for statistical significance. Inspection of the factor loadings for the three JDS 
factors, relative to Verdict Decision 1 (Table 4.19) and Verdict Decision 2 (Table 4.20), provides 
clear evidence of the appropriateness of including these latent factors in the scoring of the JDS.  
 All three JDS factor loadings are statistically significant (p < .001), in a positive direction 
at both verdict decision points and, notably, overall the items more strongly load onto each of the 
three JDS factors, than on the general factors. The superiority of the three JDS factors over the 
general factor in the conceptualisation of the JDS factorial structure is therefore displayed. This 
thereby suggests that across both verdict decision time points, individual juror decision making is 
comprised of three subscales (complainant believability, defendant believability, and decision 
confidence) whilst controlling for the general factor. 
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Table 4.19 
 
Standardized Factor Loadings for the Three JDS Factors and General Factor (G) pre-deliberation (VD1). 
MCSI-R items G CONF COMP DEF 
1. Thinking about your individual verdict decision of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, how confident are you that 
you have made the correct decision? 
.14* .82***   
2. How well did the evidence match and cover what the complainant said happened? .34***  .42***  
3. How complete was the complainant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left 
unsupported by the evidence? 
.35***  .54***  
4. How plausible was the complainant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is 
both possible and likely?  
.64***  .43***  
5. How coherent was the complainant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening 
were logically connected? 
.49***  .53***  
6. How unique was the complainant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard? 
.34***  .61***  
7. How consistent was the complainant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .36***  .51***  
8. Overall, how much do you believe the complainant’s version of events? .76***  .43***  
9. How well did the evidence match and cover what the defendant said happened? .08   .61*** 
10. How complete was the defendant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported 
by the evidence? 
.03   .73*** 
11. How plausible was the defendant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is 
both possible and likely? 
.57***   .55*** 
12. How coherent was the defendant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening 
were logically connected? 
.25*   .75*** 
13. How unique was the defendant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard? 
.54***   .39*** 
14. How consistent was the defendant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .38**   .63*** 
15. Overall, how much do you believe the defendant’s version of events? .74***   .47*** 
16. Finally, how confident are you overall that you have reached the correct verdict decision in this case? .01 .84***   
 
Note. Factor loadings are statistically significant at * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. CONF = Confidence in Decision; COMP = Complainant Believability; 
DEF = Defendant Believability.
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Table 4.20 
 
Standardized Factor Loadings for the Three JDS Factors and General Factor (G) post-deliberation (VD2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Factor loadings are statistically significant at * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. CONF = Confidence in Decision; COMP = Complainant Believability; 
DEF = Defendant Believability.
MCSI-R items G CONF COMP DEF 
1. Thinking about your individual verdict decision of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, how confident are you that you 
have made the correct decision? 
.11 .76***   
2. How well did the evidence match and cover what the complainant said happened? .39***  .62***  
3. How complete was the complainant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported 
by the evidence? 
.29**  .79***  
4. How plausible was the complainant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is both 
possible and likely?  
.76***  .37***  
 5. How coherent was the complainant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening were 
logically connected? 
.41***  .51***  
6. How unique was the complainant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard? 
.47***  .57***  
7. How consistent was the complainant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .63***  .49***  
8. Overall, how much do you believe the complainant’s version of events? .83***  .35***  
9. How well did the evidence match and cover what the defendant said happened? .30***   .67*** 
10. How complete was the defendant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported by 
the evidence? 
.24***   .72*** 
11. How plausible was the defendant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is both 
possible and likely? 
.48***   .66*** 
12. How coherent was the defendant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening were 
logically connected? 
.17*   .76*** 
13. How unique was the defendant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard? 
.41***   .53*** 
14. How consistent was the defendant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .32***   .72*** 
15. Overall, how much do you believe the defendant’s version of events? .63***   .62*** 
16. Finally, how confident are you overall that you have reached the correct verdict decision in this case? .12 .92***   
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 The correlations between the three JDS factors, relative to Verdict Decision 1, were low 
(complainant believability and decision confidence r = .10, p > .05; complainant believability and 
defendant believability r = -.30, p < .001; defendant believability and decision confidence r = .14, 
p < .05) indicating little overlap between the variables. Correlations between the three JDS latent 
factors relative to Verdict Decision 2, were also low (complainant believability and decision 
confidence r = .05, p > .05; complainant believability and defendant believability r = -.36, p < 
.001; defendant believability and decision confidence r = .25, p < .001) indicating little overlap 
between the variables.  
 Whilst there does not appear to be a significant overlap between JDS variables at VD1 or 
VD2 decision points, establishing differential predictive validity between alternative dimensions 
of a multidimensional scale has previously been recommended (cf. Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; 
Carmines & Zeller, 1979). In the present analysis, this involves ensuring that the three dimensions 
of the JDS are associated differentially with external variables. Table 4.21 below displays the 
results of the regression analysis at both decision time points. In relation to Verdict Decision 1, 
complainant believability forms a significant negative correlation with rape attitudes (AMMSA), 
whereas a significant positive relationship is observed between defendant believability and 
AMMSA scores. While negatively correlated, decision confidence was non-significantly related 
to AMMSA scores. Defendant believability was significantly negatively correlated with self-
esteem, as was decision confidence, although this relationship was not statistically significant.  
 In relation to Verdict Decision 2, AMMSA was again significantly negatively correlated 
with the complainant believability dimension and significantly positively correlated with 
defendant believability. Decision confidence (but not defendant believability) was significantly 
negatively associated with self-esteem, whilst complainant believability was positively correlated, 
yet not statistically significantly. These results confirm that complainant believability, defendant 
believability, and decision confidence should be included as separate subscales in the JDS. 
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Table 4.21 
Regression models displaying associations between the Three JDS Factors and External Variables.   
 Verdict Decision 1 Verdict Decision 2 
 
Variable 
Self-Esteem (F [3, 320] = 
3.58, p < .05) 
β (95% CI) 
AMMSA (F [3, 319] = 
11.61, p < .001) 
β (95% CI) 
Self-esteem (F [3, 320] = 
6.01, p < .001) 
β (95% CI) 
AMMSA (F [3, 319] = 
12.76, p < .001) 
β (95% CI) 
Confidence in Decision -0.04 (-.15/.07) -0.03 (-.13/.08) -0.17** (-.28/-.06) 0.01 (-.11/.11) 
Complainant Believability  0.03 (-.09/.14) -0.16** (-.27/-.05) 0.07 (-.04/.19) -0.24*** (-.35/-.12) 
Defendant Believability -0.16** (-.27/-.04) 0.23*** (.11/.34) -0.09 (-.21/.03) 0.16** (.04/.27) 
 
Note: Verdict Decision 1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-deliberation); Verdict Decision 2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (that 
participants made post-deliberation); AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score; SES = Self-Esteem. **p < .01, *** p < 
.001.
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 Finally, internal reliability of the three JDS factors was calculated using composite 
reliability in place of traditional Cronbach’s alpha (as suggested by Boduszek & Debowska, 
2016; Raykov, 1997). Using the formula displayed below where; CR = composite reliability of 
the factor score,  = standardised factor loading, and Var (Ɛi) = standard error variance, results 
demonstrate good internal reliability for the JDS factors pre-deliberation (Verdict Decision 1) 
and post-deliberation (Verdict Decision 2). 
 
 
 
  
 
At Verdict Decision 1, results displayed that; confidence in decision (.82), complainant 
believability (.70), and defendant believability (.79), alongside the general factor (.74), 
exhibited good internal reliability. Likewise, at Verdict Decision 2, confidence in decision 
(.83), complainant believability (.72), and defendant believability (.85), as well as the general 
factor (.79), exhibited good internal reliability, when considering that values above .60 are 
considered to be acceptable (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000) 
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4.4 INTEGRATING THE ROLE OF PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY TRAITS AND 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS RAPE WITH THE JUROR DECISION SCALE (JDS) SUB 
SCALES AND VERDICT OUTCOMES – A PATH ANALYSIS. 
4.4.1 Current Study 
 The results displayed within previous sub-chapters indicated a relationship between 
psychopathic traits and juror decision making, as well as sexually aggressive attitudes upon verdict 
outcomes. Likewise, drawing upon theoretical principles of the Story Model, and utilising 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) techniques to develop and validate an empirical measure of 
jury decision making, results revealed a statistical relationship between witness credibility 
assessment (Juror Decision Scale - JDS) items, and the three sub-factors displayed (Complainant 
Believability, Defendant Believability, Decision Confidence). Whilst a direct relationship between 
particular juror constructs and verdict decisions has thus far been displayed, what is missing in the 
current thesis is an examination of the directed dependence of these constructs upon JDS sub-scale 
factors, and the subsequent dependence of the three JDS factors upon the verdict decisions jurors 
made. Alternatively put, a path analysis allows the relationship between psychopathic traits, 
sexually aggressive attitudes, witness believability, decision confidence, and verdict outcomes to 
be examined within a more structured model. Therefore, the main objectives of the current 
analyses were to test; (1) whether psychopathic personality traits and attitudes towards sexual 
aggression are significantly correlated with juror beliefs in a complainant and defendant’s stories, 
alongside confidence in verdict decisions (measured through the three factors of the JDS) and, (2) 
whether the three JDS factors are significantly correlated with individual juror verdicts at both 
verdict decision time points (pre-deliberation and post-deliberation) and between experimental 
samples (student and community jurors).  Based upon previous findings obtained in previous 
analytic sub-chapters, it was hypothesised that sexually aggressive attitudes would have a direct 
effect upon the JDS factors, and further that JDS factors would have a direct effect upon verdict 
decisions, across all verdict decision time points and between experimental samples. Moreover, it 
was hypothesised that the four PPTS traits would have no direct effect on JDS factors in 
Experiment 1 student sample, but may exhibit some direct effects upon witness believability 
assessments in the community sample, where again it was suggested that JDS factors would have 
a direct effect upon verdict decisions pre and post deliberation.  
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4.4.2 Path Analysis  
 Path analysis constitutes an extension of multiple regression, estimating the significance 
and magnitude of causal connections between variables included in the analysis. Based upon 
previous theory and the findings obtained within earlier sub-chapter analyses, four separate path 
models were specified and tested using Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) with robust 
maximum likelihood (MLR) estimation. Preliminary analysis was conducted in SPSS 22 to ensure 
that all data were suitable for path analysis. Four distinct models were tested to examine the 
presence of any such relationship at both verdict decision time points, across the two experimental 
data sets. Model 1 relates to jurors’ Verdict Decision 1 within Experiment 1 (see Fig 4.4), Model 
2 relates to jurors’ Verdict Decision 2 within Experiment 1 (see Fig. 4.5), Model 3 relates to jurors’ 
Verdict Decision 1 within experiment 2 (see Fig 4.6), and Model 4 relates to jurors’ Verdict 
Decision 2 within Experiment 2 (see Fig. 4.7). In essence, path analysis was used to assess the 
relationship between all variables in each respective model and, as such, five exogenous variables 
or factors (Affective Responsiveness, Cognitive Responsiveness, Interpersonal Manipulation, 
Egocentricity, and Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression) and three endogenous 
variables/factors (Complainant Believability, Defendant Believability, and Decision Confidence), 
were examined against the verdict decision outcome variable. 
 The overall fit of each model was assessed using the following statistics; Chi-square (χ2), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Cronbach, 1990), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), 
Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), with the associated 90% 
confidence interval (90% CI), and Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). A non-
significant Chi-square value (Kline, 2005) and CFI and TLI values above .95 are indicative of 
good model fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). CFI and TLI values above .90 are, however, 
considered adequate model fit (Dhingra, Boduszek, & O’Connor, 2016; Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Likewise, RMSEA and SRMR values less than or approaching .05 suggest good model fit (Bentler, 
1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
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4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Subscale Differences 
4.4.3.1 Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 descriptive statistics, including means (M), standard deviations (SD), and the 
observed range of scores all for continuous variables used in the present analysis, are presented 
above. Specifically, descriptive statistics for the four sub-scales of the PPTS are displayed in Table 
4.1 and for the AMMSA scale total scores, alongside the three JDS factors (Complainant 
Believability, Defendant Believability, and Confidence in Decision) at both verdict decision time 
points (VD1 = pre-deliberation; VD2 = post-deliberation), refer to Table 4.17. Experiment 1 
verdict decision frequencies at both decision time points, are also displayed in Table 4.2 above.  
Descriptive results reveal that student mock juror participants, on average, displayed moderate 
levels of psychopathic personality traits (AR, CR, IMP, EGO) and sexually aggressive attitudes 
(AMMSA). Statistics also reveal consistent moderate mean scores on the three JDS sub-scales 
across both decision time points. Paired sample t-tests were conducted to examine whether any 
significant difference occurred in JDS sub-scale scores VD1 to VD2. Results revealed that 
Complainant Believability scores at the VD1 point (M = 22.32) compared with at the VD2 point 
(M = 21.27) differed significantly (t (323) = 5.812, p < .001, d = .21) with the degree of difference 
shown to be small, in that overall student jurors’ belief in the complaints story decreased after 
deliberation had taken place. Results also suggest a significant difference in decision confidence 
between VD1 (M = 7.10) and VD2 (M = 7.57), with student jurors reporting higher confidence in 
their verdict decision after deliberations (t (323) = -5.699, p < .001, d = .31). The degree of 
difference in mean scores was again shown to be small. No statistically significant change in 
Defendant Believability scores was detected between decision points. 
 Verdict decision frequencies displayed that initial verdict decisions made by participants 
pre-deliberation (VD1) were comparably similar (not-guilty verdict = 55.2%, guilty verdict = 
44.8%), and that the number of participants returning a not guilty verdict increased post-
deliberation (VD2) (not guilty verdict = 59.0%, guilty verdict = 41.0%). Notably, however, a 
McNemar's Chi-square test for association displayed that there was no statistically significant 
change in the verdict decisions made by mock jurors between pre-deliberation and post-
deliberation; 2 (1, N = 324) = 2.16, p = .142. 
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4.4.3.2 Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 descriptive statistics for the four sub-scales of the PPTS are displayed in 
Table 4.1 above and Table 4.13 for the AMMSA scale total scores. Descriptive statistics for the 
three JDS factors within Experiment 2, at both verdict decision time points (VD1 and VD2), are 
displayed in Table 4.22 below, and verdict decision frequencies in Table 4.2 above. Descriptive 
results reveal that community mock juror participants displayed moderate levels of psychopathic 
personality traits (AR, CR, IMP, EGO) and sexually aggressive attitudes (AMMSA), although 
notably mean scores on both scales were overall slightly higher those observed in the Experiment 
1 student sample.  
 Statistics also reveal consistently moderate mean scores on the three JDS sub-scales across 
both time points. Notably, when compared to the Experiment 1 student sample, community 
sampled mock jurors in Experiment 2 displayed lower mean scores in assessments of the 
complainant’s believability at both pre-deliberation and post-deliberation time points. Paired 
samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether any significant difference occurred in JDS 
sub-scale scores VD1 to VD2 within Experiment 2. Results display that Complainant Believability 
scores at the VD1 point (M = 19.67) compared with scores at the VD2 point (M = 17.76) differed 
significantly (t (98) = 5.297, p < .001, d = .45), with the degree of difference shown to be small, 
in that overall community sampled jurors belief in the complaints story decreased after deliberation 
had taken place. No statistically significant change in Defendant Believability or Decision 
Confidence scores was detected between decision points. 
 Examination of verdict decision frequencies within Experiment 2 displayed a higher 
proportion of community sampled mock jurors decided that the defendant was not guilty at the 
pre-deliberation time point (VD1; not guilty = 78.0%) than student mock jurors did within 
Experiment 1, at the same decision point. Within Experiment 2, the number of participants 
returning a not guilty verdict post-deliberation increased further (VD2; not guilty = 85.0%). Again, 
a McNemar's Chi-square test for association was conducted to examine whether there was a 
significant change between the two verdict decision time points within Experiment 2. However, 
results revealed no statistically significant change occurred between pre-deliberation (VD1) and 
post-deliberation (VD2) verdict decisions made; 2 (1, N = 100) = 2.77, p = .092. 
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Table 4.22 
Descriptive Statistics for the JDS factors pre-deliberation (verdict decision 1 – VD1) and post-
deliberation (verdict decision 2 – VD2) within experiment 2 (n = 100). 
Variables M SD Mdn Observed 
Min. 
Observed 
Max. 
JDS VD1      
Confidence in Decision 7.31 1.52 8.00 4 10 
Complainant Believability  19.67 4.34 19.00 12 35 
Defendant Believability 22.42 4.16 23.00 13 32 
JDS VD2      
Confidence in Decision 7.70 1.85 8.00 2 10 
Compliant Believability 17.76 4.11 17.00 10 30 
Defendant Believability 22.81 6.38 22.00 12 67 
 
Note: JDS = Juror Decision Scale; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-
deliberation); VD2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (that participants made post-deliberation). 
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4.4.4 Model Testing  
4.4.4.1 Experiment 1  
 To test the verdict decision models proposed within Experiment 1, a two-step procedure 
was adopted. The first step was to analysis the overall model fit, which includes all direct paths 
from predictors (exogenous factors) and covariates (endogenous factors) to verdict decisions. The 
second step involves examining the statistical significance, strength, and direction of the path 
coefficients between factors. 
 Figures within Table 4.23 below demonstrate that for Model 1 (see Figure 4.4), the chi-
square statistic was non-significant, and examination of other goodness-of-fit statistics indicated 
good model fit for the proposed model paths with Verdict Decision 1, made by student jurors (χ2 
(5) = 5.21, p > .05, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .01 [90% CI = .00/.08], SRMR = .01).  
 Figure 4.4 displays the path coefficients between all factors in the proposed Model 1. As 
can be seen, a significant negative relationship existed between sexually aggressive attitudes and 
belief in the complainant’s story, alongside a significant positive relationship between sexually 
aggressive attitudes and belief in the defendant’s story. AMMSA had no significant relationship 
with decision confidence and none of the psychopathic personality traits were shown to be 
significantly related to the JDS factors (see Figure 4.4). Importantly, in terms of the JDS factors, 
a significant moderate positive relationship was found between belief in the complainant’s story 
and guilty verdicts pre-deliberation (VD1), as well as a statistically significant negative 
relationship between belief in the defendant’s story and guilty decisions (VD1). Whilst confidence 
in verdict decisions was positively related to guilty verdicts, this was not statistically significant 
in Model 1 (relative to the Verdict Decision 1 time point).  
.
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Table 4.23 
Fit Indices for the Four Alternative Path Models of the PPTS sub-scales and AMMSA with JDS sub-scales, upon Individual Verdict Decision Making 
at VD1 (pre-deliberation) and VD2 (post-deliberation), in both experimental samples. 
Study Models χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA 90% CI SRMR 
Experiment 1 1 (VD1) 5.21* 5 .99 .99 .01 .00/.08 .01 
 2 (VD2) 10.81* 5 .96 .81 .06 .00/.11 .02 
Experiment 2 3 (VD1) 7.14* 5 .98 .90 .06 .00/.17 .02 
 4 (VD2) 3.48* 5 1.00 1.15 .00 .00/.11 .03 
 
Note: PPTS = Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale; AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression; JDS = Juror Decision Scale; CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index; CI = Confidence Interval; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; χ2 = chi square goodness of fit statistic; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-
deliberation); VD2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (that participants made post-deliberation). * Indicates χ2 are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
178 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Path model of the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale four sub-scales (AR, CR, IPM, & EGO) and Rape Attitudes (AMMSA) through 
the three Juror Decision Scale sub-scales (COMP, DEF, CONF), upon verdict decision 1, within the experiment 1 student sample. AR = Affective 
Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity; AMM = Acceptance of Modern Myths 
about Sexual Aggression total score; COMP1 = Complainant credibility rating during verdict decision 1; DEF1 = Defendant credibility rating during 
verdict decision 1; CONF1 = Confidence in verdict decision 1; G = Guilty Verdict. ***p < .001. 
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 The fit of the proposed Model 2, with all possible direct paths (see Figure 4.5) indicated a 
good model fit. Figures in Table 4.23 above display the Chi-square statistic was non-significant 
and overall other goodness-of-fit statistics were within an acceptable range for the proposed model 
paths with verdict decision 2 (χ2 (5) = 10.81, p > .05, CFI = .96, TLI = .81, RMSEA = .06 [90% 
CI = .00/.11], SRMR = .02).    
 Figure 4.5 below displays the path coefficients between all factors in Model 2. As can be 
seen, a significant negative relationship exists between sexually aggressive attitudes and belief in 
the complainant’s story at the second verdict decision point, alongside a significant positive 
relationship between sexually aggressive attitudes and belief in the defendant’s story again at the 
second verdict decision stage. Again, AMMSA had no significant relationship with decision 
confidence and none of the psychopathic personality traits were shown to be significantly related 
to the JDS factors (see Figure 4.5). In terms of the JDS factors, a significant moderate positive 
relationship was found between belief in the complainant’s story and guilty verdicts post-
deliberation (VD2), as well as a statistically significant negative relationship between belief in the 
defendant’s story and guilty verdict outcomes (VD2). Whilst confidence in verdict decisions was 
again positively related to guilty verdicts, this was not found to be statistically significant for 
student mock jurors.
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Figure 4.5: Path model of the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale four sub-scales (AR, CR, IPM, & EGO) and Rape Attitudes (AMMSA) through 
The three Juror Decision Scale sub-scales (COMP, DEF, CONF), upon verdict decision 2 within the experiment 1 student sample. AR = Affective 
Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity; AMM = Acceptance of Modern Myths 
about Sexual Aggression total score; COMP2 = Complainant credibility rating during verdict decision 2; DEF2 = Defendant credibility rating during 
verdict decision 2; CONF2 = Confidence in verdict decision 2; G = Guilty Verdict. ***p < .001. 
181 
4.4.4.2 Experiment 2 
 To test the verdict decision models proposed within Experiment 2, an identical two-step 
procedure was adopted, firstly analysing the overall model fit of Models 3 and 4, and secondly 
examining the significance and direction of the path coefficients between factors. Figures within 
Table 4.23 above show that for Model 3 (see Figure 4.6), the Chi-square statistic was non-
significant and, overall, other goodness-of-fit statistics were within an acceptable range for the 
proposed model paths with Verdict Decision 1, made by community sampled jurors (χ2 (5) = 7.14, 
p > .05, CFI = .98, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .00/.17], SRMR = .02).  
 Figure 4.6 displays the path coefficients between all factors in the proposed Model 3. A 
significant negative relationship was again displayed between sexually aggressive attitudes 
(AMMSA) and belief in the complainant’s story (COMP1). Notably, a significant positive 
relationship also exists between sexually aggressive attitudes and belief in the defendant’s story 
(DEF1), as well as decision confidence (CONF1). Within Experiment 2, at the pre-deliberation 
decision point, the psychopathic personality trait affective responsiveness (AR) was shown to be 
significantly negatively related to belief in the defendant’s story, and interpersonal manipulation 
(IPM), significantly negatively related to belief in the complainant’s story (see Figure 4.6). 
Associations between the remaining psychopathic personality trait factors and the JDS factors 
were not shown to be statically significant. In terms of the JDS factors, a significant moderate 
positive relationship was again displayed between belief in the complainant’s story and guilty 
verdicts pre-deliberation (VD1), as well as a statistically significant negative relationship between 
belief in the defendant’s story and guilty decisions (VD1). Decision confidence (CONF1) was also 
significantly positively related to guilty verdicts within Path Model 3 community jurors at the VD1 
time-point. 
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Figure 4.6: Path model of the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale four sub-scales (AR, CR, IPM, & EGO) and Rape Attitudes (AMMSA) through 
The three Juror Decision Scale sub-scales (COMP, DEF, CONF), upon verdict decision 1 within the experiment 2 community sample. AR = 
Affective Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity; AMM = Acceptance of 
Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score; COMP1 = Complainant credibility rating during verdict decision 1; DEF1 = Defendant 
credibility rating during verdict decision 1; CONF1 = Confidence in verdict decision 1; G = Guilty Verdict. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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 The fit of the proposed Model 4, with all possible direct paths (see Figure 4.7), again 
indicated a very good model fit. Figures in Table 4.23 above show that the Chi-square statistic 
was non-significant and all other goodness-of-fit statistics were within the stipulated ideal 
range for the proposed model paths with Verdict Decision 2 (χ2 (5) = 3.48, p > .05, CFI = 1.00, 
TLI = 1.15, RMSEA = .00 [90% CI = .00/.11], SRMR = .03).    
 Figure 4.7 below displays the path coefficients between all factors in the proposed 
Model 4. A significant negative relationship was again consistently displayed between sexually 
aggressive AMMSA attitudes and belief in the complainant’s story (COMP2). Notably, a 
significant positive relationship also exists between sexually aggressive attitudes and belief in 
the defendant’s story (DEF2), as well as decision confidence (CONF2). A differential 
relationship between psychopathic personality traits was observed post-deliberation, to the 
effects observed at the pre-deliberation decision point. Notably, whilst affective responsiveness 
(AR) remained significantly negatively related to belief in the defendant’s story, interpersonal 
manipulation (IPM) was no longer shown to be significantly negatively related to belief in the 
complainant’s story, and was in fact now shown to be positively related to COMP2, yet 
statistically non-significant (see Figure 4.7). Associations between all remaining psychopathic 
personality trait factors and the JDS factors were also not found to be statistically significant.  
 In terms of the JDS factors, a consistent significantly positive relationship was observed 
between belief in the complainant’s story and guilty verdicts post-deliberation (VD2), as well 
as a statistically significant negative relationship between belief in the defendant’s story and 
guilty decisions (VD2). Whilst decision confidence (CONF2) remained positively related to 
guilty verdicts, within Path Model 4, this was no longer found to be statistically significant. 
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Figure 4.7: Path model of the Psychopathic Personality Trait Scale four sub-scales (AR, CR, IPM, & EGO) and Rape Attitudes (AMMSA) through 
The three Juror Decision Scale sub-scales (COMP, DEF, CONF), upon verdict decision 2 within the experiment 2 community sample. AR = Affective 
Responsiveness; CR = Cognitive Responsiveness; IPM = Interpersonal Manipulation; EGO = Egocentricity; AMM = Acceptance of Modern Myths 
about Sexual Aggression total score; COMP2 = Complainant credibility rating during verdict decision 2; DEF2 = Defendant credibility rating during 
verdict decision 2; CONF2 = Confidence in verdict decision 2; G = Guilty Verdict. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Within the present chapter the results relative to each aim of the thesis are discussed in 
turn. Current findings which elucidate the relationship between psychological traits and attitudes, 
as well as demographic and victimisation variables upon juror decision making are accounted for 
in terms of past research. Results of the confirmatory factorial exploration of the newly devised 
and validated Juror Decision Scale are also discussed, alongside conclusions drawn in respect of 
the path analyses conducted. Notably the association between all variables tested in the four 
respective path models are outlined. Finally, the chapter draws conclusions from the empirical 
explorations and findings obtained within the current research. Study limitations are outlined as 
are the practical, theoretical, methodological, and research implications before future research 
directions are discussed. Final conclusions drawn from the research are then considered.  
5.1 THE ROLE OF PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY TRAITS UPON JUROR 
DECISION MAKING  
 With no prior utilisation of person-centred analysis in the context of juror decision making 
research, the current exploration constitutes the first study to profile mock jurors based upon 
personality-derived psychopathic traits. Using latent profiling analysis (LPA) and subsequently 
multinomial logical regression, the research attempted to firstly, identify meaningful differences 
in psychopathic personality trait groupings (termed classes) between participants, and secondly, 
examine whether alternate classes identified were differentially associated with the verdict 
decisions mock jurors made. Therefore, within the context of an improved experimental paradigm 
designed to be high in ecological validity whereby more reliable empirical findings can be 
obtained, the previously untested relationship between psychological constructs and juror decision 
making was examined. Specifically, psychopathic personality traits and their association with juror 
decisions within the context of a rape trial were investigated, making use of a newly developed 
scale and conceptualisation of psychopathy. Importantly, LPA were conducted separately upon 
the two independent samples; an opportunity student sample within Experiment 1 and 
systematically randomly selected community sample within Experiment 2. Logistic regression 
were conducted at both verdict decision points (pre-deliberation and post-deliberation). 
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 Within Experiment 1, LPA identified three meaningful classes of psychopathic personality 
traits among the student sample. This included a small number of participants in the high 
psychopathy group (16%) who exhibited elevated scores on three of the four PPTS factors 
(affective responsiveness, interpersonal manipulation, and egocentricity), a moderate 
egocentricity-interpersonal manipulation psychopathy group (38%) characterised by moderate 
scores in such traits, and a low psychopathy group of participants (46%) who exhibited low scores 
on all four PPTS traits. Importantly, whilst some quantitative differences in intensity were 
observed between the groups relative to such traits, no significant association was detected 
between participant’s psychopathic personality class membership and the verdict decisions made 
at either decision point. Alternatively put, psychopathic personality traits were found to have no 
direct relationship upon the individual verdict decisions student mock jurors made during trial, 
neither pre-deliberation nor post-deliberation.  
 Within Experiment 2, LPA again identified three meaningful latent classes of psychopathic 
personality traits among the community sample. Displaying a similar grouping pattern, mock 
jurors in the high psychopathy group (7%) exhibited elevated scores on three of the four PPTS 
factors. This included high scores on the affective responsiveness component and very high scores 
on interpersonal manipulation and egocentricity traits. A moderate psychopathy group was 
displayed (55%) and characterised by participants with moderate scores on interpersonal 
manipulation and egocentricity traits, with relatively low scores on both (lack of) affective and 
cognitive responsiveness traits. Finally, a low psychopathy group of participants was displayed 
(38%), who exhibited reduced scores on all four psychopathic personality traits. Interestingly 
contrasting with the findings obtained for student mock jurors above, a significant association was 
found between psychopathic personality class membership and the verdict decisions community 
mock jurors made.  
 To elaborate further, present results display mock jurors in the high psychopathy group 
were significantly less likely (OR = 0.08) to return a guilty verdict than jurors within the low 
psychopathy group. More importantly however, this relationship was consistently obtained at both 
verdict decision time points (i.e. pre- and post-deliberation), with very large effect size values 
exhibited for such associations. Alternatively put, within the community sample, jurors who scored 
high on affective responsiveness, egocentricity, and interpersonal manipulation psychopathic 
personality traits were significantly more likely than jurors who scored low in such traits, to return 
a not guilty verdict. This association was not only found to be strong (as indicated by the effect 
sizes exhibited across both time points) but consistent irrespective of the influence of deliberation, 
187 
in that, such a relationship was evident with juror’s pre-deliberation verdict decision and post-
deliberation verdict decision. The current findings therefore offer some important insights and 
conflicting findings to those obtained within past research whereby little evidence of a relationship 
between jurors’ psychological traits and subsequent decision making, was historically obtained 
(Lieberman & Sales, 2007). 
 Traits such as (a lack of) affective responsiveness were shown to have an important 
influence upon individual verdict decisions. Increased scores were associated with a greater 
likelihood of returning a not guilty verdict and jurors exhibiting reduced scores on the trait were 
conversely more likely to return a guilty verdict. In consideration of previous research which found 
mock jurors who exhibited greater empathy for victims during trial were more likely to make pro-
victim judgements during deliberation (Bottoms et al., 2014; Deitz et al., 1982), results suggest 
the ability to emotionally respond to the feelings of others directly influences the verdict decisions 
jurors make during trial. Something which appears particularly important in the context of a rape 
trial whereby an inability to emotionally respond to a victims suffering is likely to influence the 
extent to which any perceived victimisation or criminality actually occurred. In fact previous 
research seemingly supports such a notion finding increased scores in the Callus Affect component 
of the PCL-R (a trait closely related to the Affective Responsiveness component within the 
PPTM), was significantly related to heightened scores in rape myth acceptance (RMA) and general 
negative attitudes towards victims of rape. Boduszek et al. (2016) conceptualised (a lack of) 
Affective Responsiveness as representing general emotional shallowness and a deficit in affective 
empathy. Taking account of this conceptualisation alongside the consistency in findings displayed 
by Debowska et al. (2015) and Bottoms et al. (2014) with the present results, the relationship 
between heightened scores in the trait and evidence of a jurors increased likelihood of returning a 
not guilty verdict within the context of a rape trial seems unsurprising. The present finding 
therefore suggests in the context of a rape trial, deficits in affective responsiveness likely impede 
the juror’s ability to appropriately respond to the complainant’s testimony, seemingly predisposing 
them towards a not guilty verdict. 
 The significance of psychopathic personality traits such as interpersonal manipulation and 
egocentricity were also displayed within the present analysis. Specifically, community sampled 
jurors with elevated scores on both traits were shown to have an increased likelihood of returning 
a not guilty verdict. To date, no previous research has sought to examine the importance of such 
traits or psychopathy more broadly, upon juror decision making. Although as the results were 
obtained within the context a realistic rape trial, findings appear to support past research which 
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found heightened levels of egocentricity appeared to play a role in the formation of attitudes which 
allow men to disregard the perpetration harm towards women (Debowska, Boduszek, & Willmott, 
2017). As such the present study findings constitute early evidence of the role that such 
psychopathic personality traits can have upon individual verdict decision formation and with a 
consistent relationship displayed pre- and post-deliberation, the final verdict decisions jurors 
ultimately return at trial. Despite this the present findings do seemingly concord with past research 
which found Interpersonal Manipulation to be significantly positively associated with the extent 
to which child rape myths were accepted outside of a jury context (Boduszek et al., 2016).  
 Perhaps more interesting again in line with the present results which displayed heightened 
scores in interpersonal manipulation were associated with an increased likelihood of returning a 
not guilty verdict, Debowska et al. (2017) found the interpersonal manipulation trait to be a 
significant correlate of attitudes towards male sexual dating violence. Circumstances not to distinct 
from the rape trial in which the present study sample of jurors made decisions upon. It thereby 
appears that those skilled at manipulating others may hold attitudes which condone violent 
behaviour. With manipulation tactics previously associated with sexual coercion in offender 
samples (DeGue, DiLillo, & Scalora, 2010), Debowksa et al. (2017) concluded interpersonal 
violence prevention programs should focus on remodelling perceptions surrounding the 
unacceptability of such tactics within prison settings. Whilst clearly of practical relevance for 
jurors exhibiting such problematic traits in the context of jury deliberations, assessment and 
treatment in light of current legislative restrictions that surround the peremptory questioning of 
jurors, make such a remedy almost impossible. Nonetheless, the present findings do offer further 
support for the premise of juror screening, as an attempt to reduce predisposed bias from the jury 
process.  
 Likewise, the co-occurrence of elevated scores on egocentricity and lack of affective 
responsiveness traits also seemingly supports the assertion made previously of an interactional 
relationship between such components. Here it is argued, when combined, such elevated traits 
appear to further impede an individual’s ability to recognise the emotional state of others. 
Evidenced somewhat in the association displayed between mock jurors exhibiting increased scores 
and the resulting decreased likelihood of returning a guilty verdict (Boduszek et al. 2016; 
Boduszek et al, 2017). Taken together, the present results appear to suggest traits measuring the 
individual juror’s sense of self-importance and ability to manipulate others, alongside general 
inability to emotionally respond to the feelings of others, have clear practical relevance when 
attempting to assess and reduce predisposed bias within the courtroom. 
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 Interestingly low to moderate scores on the (lack of) Cognitive Responsiveness component 
were notably similar between all three psychopathy group classifications, appearing to suggest that 
despite other trait differences found, the community sample had comparable abilities in 
recognising emotions in others. Whilst this trait seemingly has little differential association upon 
the verdict decisions different classes of jurors made, contrasting with the importance found for 
Affective Responsiveness, the present results do support Boduszek and colleagues assertion that 
affective and cognitive responsiveness should be measured as two distinct components within the 
psychopathic personality conceptualisation (Boduszek et al. 2016; Boduszek et al. 2017). 
 Also of interest, the present findings offer some degree of support for broader on-going 
debate surrounding the representativeness of student sampled mock jurors when compared with 
community selected participants. Despite a large body of research arguing any psycho-
demographic differences observed had a negligible impact upon respective samples decision 
formation (Eisenberg et al, 2002; Diamond et al, 1998; Green & Bornstein, 2003), the present 
results offer an alternate perspective. In line with recent research by Keller and Weiner (2011) and 
McCabe et al., (2010) who found evidence that student and community samples differed 
significantly in attitudes and cognitive processing styles - which in turn impacted ultimate 
culpability decisions - the present study failed to obtain evidence of a significant association 
between psychopathic personality traits and verdict decisions in students. This was despite such 
an association being found within community mock jurors. However, whilst juror eligibility was 
matched between respective samples and similar latent profile classifications found, several 
methodological differences were still in existence between the two samples. Accordingly, whilst 
of interest, such differences mean clear inferences cannot be reliably drawn surrounding the extent 
to which student sampled mock jury findings can be considered externally valid or not. 
 Overall, whilst many have argued that psychological constructs have limited predictive 
utility in relation to juror voting preferences (Cutler et al., 1992; Liberman & Sales, 2007), with 
others describing the pursuit of such a relationship as unnecessarily, simplistic, and occupying jury 
researchers for too long (Kovera & Austin, 2016), the present findings provide important evidence 
which sits in contrast to such a position. Likewise, past studies which have seen value in such 
exploration have focused almost exclusively upon psychological traits such as authoritarianism 
and constructs which govern juror’s general tendencies to adhere to authority, as well as broader 
belief systems surrounding wrongdoing. Whilst finding some limited evidence of a relationship 
between such traits and verdict decisions (Kravitz et al., 1993; Morna & Comfort, 1982; Sosis, 
1974), meta-analytic reviews conclude only weak and inconsistent evidence of such an association 
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exists (Narby et al. 1993). However, of the four psychopathic personality traits examined in line 
with Boduszek et al.’s (2016) recent conceptualisation, heightened scores on three traits were 
found to be differentially predictive of voting preferences. A relationship shown to be consistent 
and seemingly unaffected by the deliberation process. In fact whilst many legal scholars and 
practitioners have traditionally considered deliberations to be the point during which any 
preconceived bias is removed from the decision making process, as a product of the collective 
group consensus and sensibility prevailing, the current findings appear to suggest such a premise 
is largely unsupported. A conclusion drawn from the direct influence the psychopathic personality 
traits tested were found to consistently have upon community juror decisions both pre-and post-
deliberation. Clearly the need to reduce the potential bias and seemingly predisposed influence 
such personality traits have upon verdict decisions, is of central importance. No more so than 
within the context of rape trials where unique features of the crime (Willmott, 2016) and high 
attrition rates (Temkin & Krahe, 2008) already pose significant barriers which reduce a victims 
likelihood of obtaining a conviction. 
 Alternatively, evidence of a discernible relationship between a juror’s psychological make-
up and the verdict decisions made during a contested rape trial offers early evidence of a counter 
narrative, suggesting personal characteristics may have more of an influence than first thought. 
Whilst recognising that such endeavours may be considered simplistic and unnecessary by some, 
the importance of such relationships upon the impartiality assumption of the jury trial process 
cannot be ignored. This is particularly important when considering many jury systems around the 
world require no justification for a verdict decision and tend to be final (Kapardis, 2014). 
Undoubtedly further replication of the present study is required upon varying and distinct samples 
before conclusively arguing the importance of psychopathic personality traits upon juror decisions.  
 
5.2 THE ROLE OF RAPE ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL VICTIMISATION UPON 
JUROR DECISION MAKING 
 The overall aim of the current study was to examine the role of rape attitudes, juror 
demographics, and personal victimisation experiences upon individual juror decision making, 
specifically within the context of a rape trial. Firstly, based upon past research which links various 
demographics with an increased likelihood of subscribing to rape myths (Barnett et al., 2016; 
Suarez & Gadalla, 2010), group differences were explored for gender, ethnicity, and education. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a wealth of past research has indicated the importance 
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of rape supportive attitudes upon verdict outcomes. Previous studies have reported increased rape 
myth acceptance scores to be associated with jurors’ general negative perceptions of a rape 
complainant, as well as their propensity to return a not guilty verdict (Bohner, 1998; Dinos et al., 
2014; Ellison & Munro, 2010; 2015; Finch & Munro, 2005; Pollard, 1992; Raitt & Zeedyk. 1997; 
Temkin & Krahe, 2008; Whatley, 1996). Yet despite such a strong empirical evidence base, 
criticisms surrounding the subtlety of rape attitude scales used in past research, alongside more 
significant concerns surrounding the methodological settings typically utilised (thought to lack 
external and ecological validity), has resulted in a general disregard for such findings and lack of 
uptake by policy makers. Additionally, although studies have found evidence of an association 
between personal victimisation and the acceptance of myths surrounding sexual violence 
(Debowska et al., 2015), research is also yet to examine the role of previous sexual victimisation 
upon juror decision making during related rape trials. Therefore, in accordance with the broader 
aims of the thesis, the second objective sought to examine whether psycho-social factors including 
age, gender, personal victimisation, and rape attitudes were significantly predictive of mock juror 
decisions within the context of a realistic mock rape trial. To do this, the AMMSA scale, 
specifically devised to be a more subtle and comprehensive measure of rape myth acceptance 
(Gerger et al., 2007), was utilised alongside victimisation and demographic variables. Importantly, 
the role of such variables upon individual verdict decision formation was investigated using 
logistic regression analyses, and examined separately upon the two independent samples and at 
both individual juror decision points (pre-deliberation and post-deliberation).  
 Within the student sample, group differences in AMMSA scores were found for gender 
and ethnicity, with men scoring significantly higher than women, and Black and Asian minority 
ethnic (BAME) participants scoring significantly higher than Caucasian participants. Within the 
community sample a consistent result was displayed, with both men and BAME participants again 
scoring significantly higher in rape myth acceptance. Whilst effect size estimators suggest overall 
all differences were small, the results indicate a discernible relationship does exist between 
observer demographic characteristics and the likelihood of subscribing to such myths. Although 
some studies have previously reported evidence of an association with ethnic background (Mori 
et al., 1995; Reling, et al., 2017), the present results surrounding gender are in accordance with a 
large body of past research that found men from diverse settings, were more likely to subscribe to 
such myths than women (Burt, 1980; Carroll et al., 2016; Grubb & Turner, 2012; Hayes, Abbott, 
& Cook, 2016; Hayes, Lorenz, & Bell, 2013; Johnson, Kuck, & Schander, 1997; Kopper, 1996).  
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 Further support of the apparent gendered nature of rape attitudes adds weight to the 
assertion that pro-rape and broader sexually aggressive attitudes towards women appear socially 
constructed, previously found to feed into more general belief systems surrounding the role, 
treatment, and sexual objectification of women in society (Burt, 1980; Muehlenhard & Linton, 
1987; Temkin & Krahe, 2008). In fact, research has shown men exhibiting elevated scores in rape 
myth acceptance commonly report having used verbal coercion, deception, physical force, and 
explicit sexually aggressive behaviour to obtain sex in the past (Jozkowski, & Peterson, 2013; 
Koss & Dinero, 1988; Wright, & Tokunaga, 2016), with the number of men who admit they would 
rape a woman if they knew they would not get caught oscillating around 30% (Briere & Malamuth, 
1983; Hamilton & Yee, 1990). Although other research with offender populations found general 
violent tendencies were not necessarily predictive of sexually aggressive attitudes or offending 
(Debowska et al., 2017), in a recent systematic review, Johnson and Beech (2017) drew attention 
to numerous past studies that found heightened rape myth acceptance to be strongly associated 
with an individual’s proclivity to commit rape. In fact, reviewing research directly conducted with 
convicted rapists, the aforementioned authors highlight that cognitive distortions surrounding 
attitudes supportive of sexual violence are historically found to be a significant risk factor with 
predictive validity for future sexual recidivism. Consequently, high prevalence rates of sexual 
violence perpetrated by men against women (MOJ, 2015) appear unsurprising and clearly 
highlights the need for more widespread recognition of the problematic impact such inaccurate 
assumptions can thereby have. Whilst societal level change undoubtedly poses significant 
challenges, with much past research highlighting the increased prevalence and currency of 
sexually violent beliefs within male dominated environments, such as college fraternities, sports 
teams, the military, and prison (Carroll et al., 2016; Debowska, Boduszek, Dhingra, & DeLisi, 
2016; Hayes, Abbott, & Cook, 2016; Hayes, Lorenz, & Bell, 2013; Kopper, 1996), more focused 
programmes which foster a direct approach to challenging such belief systems may have greater 
success. Moreover, it stands to reason that if such all-male settings can create a sub-culture in 
which such sexually violent and rape myth accepting attitudes are developed, then focused efforts 
within such settings seem intuitively likely to be an environment where they may be more 
persuasively discouraged. 
 Whilst educational differences were not examined in the student sample (deemed to be of 
little value due to the comparable level of education within such a population), in the community 
sample the relationship between educational attainment and AMMSA scores was explored. Results 
displayed that education appears to be an important prerequisite in the acceptance of such attitudes 
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in that, participants who reported having less than a university degree (or equivalent), exhibited 
significantly higher scores on the AMMSA than those with at least a university degree 
qualification. In light of past research which found intelligence and socio-economic status had 
some association with the acceptance of rape myths (Anderson, Cooper, & Okamura, 1997), 
alongside a direct relationship between intelligence and jurors’ voting preferences (Denove & 
Imwinkerlried, 1995; Esienberg et al., 2005; Sealy & Cornish, 1973), the role of intelligence in 
the courtroom appears to have some influence. It is possible that the role of intelligence may be 
accounted for in terms of critical thinking capabilities in that, those with greater educational 
attainment are both more able and willing to critically appraise, rather than passively accept, 
preconceived attitudes that are common place in society. Seemingly adding weight to such an 
assertion, past research has displayed rape myth acceptance to be significantly positively 
associated with traditional gender role beliefs and the subscription of racist attitudes (see Suarez 
& Gadalla, 2010; Wright & Tokunaga, 2016). 
 Pertaining to the second objective which sought to verify whether psycho-social factors 
were predictive of mock juror decisions, acceptance of modern myths surrounding sexual 
aggression were found to be significantly negatively associated with the individual verdict 
decisions jurors made. Importantly the relationship between elevated rape myth acceptance and 
not guilty verdicts was consistently displayed within student and community sampled mock jurors. 
Notably, whilst some legal scholars have argued the presence and strength of any relationship is 
mitigated by the deliberation stage of jury trials, expecting group deliberation to isolate, reduce, 
and remove the influence that any individual preconceived biased attitudes may have (see 
Kapardis, 2014), the present results display such an assumption appears inaccurate. In fact, 
amongst all of the variables tested pre- and post-deliberation, attitudes towards rape (as measured 
by the AMMSA) were the most consistent predictor of verdict outcomes, with elevated scores 
shown to be significantly associated with not guilty verdict decisions. 
 Therefore, congruent with past research that found greater rape myth acceptance reduced 
a juror’s belief in rape complainant testimony and ultimately the verdict returned (Dinos et al., 
2014; Ellison & Munro, 2010; Finch & Munro, 2005; Pollard, 1992; Raitt & Zeedyk. 1997; 
Temkin & Krahe, 2008; Whatley, 1996), the totality of the present results likewise displays that 
irrespective of the sample adopted, attitudes towards rape were significantly predictive of juror 
voting preferences. Therefore, despite concerns surrounding the reliability of results obtained 
within past research, based primarily upon issues of ecological validity, as well as the samples and 
scales employed, present study findings obtained within a more realistic mock trial approach, 
194 
provide convincing evidence supporting the aforementioned assertions that rape biases appear to 
unfairly affect juror decision making within rape trials.  
 Evidence that heightened acceptance of rape myths appears to directly affect jurors’ 
decision making appears to suggest such attitudes may predispose jurors towards returning a 
verdict unsupportive of the complainant’s version of events. A premise which itself brings the 
impartiality assumption underlying juror decision making into question (Burrowes, 2013; 
Ellsworth, 1993). Whilst it is of course entirely possible that jurors who returned a not guilty 
verdict did so in accordance with English law, which stipulates, to vote guilty requires that a juror 
be sure beyond a reasonable doubt (Judicial College, 2016). However, when considering the 
relationship between greater acceptance of rape myths and not guilty verdicts was obtained 
consistently between both samples and across all verdict decision points, such verdicts appear to 
be more the product of inherent predispositional characteristics than merely decision uncertainty. 
Perhaps more convincingly however, recognising that decreased scores in AMMSA within the 
present research were equally and conversely found to predict a juror’s likelihood of returning a 
guilty verdict (across both samples and decision points), the predispositional bias effects of rape 
attitudes appear difficult to ignore.  
 Pertaining to the role of personal sexual victimisation upon verdict outcomes, results 
displayed that within the student sample, personal experience of rape was significantly predictive 
of juror’s selection of a guilty verdict, pre-deliberation (OR 4:17). However, this association was 
no longer found to be significant post-deliberation. Comparably, within the community sample, 
despite displaying relatively similar rates of personal sexual victimisation reported by participants, 
such a factor had no significant relationship upon verdict decisions pre- or post-deliberation. 
Importantly, whilst being the victim of a sexual offence may impact upon juror’s initial verdict 
inclinations within the context of a rape trial, in line with past research (Dunlap et al., 2015) the 
present results suggest such a bias was not significantly predisposing following group deliberation. 
Such results therefore suggest that despite its intuitively appealing insight, personal experience of 
sexual victimisation played no significant role in juror’s final decision making. Following 
examination of the role of gender, results displayed that within the community sample gender was 
a statistically significant predictor of individual verdict decisions pre-deliberation, when 
controlling for all other factors in the model. Moreover, in accordance with past research which 
found gender may have some predictive association with the verdict inclinations jurors make 
(Brekke & Borgida, 1998; Kovera, et al., 1999), men were shown to be more inclined towards not 
guilty verdicts, with the converse true for females. Likewise, with rape attitudes found to be a 
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significant predictor at all verdict decision time points within the community sample, and a wealth 
of research finding that gender is predictive of RMA, it is perhaps unsurprising that males were 
found to be more likely that females to return a not guilty verdict. Displaying further evidence of 
the apparent gendered nature of doubt surrounding victim allegations within rape. However, as 
was found for the role of previous victimisation, post-deliberation gender was not a significantly 
associated with individual verdict decisions. As the gender-verdict decision relationship was only 
found pre and not post-deliberation, the importance of gender upon final verdict outcomes appears 
overall unsupported in the present research. Alternatively put, whilst gender appears to predispose 
jurors towards initial verdict inclinations, with men more inclined to return a not guilty verdict and 
women more inclined to position their decision in accordance with the complainants account, 
following deliberation evidence of such a gender bias is no longer directly associated with the 
verdict decisions made. 
 Consequently, the current findings thereby offer important insights into the broader debate 
surrounding the role of personal characteristics upon jury decision making. Despite the presence 
of any relationship having previously being suggested to be weak and inconsistent (see Kovera & 
Austin, 2016; Liberman & Krauss, 2009), the attitudinal characteristics of mock jurors were shown 
to be directly related to the verdict decisions returned during trial, across samples tested and at all 
verdict decision points. Findings which thereby support previous assertions that case-relevant 
attitudes appear to be amongst the most reliable predictors of juror verdict decisions within related 
trials (Cutler et al., 1992; Moran et al., 1990).  
 
5.3 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY AND DIMENSIONALITY OF THE JUROR DECISION 
SCALE (JDS) 
 Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model provides a detailed conceptualisation of the 
decision-making process thought to underlie a jurors’ decision to vote guilty or not guilty. 
However, whilst credited for its comprehensiveness and widely regarded as the dominate 
explanation of juror-level decision making, to date no prior research has sought to empirically test 
or verify important theoretical features underlying the model. In particular, a central feature of the 
model which suggests whilst listening to competing accounts given by a defendant and 
complainant during trial, jurors assess the believability of both stories according to subscribed set 
of certainty principles. Here, based upon the extent to which each story is determined to be 
coherent, complete, and plausible (amongst other certainty principles), the theory posits the story 
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that is rated as being most believable, will be accepted as the individual jurors verdict decision. 
However, with no measure currently in existence, it was necessary to develop a self-report scale 
which directly integrated the theoretical certainty principle features into an empirically testable 
measure. The main objectives of the current study were therefore to develop a valid and reliable 
scale that permitted the Story Models conceptualisation of individual juror decision formation to 
be examined - subsequently named the Juror Decision Scale (JDS). Secondly, to evaluate the 
dimensionality and construct validity of the JDS using confirmatory techniques. Specifically, 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and confirmatory bi-factor analysis techniques were applied 
upon student sampled mock-jurors, who after being exposed to a simulated rape trial, completed 
the self-report JDS pre- and post-deliberation. Therefore, in order to test Pennington and Hastie’s 
(1992) assertion that jurors conduct certainty principle assessments of competing accounts heard 
during trial, which in turn determine what story jurors consider most believable and make a verdict 
decision in line with, the factorial structure of the JDS was investigated. 
 It has previously been suggested that in order to fully explore the factorial structure of a 
proposed measure, a number of alternate conceptually sound solutions should be tested (Boduszek 
& Debowska, 2016; Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010). In the current study three alterative models 
of the JDS were identified and tested at both pre and post deliberation verdict decision points (a 
one-factor model, a three-factor model, and a bifactor model with three grouping factors), using 
confirmatory techniques. The results displayed that the only acceptable solution for the 16-item 
JDS at both verdict decision points (as indicated by examination of the model fit statistics) was 
the bifactor model with three grouping factors (Complainant Believability, Defendant 
Believability, and Decision Confidence), whilst controlling for a general factor. Notably, as the 
majority of co-variation between the observed indicators was explained by the three grouping 
factors, again at both decision points, these factors formed the basis for creating the instruments 
subscales (see Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010). According to Boduszek and Debowska (2016), 
when compared with traditional CFA procedures, bifactor modelling allows the validity of a single 
factor to be assessed alongside incorporating elements of construct multi-dimensionality. 
Adopting this approach subsequently elucidated the JDS as a multi-dimensional concept.  
 Additionally, whilst the three JDS factors displayed little overlap with one another overall, 
the need to establish differential predictive validity between sub-scales on a multidimensional 
scale has been previously recommended (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Ensuring sub-scales measure 
separate theoretical (rather than just statistical) factors by establishing differential predictive 
validity thereby allows conceptual distinctiveness to be reliably ascertained (Boduszek & 
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Debowska, 2016). Indeed, the present results displayed that across both decision time points, the 
three JDS factors correlated differently with external measures. For example, the complainant 
believability sub-scale was significantly negatively associated with rape attitudes (as measured 
using the AMMSA scale) both pre and post-deliberation. In line with past research and the results 
obtained in the present thesis (see sub-chapter 5.2 above), this appears to indicate that greater 
acceptance of rape myths does reduce a juror’s belief in rape victim’s testimony (Dinos et al., 
2014; Ellison & Munro, 2010; Finch & Munro, 2005; Pollard, 1992; Raitt & Zeedyk. 1997; 
Temkin & Krahe, 2008; Whatley, 1996). Conversely, the defendant believability sub-scale was 
found to be significantly positively associated with AMMSA scores, again both upon juror’s pre-
deliberation and post-deliberation verdict decisions. The combination of such thereby provides 
some early support for Pennington and Hastie’s (1992; 1993) certainty principle assertions in that, 
heightened scores on the complainant believability sub-scale seemingly co-existed with reduced 
scores in defendant believability, when measured in association with external variables. Clearly 
however the need to examine the existence of any relationship upon individual verdict decisions 
is required before such conclusions can be reliably drawn (refer to Chapter 5 sub-section 5.4 for 
related path analyses results). 
 Interestingly, relative to mock juror’s pre-deliberation individual verdict decision results, 
defendant believability was found to be significantly negatively correlated with self-esteem, 
indicating that low self-esteem appears predictive of increased belief in the defendant’s but not the 
complainant’s testimony. A similar negative correlation was also found post-deliberation however 
notably, the association was not found to be statistically significant. With no research to the authors 
knowledge directly examining the relationship between juror self-esteem and the judgements made 
in respect of the credibility of competing witness testimony, future research should seek to 
disentangle what may be an interesting area of further exploration. Notably, evidence of a 
predictive relation between juror self-esteem and judgements surrounding the credibility of a 
defendant or complainant, may provide further evidence which supports the results obtained in the 
present exploration (see discussion sub-chapter 5.1) of a relationship between juror characteristics 
and verdict decisions. Interestingly, decision confidence was found to be significantly negatively 
associated with self-esteem, post-deliberation. A similar though non-significant correlation was 
also displayed at the pre-deliberation time point, seemingly suggesting that jurors exhibiting 
greater self-esteem were not in fact those most confident in the verdict decision choice made. 
Again with little exploration of the importance of self-esteem upon juror confidence in verdict 
decisions, further research is undoubtedly warranted.  
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 A particularly interesting finding obtained pertains to the differential predictive validity 
displayed between the complainant and defendant believability sub-scales. Whilst established in 
relation to external variables rather that the specific verdict decision individual jurors made, the 
findings do provide early support in line with Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) assertion that prior 
to selecting a verdict decision, jurors assess competing accounts in terms of which is deemed to 
be most believable. Shown to be significantly associated in opposing directions with rape myth 
acceptance, assessments made according to certainty principle items included in the JDS 
(surrounding a stories completeness, plausibility, coherence amongst others), may not only be 
drawn upon to decide which story will ultimately be selected (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) but 
appear to be influenced in themselves by prior attitudes jurors held. Alternatively put, whilst the 
certainty principle items comprised with the JDS are clearly important determinants upon 
individual decision formation as first theorised, these assessments appear to be influenced in 
themselves by preconceived attitudes jurors hold. 
 Overall, despite some present study limitations the most pertinent of which surrounds the 
use of self-report measures commonly associated with a perceived response bias (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), the present research adds something of an empirical 
contribution to an almost exclusively theoretical literature surrounding the Story Models 
conceptualisation of the certainty principles. Whilst several studies have sought to substantiate 
claims that jurors construct competing stories during trial and other studies have sought to establish 
the importance of isolated features including plausibility, coherence, and completeness upon mock 
juror assessments (Canter, Grieve, Nicol, & Benneworth, 2003; Jackson, 1996), of guilt (Voss & 
Van Dyke, 2001; Yale, 2013), no research to date has developed and validated a complete scale 
which permits comprehensive testing of such an assertion. In fact, the development of the JDS 
alongside demonstrating its multidimensional conceptualisation and that associated items are best 
captured by three distinct grouping factors whilst controlling for a general factor, permits future 
testing of the assertion that a juror’s greater belief in a complainant or defendant’s story, has any 
significant or differential association with individual juror verdict decisions made. 
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5.4. INTEGRATING THE ROLE OF PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY TRAITS AND 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS RAPE WITH THE JUROR DECISION SUB-SCALES (JDS) 
AND VERDICT OUTCOMES 
 Whilst a direct relationship between juror characteristics and verdict decisions was 
displayed within previous results, what has remained untested within the current exploration up 
until this point is an examination of the directed dependence of all constructs shown to be 
important, upon the three JDS dimensions, and the subsequent dependence of such factors upon 
the verdict decisions jurors ultimately made. Alternatively put, utilisation of path analysis allows 
the relationship between psychopathic personality traits, rape attitudes, witness believability, 
decision confidence, and verdict outcomes to be examined within a structured path model. 
Therefore, the first objective of the current exploration was to test whether psychopathic 
personality traits and acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression were significantly 
associated with juror beliefs in complainant’s and defendant’s stories, as well as the confidence 
jurors reported for their verdict preferences. Secondly, to verify whether the JDS factors 
conceptualised as jurors’ differing beliefs surrounding a complainant’s and defendant’s stories and 
decision confidence, were themselves significantly related with the individual verdict decisions 
jurors made. In order to test the presence of such associations within a single model, path analyses 
were undertaken separately upon student and community samples, both pre- and post-deliberation.  
  Interestingly, in what equates to the first attempt to model the relationship between juror 
characteristics, witness assessments, and verdict outcomes, results displayed that rape attitudes 
were significantly associated with complainant and defendant believability assessments both pre- 
and post-deliberation, across both independent samples. Specifically, a significant negative 
association was found between AMMSA scores and belief in a rape complainant’s story across all 
decision points. Conversely AMMSA scores were found to be significantly positively associated 
with belief in a defendant’s story, again irrespective of the whether mock jurors were students or 
more jury representative members of the community. Alternatively put, an increased acceptance 
of rape myths was shown to be significantly associated with an increased belief in a defendant’s 
story during trial, whilst also associated with a decreased belief in the complainant’s version of 
events. These findings are thereby seemingly consistent with past research that suggested those 
holding elevated scores in rape myth acceptance also tended to display an increased proclivity for 
use of sexually coercive and aggressive tactics in order to obtain sex (Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; 
Koss & Dinero, 1988), impacting their determination of blame and wrongdoing when such 
circumstances were explained. The results appear to display the predisposing nature of rape 
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attitudes, seemingly inhibited juror’s impartial assessment of witness testimony, biasing them 
towards belief in the defendants account. Again such findings are in accordance with a wealth of 
past research which displayed elevated rape attitudes directly impact upon the extent to which 
victim allegations are believed during trial (Burt, 1980; Finch & Munro, 2005; Raitt & Zeedyk, 
1997; Temkin & Krahe, 2008; Whatley, 1996). 
 More importantly however, alongside the presence of an association between rape attitudes 
and the extent to which a witness’s testimony is believed, the present research displayed such 
complainant and defendant believability assessments were also associated with the verdict 
decisions jurors made. Again with the direction of associations found to be the same between all 
verdict decision time points and across independent samples, a juror’s belief in a complainant’s 
story was significantly positively associated with the likelihood of juror’s returning a guilty verdict 
and belief in a defendant’s story was significantly negatively associated with the likelihood of 
jurors returning a guilty verdict. For clarity, these findings thereby display that jurors who believed 
the complainants version of events were less likely hold negative attitudes towards rape and more 
likely to return a guilty verdict. Alternatively, those believing the defendant’s account, more likely 
to hold negative attitudes towards rape and more likely to return a not guilty verdict. The totality 
of such findings thereby not only supports Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model 
conceptualisation in that, certainty principle assessments of competing witness stories appear to 
underlie a jurors verdict decision selection (established through use of the JDS sub-scales), but 
further supports the notion that attitudinal constructs affect juror assessments of the evidence 
presented during trial and ultimately the verdicts they return.  
The significant associations displayed between rape attitudes and a decreased belief in the 
complainants account which co-occurs alongside an increased belief in a defendant’s account 
within the context of a contested rape trial, in turn also found to be significantly associated with 
the ultimate verdict returned, displays strong and comprehensive evidence for the first time of the 
complex ways in which negative attitudes towards rape are likely to impact upon jurors ultimate 
verdict decisions within such trials. Accordingly, the findings thereby offer more comprehensive 
evidence which supports previous research and theoretical assertions that, at least within rape 
trials, attitudes towards rape act as significant inhibitors towards a jurors likelihood of returning a 
guilty verdict (Burrowes, 2013; Dinos et al., 2015; Ellison & Munro, 2010; 2015, Temkon & 
Krahe, 2008). Evidence of which gives weight to the argument that jurors exhibiting such bias 
should be screened out of the jury trial process (Willmott, 2016; Willmott & Boduszek, 20016; 
Willmott, Boduszek, & Booth, 2017), or at the very minimum the existence of such inherent bias 
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be more readily accepted by the English criminal justice system as a possible cause of low 
conviction rates within English rape trials.  
 Other important associations displayed between belief in a witness’s testimony and final 
verdict outcomes were obtained within the community sample mock jury trials. Alongside a 
significant positive correlation between, rape attitudes and decision confidence, and decision 
confidence and guilty verdicts pre-deliberation, components of psychopathic personality were also 
found to be negatively correlated with belief in witness accounts. Specifically, (lack of) affective 
responsiveness was significantly associated in a negative direction with belief in a defendant’s 
story and interpersonal manipulation was also significantly negatively associated belief in a 
complainant’s story. Whilst such a correlation was found to hold and be consistent in relation to 
the role of affective responsiveness in defendant believability, none of the aforementioned 
associations were found to be significantly correlated with verdict decisions at the post-
deliberation phase. Therefore, whilst attitudes appear to have some relationship with the degree of 
confidence jurors had in their verdict decisions pre-deliberation, and psychopathic traits have upon 
assessments of the witness accounts at the same decision point, such effects were not found to 
impact upon the final verdict decisions jurors made in either sample’s path models. Despite this 
further research is required to more conclusively elucidate the influence and importance of such 
traits upon decision confidence and decision formation within future replications of the study. 
 
5.5 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
 Despite the importance and significance of the findings obtained within the present 
research, as with all research some limitations did exist. The first and perhaps most pertinent of 
which relates to the studies use of self-report measures. Despite widespread use, self-report 
measures are commonly criticised for their reliance on respondent honesty. A problem thought to 
be of particular importance within psychology whereby measurement tools are used in order to 
gain some degree of insight into attitudes and beliefs of those responding (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Clearly then use of such self-report scales within the present research 
may have introduced an element of response bias which could result in skewed findings. Given 
that the prevalence of rape myths in society are known to be high and that participants adopting 
the role of a mock juror in the present study knew that they were taking part in a contested rape 
trial, may have led some to respond in a socially desirable or distorted manner. Although attempts 
to minimise such effects were carried out by utilising rape myth acceptance scales specifically 
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developed as a more subtle measure of such attitudes, it remains possible that demand 
characteristics may have meant such jurors responded in a socially desirable way. Likewise, 
attempting to measure levels of psychopathic tendencies within individuals who are known to be 
highly manipulative presents similar challenges. Despite this, anonymised questionnaires and 
detailed instructions given to participant’s pre-completion, notifying them of the importance of 
being honest in their responses and that no attempts to identify them as an individual would ever 
occur, were adopted in an attempt to reduce the impact of such effects.  
 Additionally, whilst important differences were observed between student and community 
samples within the present research, a lack of complete uniformity between the respective 
methodological procedures prevents direct comparisons from being conclusively made. Moreover, 
alongside differences in the sample employed a number of other factors differed between 
experiments including; the manner in which the trial was presented and evidence delivered (video 
format versus live simulation), trial length (two hours versus one whole day), and the way in which 
participants were approached (poster advertisements versus personalised postal invitations). 
Although such differences tend to reflect the general procedural differences employed within 
student sample mock jury research as opposed to more realistic endeavours which draw upon 
community samples, clearly future research should seek to reduce the number of extraneous 
variables that may interact with any differences which exist. Recognising the numerous other ways 
in which both experiments were advanced when compared with past jury research, e.g. utilisation 
of real case materials, professional lawyers within genuine trial environments, legal consultation 
surrounding the admissibility of evidence presented, some degree of insight is however provided 
regarding the external validity existing within student sample jury research. Future research which 
seeks to replicate the present study methodology whilst implementing greater experimental 
controls may thereby allow such external validity effects to be more readily investigated and 
understood. 
 One final limitation worth noting within the present research surrounds the gravity 
associated with mock juror decisions. A concern with almost all research which attempts to 
experimentally investigate juror decision making is the extent to which the decisions made by 
mock-jury participants are representative of those made by real jurors during genuine trials. 
Clearly in order for jury studies to be in accordance with research ethics it is necessary to inform 
participants that their decision making relates not to a genuine case but a trial simulation. A factor 
which will seemingly thereby have a bearing upon the degree of attention, effortful processing, 
and general engagement with the decision making process participants provide. However, whilst 
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recognising the potential influence of such an effect within the present research, concerted efforts 
were made during methodological development (pre-experimentation) to limit any impact 
observed therein. For example, jurors were informed that the case they were deciding upon related 
to an actual rape allegation that had previously been to trial and in order to foster participant 
engagement, they were informed that the research formed part of an ongoing working relationship 
with the UK court system. Inferring the importance of their decision making task, participants 
were asked to take their role as a juror seriously and treat the process as though they were making 
decisions as the real jurors within the genuine trial. The totality of which did seemingly display a 
heightened level of participant engagement, as evidenced by the extended and at times heated 
discussions undertaken by participants during the deliberation phase of the study. Although clearly 
a limitation that is encountered within all jury research, attempts to foster a realistic trial 
environment and conditions under which genuine jurors make their decisions, thereby appeared to 
mitigate the strength of such effects. 
5.6 THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS  
 Although numerous competing explanations attempt to account for juror-level decision 
making, none have been so widely adopted in the literature as Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) 
Story Model. Utilisation of the model over alterative theories is partially explained by the author’s 
specific attempt to comprehensively account for juror decision making from initial decision 
formation, through to final verdict classification. Yet whilst intuitively appealing and evidenced 
in part by the authors early endeavours to display the importance of narrative constructions of 
evidence during trial, a large proportion of the theory remained empirically untested. As such, the 
development and validation of the JDS within the current thesis not only provides a means through 
which core features of the model’s conceptualisation can be empirically tested but in light of results 
from the present structural path model analyses, provides early evidence in support of the decision 
making pathways that jurors seemingly undertake. With the current development and validation 
of the empirically testable JDS scale, which incorporates certainty principle features considered 
integral within the models original conceptualisation, Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model 
account of individual decision formation can be more readily examined within future research. As 
such, in order to further substantiate the importance of certainty principle assessments upon 
individual decision formation, future explorations are able to utilise the JDS within diverse mock-
juror samples, across a variety of trial types. Although providing preliminary support for the 
model, it is of course entirely possible the rape case used within the present exploration may have 
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had some unique qualities that led to the support obtained for the models conceptualisation. To 
therefore ensure that this was not simply the case and examine whether the same theorised certainty 
principle processing and assessment of competing stories underlies juror decision formation in 
other crimes, such as, homicide or manslaughter whereby blame is also disputed, mock jury 
research should seek to replicate the current findings within such future experimental explorations. 
Nonetheless, the present research has displayed the ability to test theoretical concepts previously 
assumed in the Story Model, without attempts to empirically verify. Future research should thereby 
seek to more readily isolate and examine the importance of other components of competing juror-
level theories in order to continue to develop understanding surrounding how jurors in fact arrive 
at the verdict decisions they select. 
 Greater development in understanding the interaction between personal constructs, 
evidence interpretation, and verdict decision making obtained within the present research also has 
theoretical and research implications within the domain of jury decision making. Moreover, 
evidence of such a relationship extends current understanding of the Story Model in that, whilst it 
was only previously theorised that personal inferences impacted upon juror’s interpretations of 
competing stories, which in turn were thought to inform a juror’s final verdict decisions, the 
present results provide the first empirical support of such an interactive association. In fact, 
evidence obtained of a structured association between such factors not only displays such a 
relationship exists but goes some way to inform the Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) theory, 
displaying the role of personal inferences and characteristics to be more important than the models 
current conceptualisation accounts for. In light of such contributions future research should 
thereby also seek to replicate the present findings and further examine the interaction between 
juror constructs and the perceived story construction phase individual jurors appear to undertake. 
Finally, as the Story Model equates to a juror-level explanation of decision formation in that, the 
theory provides no account of the role of group deliberation after the individual has constructed a 
story and decided upon a verdict (pre-deliberation explanation), with the current research 
displaying certainty principle assessments which underlay pre-deliberation decision formation for 
the most part, held consistent irrespective of deliberations, the model can be asserted as an 
explanation which accounts for how the majority of jurors arrive at their final verdict decision.  
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5.7 METHODOLOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS  
 Following the detailed construction of the present research methodology and directly 
considering the limitations which exist within past research, a number of recommendations emerge 
that future explorations would benefit from employing. Firstly, in light of the legislative 
restrictions which currently limit research access to real jurors around the world and particularly 
within the UK, the need to ensure ecological and external validity remains paramount. With 
student samples yet to have been reliably shown to exhibit external validity, the need to conduct 
experimentation upon more representative samples remains apparent. Where student samples are 
utilised, the need to assess and ensure their eligibility to serve as a genuine juror should thereby 
constitute an essential minimum inclusion criterion within the study. Perhaps more importantly, 
although the present findings displayed no significant change in verdict decisions occurred 
between pre-deliberation participant decisions and those made after deliberation, this should not 
be taken to assume that the first pre-deliberation decision jurors make will hold consistent post-
deliberation for all jurors, in varying cases. It may well be the case that greater variation in verdict 
decisions occur in trials where less prevalent societal attitudes appear to have relevance to the facts 
of the case and as such the need for group deliberation within any mock jury research is always 
required in order that the study can be considered to exhibit adequate external validity.  As such, 
in order that jury research continues to advance useful knowledge and is considered to be a reliable 
representation of the jury decision making process undertaken by genuine jurors, researchers 
should seek to assess jury-level not just juror-level decision making, in combination. The 
credibility of findings, considered to exhibit adequate external validity will thereby likely 
transpose into policy maker’s willingness to draw upon, and adopt, results obtained therein. 
 Additionally, in order to meet a minimum basic standard of ecological validity, required 
for subsequent research findings to be readily interpreted in line with genuine juror processing, 
some degree of collective group deliberation is also required. In fact, incorporating six core criteria 
within the initial development of any jury study, factors which Diamond (1997) first stipulated 
were most likely to reduce the ecological validity of mock jury research, namely inadequate; 
sampling, simulations, deliberations, dependant variables, prior field work operationalisation, and 
participant engagement, would permit a greater amount of ecologically reliable research to be 
produced. In turn, such a structural approach to methodology would ensure that a basic minimum 
standard of mock jury research is consistently produced within the literature and subsequently used 
to inform legal policy and future research. The need for greater use of advanced analytical 
procedures such as person-centred and structural modelling techniques are also clearly warranted. 
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Due to the lack of jury explorations to date which make of such procedures, alongside the greater 
statistical power often afforded with such procedures, these factors alone may improve the 
reliability and validity of future jury research endeavours. 
 
5.8 PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 A number of implications emerge from the present research, important upon both legal 
policy and within more practical settings. Firstly, taken together the current research demonstrates 
that justice systems around the world and particularly those which make use of a jury system, are 
wrong to simply assume that juror characteristics have no significant bearing upon the verdict 
decisions made during trial. In fact, the role of psychological constructs and attitudes appear in 
many instances within the present research, to be directly related and even predictive, of the 
decisions that jurors make. With this in mind a greater appreciation of the potential for predisposed 
bias is undoubtedly required, particularly within rape trials where convictions rates are routinely 
low. With impartiality a core premise underlying the jury model of delivering justice, one possible 
implication of the present findings is the need to assess or more reliably measure, the extent to 
which juror decisions may be considered fair and indeed impartial within genuine rape trials. 
 Whilst current English law rarely permits any peremptory challenges or questioning of 
genuine jurors pre-trial or in fact at any point during their jury service, the present findings 
arguably make a case for the introduction of some degree of juror screening pre-trial. Whilst 
clearly such a process will have cost implications and involve some level of disruption to historic 
English jury procedures, where evidence of a direct relationship is displayed between certain juror 
characteristics and the verdict decisions jurors made during trial, and that deliberation had no 
significant influence upon such a predispositional relationship, the need to assess the extent to 
which such bias is problematic remains paramount. This is a position seemingly only strengthened 
further when considering the underlying premise of the jury model of delivering justice is that use 
of lay persons as ultimate decision makers are perceived to constitute a fairer means of determining 
guilt. In accordance with such random selection procedures, the degree to which genuine jurors 
bring pre-existing bias into a genuine courtroom environment remains untested within the UK and 
therefore such an impartiality assumption remains just that, only assumed. In fact, some legal 
scholars have raised similar concerns in the past. Darbyshire et al. (2003) described random 
selection procedures in England as having a blind faith in impartiality, with Zander (2005) in his 
report to government policy makers on the issue of derestricting legislation which prevents 
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researchers from examining the fairness assumption of jury decision making, concluding any 
access granted would likely lead to such a degree of undesirable conduct being observed, that 
abolition of the juror process would undoubtedly be called for. Whilst abolishment of the jury 
system is not asserted by the present author, the need to further assess the extent to which real 
juror’s decisions may be compounded by preconceived bias and whether screening procedures in 
fact provide a possible means of reducing undesirable bias from entering the jury decision making 
process, is called for.  
 The notion of juror screening asserted on the basis of the present study results do however 
have directly applicable implications for countries such as the US that already adopt some degree 
of juror screening procedures within the voir dire process. As such, rather than trial consultants 
and attorneys making crude assumptions surrounding likely juror bias pertinent to a given case or 
drawing upon constructs previously found to be weak predictors of jurors verdict preferences, 
measures and traits displayed to be of greater practical and predictive relevance within the present 
research may provide a more feasible basis for such predictions. Particularly within the domain of 
scientific jury selection, which although often characterised by non-scientific research, the present 
results would offer an alternative means by which conclusions can be drawn. Likewise, with biases 
resulting from preconceived assumptions shown to impact upon jurors decisions, it stands to 
reason that judges themselves may suffer from similar negative influences. Importantly as jury 
trials account for just one percent of all criminal cases decided in the UK each year, with most 
being heard and decided by three legally untrained magistrates, the need to examine the extent to 
which such decisions may also be confounded by similar effects remains apparent.  
 In terms of policy, the present results make a case for further utilisation of jury guidance 
surrounding preconceived bias and in particular, rape myth acceptance within related trials. Whilst 
previous research conducted by legal scholars Ellison and Munro (2010; 2015) has led to judges 
in the UK now routinely warning jurors in rape trials to avoid drawing upon such attitudes when 
making verdict decisions, the degree to which jurors are both able to put such biases aside and 
willing to do so, remains disputed. It is therefore presently asserted that based upon the current 
findings, and pre-existing literature which displays how widely rape myth acceptance permeates 
throughout society, that English jurors should therefore be screened and determined to be ‘rape 
trial eligible’ before hearing evidence in such cases. Maybe then the problem of rape bias upon 
jury verdict decisions can be more readily recognised and somewhat reduced.  
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 Further, some degree of appreciation must also be given to the extent to which such biasing 
rape attitudes and psychological constructs shown to be important within the present research, are 
in fact implicit. Thereby, where such constructs are found to be held below conscious awareness, 
then the degree to which any policy changes that introduce greater judicial instructions or 
directions be given to jurors during trial in an attempt to prevent the negative outcomes of such 
bias from entering the decision making process, remains questionable. Regardless, it is therefore 
recommended that an overall improved and increased awareness of the impact that juror 
characteristics and traits may have upon the impartiality of decisions, be more formally recognised 
by the English criminal justice system, accounted for in terms of policy where appropriate, and 
more readily monitored or assessed by granting greater researcher access to jurors where policy is 
likely to have little effect.  
 Overall, the main practical applications and policy implications of the present research 
therefore surround the need for criminal justice systems around the world and in particular within 
England, to more readily recognise, and attempt to reduce, predisposed juror bias emerging from 
inherent characteristics. Policy makers should pay greater attention to the present findings as such 
results were obtained within the context of a study purposely designed to be a closer replication of 
a genuine English jury trial than any prior research conducted. The degree of reliability ascribed 
to such findings should therefore be accounted for when reviewing evidence of a relationship 
between juror constructs and verdict outcomes that was obtained both pre- and post-deliberation, 
drawing into question previous judicial assumptions that group deliberation simply neutralises 
preconceived bias or assumptions taken into the jury room. Accordingly, a clear need for greater 
researcher access with genuine or shadow jurors hearing evidence in similar cases is required. 
Permitting such would allow first hand and undisputable evidence of the role that such factors 
have upon genuine verdict outcomes and juror decision making to be ascertained. Regardless of 
such research access being permitted, the present findings alone provide a reliable evidence base 
from which it can be concluded that genuine trial outcomes, particularly within rape trials, are 
being unfairly effected by preconceived juror bias. As such the need to adopt screening procedures 
which make use of well-established and validated psycho-social measures provides an opportunity 
to not only assess the extent of the problem but reduce and possibly remove juror bias whereby it 
is displayed.  
 Finally, as alluded to above, the present findings also make a strong case for the need to 
loosen current legislative restrictions which govern research access to genuine jurors. Within 
England and Wales, the Contempt of Court Act prevents jurors from disclosing any element of 
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their deliberations after the trial has concluded and seemingly more questionably, for the most part 
largely prohibits researchers from asking jurors any questions about their experiences. Notably, 
with current empirical evidence highlighting the apparent relationship between juror attitudes, 
biases, and general psychological make-up, greater research access would thereby permit further 
findings to be obtained without the continued issue of ecological and externally validity 
undermining the findings obtained.  
 
5.9 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 One seemingly obvious area of future research development surrounds the need to 
undertake a mixed method approach when examining the role of juror bias upon verdict outcomes. 
Clearly future research should seek to replicate the present findings using the same psycho-social 
measures in an alternative sample and within the context of differing rape trial scenario before any 
conclusive policy amendments should be made. More than this however, future research would 
benefit from combined quantitative assessments of preconceived bias measured in much the same 
way of the present study, alongside qualitative examination of deliberation discussions. It may 
therefore be possible to retrospectively examine whether jurors who score high in traits such as 
interpersonal manipulation and heightened rape attitudes, display such bias and predispositions 
within their deliberative interactions with other jurors. Where qualitative assessments display 
evidence of such bias within juror discourse, the present findings would be strengthened further, 
in turn offering additional support for the need to conduct juror screening procedures pre-trial.  
Another interesting area for potential future research development surrounds the extent to 
which alternative stories can be presented during trial, and may impact the verdict decisions jurors 
then subsequently make. Based upon the present findings and assertions previously made by other 
researchers (cf. Burrowes, 2013), perhaps attempts to present alterative narratives during trial, 
which rather than feeding into rape myth misconceptions, directly sought to challenge such views 
from the onset, may lead to alternative stories being constructed. Moreover, of particular relevance 
within rape trials due to wide spread societal attitudes held towards rape, alongside several unique 
features of the crime not found in other cases (e.g. lack of physical evidence, DNA offering little 
insight into consent), where lawyers begin to present alternative stories of contested rape 
situations, jurors may draw less heavily upon preconceived ideas. Future research should therefore 
seek to qualitatively examine whether non-typical evidence presentation by prosecution lawyers, 
whereby facts and figures which challenge rape myths are included as part of the evidential story 
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construction, may lead to alternative stories being constructed. For example, where the prosecution 
evidence outlines that in line with most rape victims the complainant reported the allegation within 
two weeks following the offence and whilst this may appear unusual, it is in fact the typical period 
of reporting. Such fact-informed evidential support may thereby result in pre-existing cognitive 
biases no longer becoming activated by the story which is presented during trial. 
 Moreover, it may therefore be possible that instead of the common approach taken during 
rape trial arguments which generally involves the prosecution attempting to display the 
complainant’s lack of carelessness and own blame for the rape, with the defendant constructed as 
having taken no steps under the circumstances to ascertain consent, that prosecution lawyers 
instead begin to assign greater weight to the importance of outlining the role of the defendant’s 
culpability in stories presented. Rather than an emphasis on what the complainant said and did 
during the contested sexual situation, the need to construct a counter-narrative whereby the default 
position is focused upon an assumption that it is the defendant’s responsibility to ascertain that 
consent was sought (rather than a more common approach of displaying a lack of consent was 
given by the alleged victim). Whilst undoubtedly complex, future research should seek to 
investigate the ability of such counter narratives in altering the stories which jurors thereby 
construct and are used to inform the verdict decisions made within rape trials. Where such 
alternative narratives are found to reduce the use of preconceived assumptions jurors draw upon, 
greater possibilities surrounding the involvement of police investigators gathering evidence more 
akin to such a pro-victim narrative being conveyed in court, may help improve upon current rape 
attrition rates and low conviction rates. Likewise, future research may therefore also benefit from 
directly exploring whether educating jurors around the specifics of consent and law of consent 
outside of the often overly legally complex instructions given by a trial judge, in turn has any effect 
upon the reduced reliance of rape supportive statements whilst making verdict decisions during 
rape trials. 
 Finally, where greater access to real juries is granted in the future, research should seek to 
directly test the extent to which removal of jurors found to score high in rape bias and psychopathic 
personality traits unfavourable to an impartial assessment of the evidence, thereby leads to fairer 
verdict outcomes (and perhaps an increased number of guilty verdicts), being attained at trial. 
Additionally, with the benefits of advanced methodologies and statistical procedures displayed 
within the present research, the need for future research which makes greater use of ecologically 
valid experimental procedures alongside more powerful advanced statistical approaches, will 
allow the influence of further bias to be investigated and perhaps age old concepts previously 
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found to be weak predictors, to be elucidated as more reliable predictors of verdict outcomes that 
previously thought. 
 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
 Within the English criminal justice system, trial by jury remains the gold standard means 
of delivering justice. The complex mix of evidence against those accused, alongside testimony 
which challenges the police interpretation of the facts, is thought to be resolved simply through 
exposure to a jury of our peers. Of course in practice, things are unlikely to be so simple, something 
which the present research has alluded to. In fact, discussing jury decisions with any police officer 
typically results in the same opinion being expressed, that the only predictable feature of the jury 
– is their unpredictability. Despite this, in the aftermath of a verdict being returned, the typical 
response from the public and the press alike, is one of unwavering acceptance. Irrespective of the 
media’s portrayal of a defendant or complainant pre-trial, once the jury has decided, rarely will 
this decision be challenged. Public opinion polls consistently display high levels of support for 
trial by jury, with more than 80% of British citizens strongly advocating use of the system. 
Likewise, those working within the judiciary, appear to share such a view. The previous Attorney 
General Dominic Grieve, responsible for all prosecutions brought in England until mid-2014, 
stated the jury system to be an essential feature of British justice, “deeply ingrained in our national 
DNA”. Despite this, over recent year’s critics of the jury system have steadily begun to grow, 
particularly within the academic community and appearing to be the result of an increasing number 
of cases and crime types where questionable verdicts were returned. Cases that police officers 
describe as ‘nailed shut’ routinely fail to obtain guilty verdicts and those generating strong public 
opinion appear most susceptible to bias, with many questions surrounding what other factors may 
influence the decision to vote guilty or not, remaining unanswered.  
 Despite this within England and Wales around 30,000 cases progress to full trial each year, 
resulting in approximately 400,000 jurors being summoned to take part. Interestingly, unlike in 
other countries where those selected are questioned extensively before the trial begins, within 
England the law prevents jurors from being asked almost anything related to the case. The 
reasoning for this being that the random selection of jurors, without the need for qualifying features 
(except for age, sound mental health, and a lack of criminal convictions), is highly regarded within 
the English system and, in fact, considered to be fundamental to the fairness of verdicts. This broad 
inclusion criterion is thought to ensure that varied and representative members of the community 
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are present within different cases. As such, huge value (and trust) is placed in the random 
composition of twelve people from the local community, each of whom bring alternative views 
and opinions on the case. Yet with such a wide spectrum of people acting as jurors, comes a whole 
host of associated biases. Biases which bring the assumption of juror impartiality, into question, 
no more so that within the present research. 
 Until now research emerging primarily out of the United States has shown that although 
some relationship appears to exist between the personal characteristics of jurors themselves and 
the verdicts they return, specific reliable predictors have been more difficult to ascertain. Factors 
such as the variation in juror age across the jury panel, as well as racial and gender composition, 
have all been shown to have some influence upon the final judgements made. In fact, more 
recently, research has shown that - irrespective of the evidence presented at trial - attitudes that 
jurors hold towards specific aspects of a case may themselves be able to predict the decisions that 
individual jurors will make. The totality of the present research which displayed reliable evidence 
of a relationship between particular traits and verdict outcomes within the realms of an advanced 
methodological paradigm and utilizing advanced statistical procedures, thereby contributes 
significantly to the current evidence base pertaining to such a biasing effect. Clearly, evidence of 
a relationship between juror rape attitudes, psychopathic personality traits, and the verdict 
decisions jurors make, raises serious questions surrounding how impartial and fair juror decision 
making truly is.  
 As the offence of rape generates fierce public opinion and debate it is not surprising that 
such effects appear exacerbated during related trials. Despite police figures revealing that false 
allegations represent just a small proportion of all reported rapes, the common public view towards 
those reporting such crimes remains one of disbelief and discontent. Substantial evidence exists 
which displays how widespread inaccurate beliefs surrounding how a ‘real rape victim’ behaves, 
alongside misconceptions of the typical motivations for claiming rape, are in society. These 
attitudes are so profound that judges must now routinely warn jurors against drawing upon these 
false beliefs when making decisions during the trial. However, the extent to which these 
instructions are taken into consideration remains questionable. 
 In an attempt to test whether juror bias affects the fairness of decision making, a new 
approach was devised within the present research. Members of the public and students were invited 
to take on the role of the jury in much the same way as real juries are selected, responding to the 
mock summons invitations and observing case material drawn from genuine rape trials. Every 
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mock juror completed attitudinal and personality assessments, some of which have never before 
been applied to jurors in this context before. Then, with the participation of real lawyers and 
professional actors, the jurors observed a reconstruction of a genuine rape case, in the most realistic 
experiment seemingly ever conducted in this way before, over the course of an entire day. The 
case used was selected as it had equal evidence in favour of both the complainant’s and defendant’s 
version of events. Alongside this, there was also little other objective evidence for jurors to go on, 
something that is commonplace within ‘acquaintance’ rapes, which tend to take place in private 
and between people in some way known to one another. The hypothesised premise was that a 
discernible relationship exists between a jurors’ psychological makeup, attitudes towards rape, and 
the ultimate verdict returned would strongly suggest preconceived biases have much more of a 
direct influence upon the fairness of rape trials, than has previously been portrayed or reported.  
 In conclusion, whilst prior research has primarily sought to examine the role of juror 
characteristics upon verdict outcomes in isolation, displaying weak and inconsistent evidence of 
such an association overall, the present research sought to conduct such an exploration within a 
more methodologically sound and statistically comprehensive paradigm. In fact, whilst obtaining 
evidence of direct associations between psychopathic personality traits, and rape attitudes upon 
juror decisions within the current findings, a more complex analysis of the association between 
such traits and jurors assessments of witness evidence upon ultimate verdicts returned, was clearly 
needed. Likewise, although dominate theory acknowledges the role personal attitudes and 
inferences upon individual decision formation, to date there has been no attempt to model such a 
relationship – nor empirically test the underlying constructs existing within the models 
conceptualisation. Thus, in light of the aforementioned findings discussed, a more complex 
understanding of the direct relationship characteristics such as psychopathic personality traits have 
and the path through which rape attitudes impact upon juror’s interpretation of the evidence, and 
ultimately the stories they construct during trial. Not only do the present findings support previous 
assertions made of the degree to which rape bias appears to unfairly impact upon the verdict 
decision jurors make during trial but they offer a more comprehensive, methodologically valid and 
statistically reliable, basis from which such claims can be made.  
 Should the jury system in England therefore be overhauled and abolished? I argue 
not. Should it be modernised and reviewed based upon the aforementioned empirical evidence 
obtained? Most definitely - which in turn will arguably make for fairer verdict outcomes, whereby 
biased jurors are isolated from the process. Not just for complainants, but for defendants as well.
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